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Health and experiences in early childhood are strongly associated with adult 
outcomes. In this dissertation, I explore the association in detail with a focus on 
identifying the causal mechanisms that generate variation in early health and uncovering 
the parental behaviors that determine whether early health and living conditions evolve 
into long-term deficits or advantages. 
In chapter 1, I explore whether pre-conception maternal desire for children of a 
particular sex has implications for the health of children in Indonesia. I show that a 
simple fertility stopping model predicts that when a child is born of the mother’s 
preferred sex, they will receive more resources, and I test this prediction empirically 
using a longitudinal data set. I find that children born of the mother’s preferred sex are 
heavier, have a higher body mass index, and experience fewer illnesses. I provide 
evidence that reductions in subsequent fertility are the primary mechanism for these 
effects. 
The existing research measuring the long-term implications of early childhood 
conditions frequently fails to identify the mechanisms through which early deficits 
become life-long disadvantages. In chapter 2, I examine one instance where deficits may 
matter for long-term well-being. Using data from Indonesia, I find that when third 
trimester rainfall is fifty percent higher than expected, birth weight and relative size are 
approximately .23 standard deviations higher. Despite this early advantage, I find no 
persistent positive impact fifteen years later. However, parental investment appears to be 
negatively influenced by in utero exposure to rainfall, suggesting that parents compensate 
for early health conditions. 
To date, research on the long-term effects of childhood participation in subsidized 
housing has been limited by the lack of suitable identification strategies and appropriate data. In 
chapter 3, I, along with my co-authors, create a new, national-level longitudinal data set on 
housing assistance and labor market earnings to explore how children’s housing affects their later 
employment and earnings. We find that while naïve estimates suggest there are substantial 
negative consequences to childhood participation in subsidized housing, household fixed-effects 
specifications attenuate these negative relationships for some demographic groups and uncover 
positive and significant effects for others. 
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Childhood Health and the Wantedness
of Male and Female Children
1 Introduction
The allocation of parental time and market resources across children has important eco-
nomic and social consequences. Children who receive more investment in the form of nu-
trition, parental time, or educational inputs perform better across a wide range of outcomes
during childhood and as an adult.1 Though much of the variation in inputs and outcomes
occurs across parental education and wealth categories [Currie, 2009], within household
allocative inequalities are also highly predictive of a range of important differences across
children [Jensen and Miller, 2011, Jayachandran and Pande, 2013]. As a result, explaining
how and why parents allocate limited resources within the household is critical for under-
standing population-level distributions of health and well-being among adults.
When selecting optimal consumption and investment, parents may consider a number
of different observable child characteristics. One dimension that has received substan-
tial attention in the economics literature is how parental behavior varies with the sex2 of
children in the household. This research uncovers important male advantages in mortality,
cognition, social and emotional skills, parental time, and anthropometric outcomes [Jay-
achandran and Kuziemko, 2011, Barcellos et al., 2012, Hu and Schlosser, 2011, Li and Wu,
2011], primarily through comparisons of population moments across females and males.
1For example, see Rosenzweig and Schultz [1982], Rosenzweig and Wolpin [1988], Case et al. [2005],
Cunha and Heckman [2007], Qian [2008], Maluccio et al. [2009], Almond and Currie [2011], Jayachandran
and Kuziemko [2011], Macours et al. [2012], Baker and Milligan [2013], Bharadwaj and Lakdawala [2013],
Gertler et al. [2013]
2I use the terms gender and sex interchangeably throughout the paper.
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These differences, notable in magnitude as well as in breadth, imply uneven treatment of
male and female children in a number of countries. However, even in those societies where
son-preference is widespread, a non-trivial fraction of parents will desire a daughter at
some point in their family formation. As a result, comparing mean outcomes across sex
will average over births where parents truly preferred to have son before conception and
some where parents actually preferred to have a daughter. Although the resulting treat-
ment effects are accurate measures of the population-level average differences, they ignore
potentially interesting and important heterogeneity in the size of the effect. Further, such
estimates do not capture the effect of being born of the parents’ preferred sex on the time
and resources they devote to each child. In fact, without the ability to identify parents’
more- and less-preferred gender before the birth of each child, studies in countries with a
no dominant sex-preference will wrongly conclude that child outcomes and the allocation
of parental time and resources never depend on gender.
Using a panel data set from Indonesia, a country with no immutable son-preference,
this paper investigates how being born of a mother’s pre-conception preferred sex impacts
the resources children receive in early childhood. Repeated observation of the same house-
holds over a fifteen year period enables the linkage of maternal preference for children
of a particular gender to the realized gender of the next child born to that mother and
that child’s anthropometric (BMI-for-age and weight-for-age) and general health outcomes
several years later. By conditioning on the observed, pre-birth gender preference of the
mother, identification comes from comparing children born of the preferred gender of the
mother to children in observably similar households with mothers who have the same pre-
birth gender preference who happen to be born of the less-preferred gender. Under the
assumption that gender-at-birth is not manipulated by parents, this is a natural experiment
with a treatment probability of one-half.3 To my knowledge, this paper is the first to match
pre-conception maternal sex preferences to early childhood health outcomes to estimate the
3The average biological probability of having a boy is estimated to be 51.2%
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impact of children being born of their mother’s preferred sex.
The results indicate that pre-birth maternal preferences over child gender have econom-
ically and statistically significant effects on the resources allocated to children. Being born
of a mother’s preferred gender leads to an increase in body mass index (BMI), weight-for-
age, and mother reported general health, and a decrease in the number of days the child is
sick during the past month, in the incidence of wasting, and in the incidence of thinness.
Thus, maternal preferences have real and important effects on measures of acute nutritional
status later in childhood. I find no effects on measures that reflect longer-term nutritional
deprivation (i.e. stunting). By combining the estimates with previous work [Victoria et al.,
2008] linking weight and body-mass index at two years of age to schooling, income, and
health in adulthood, the results suggest that there will be sizable long-term consequences
to these acute nutritional deficiencies.
To explore what changes in parental behavior drive the main results, I link all mothers
in the sample to their detailed fertility histories. I begin by showing that mothers who
have a child of their preferred gender are significantly less likely to continue having further
children and have significantly fewer subsequent children. Next, making use of a Two
Sample Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS) strategy [Angrist and Krueger, 1992, Inoue
and Solon, 2010], I combine estimates of the effect of the sex distribution of the first two
children on family size with estimates of the effect of family size on BMI and weight-for
age. The results imply that reductions in subsequent fertility can explain roughly half of
the total effect of being born of the mother’s preferred gender on BMI and over one quarter
of the effect for weight-for-age.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background infor-
mation on parental preferences over the sex of children and the discusses the importance
of the anthropometric measures used as outcomes. Section III presents the conceptual
framework and Section IV discusses the data and summary statistics. Section V explores
the correlates of maternal preferences for children of a particular gender. Section VI and
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Section VII present the empirical strategy and the results. Section VIII discusses potential
mechanisms and Section IX concludes.
2 Background
Background on Maternal Gender Preference
To interpret the main results of this paper it is critical to understand what drives maternal
gender preference. For a child to be born of their mother’s more preferred (or less pre-
ferred) sex it must be true that their mother desired children of one sex more than the other
before that child’s birth. Therefore, the effects estimated in this paper could not exist if
mothers were always indifferent about which sex they desire more for their next child. The
literature on the determinants and consequences of parental sex preference dates back to
the 1960s. Ben-Porath and Welch [1976] provides a theoretical basis for why parents might
prefer children of one sex. This work builds on the discussion of household fertility and
resource allocation in Becker [1960], Becker and Lewis [1973], and Becker and Tomes
[1976]. All four papers focus on the fertility implications of parental sex preference in
developed countries, though many of the mechanisms remain relevant for households in
developing contexts. Jayachandran [2014] offers a more recent exposition, targeted specif-
ically towards developing countries. In general, the potential causes of sex preference
discussed in the literature can be assigned to one of three categories: economic, cultural
and institutional, or individual taste-based.
One possible impetus for mothers to prefer that future children be of one sex is differ-
ences in the economic costs or returns to male and female children. For example, if parents
believe that girls and boys require a different set of inputs, or that the optimal bundle of
inputs differs by child gender, then the different market prices for these investment bun-
dles are relevant. Intuitively, if high quality boys are more expensive to produce than high
quality girls, even if parents value quality equally for both genders, they will prefer to have
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children that are girls. Similarly, mothers may prefer to have male children if they expect
to receive a higher return for male child labor or if they expect to receive more financial
support from male children in old age [Rahman and Rao, 2004, Koolwal, 2007, Pande and
Astone, 2007, Robitaille, 2013]. Brawn based economies,4 economies where males have a
comparative advantage over females, could contribute to mothers preferring male children
over female children. Of course, if parents are able to reduce their investment in female
children enough to equate the marginal return to resources across child gender they should
be indifferent to the sex of subsequent children, instead leading to large gender gaps in
health, human capital accumulation, and even mortality [Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982,
Qian, 2008, Pitt et al., 2012]. As this may require either active sex-selective abortion, in-
fanticide, or massively unequal allocations of resources, it may not be feasible in countries
where such practices are frowned upon or where parents are averse to inequality [Behrman
et al., 1982, Pitt et al., 1990].
A second possibility is that cultural norms and institutions impact maternal preference
for future sons and daughters. Numerous authors have suggested that the special role that
sons take on in Hindu funeral rituals has contributed to the extreme son preference in India
[Vlassoff, 1990, Pande and Astone, 2007, Jayachandran, 2014]. However, the gender gap
in religious importance is smaller in Islam. As nearly ninety percent of Indonesians are
Muslim and fewer than two percent are Hindu5, this suggests religion will be less important
in the context of this study.
Often strongly related to religion, cultural norms associated with marriage might also
contribute to maternal sex preference. For example, virilocality (patrilocality) or marital
exogamy, traditions in which daughters move away from home upon marriage or daughters
are married to individuals outside of their home village, have been proposed as potential
mechanisms through which son preference might arise [Dyson and Moore, 1983, Yount,
2005]. However, recent work suggests exogamy may be of little empirical importance in
4Defined as economies with a high average economic return to physical strength.
5CIA [2014]
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India [Rahman and Rao, 2004] and regional-level variation in virilocality is not responsi-
ble for differences in the treatment of sons and daughters in Indonesia [Levine and Kevane,
2003]. Dowries, or the price paid from the family of the bride to the family of the groom
upon marriage, have also been identified as a possible factor influencing the relative de-
mand for sons and daughters [Kishor, 1995, Arnold et al., 1998, Gupta et al., 2003]. As
with virilocality, there appears to be little reason to believe that dowries influence the de-
mand for or treatment of daughters in Indonesia. In fact, in contrast with many other South
and East Asian countries, among some Indonesian ethnic groups there is a net transfer to
the family of the bride at the time of marriage (bridewealth) [Errington, 1990, Boomgaard,
2003]. Similarly, customs that dictate which child bears the responsibility of caring for
parents as they age could impact the relative demand for sons. In much of the developing
world the eldest son is responsible for supporting parents as they age (see Dyson and Moore
1983, Ebenstein and Leung 2010). In the absence of social programs to provide care for the
elderly, parents will desire at least one son to provide care. Again, Indonesia appears to be
an outlier among developing countries with respect to the customs dictating responsibility
for elderly parents: much of the population bequests the home to the youngest daughter in
return for her caring for the parents in old age. This suggests, if anything, that there may
be incentive for parents to prefer daughters over sons.
Societal rules related to property and land rights offer a third cultural/institutional chan-
nel which might lead mothers to desire that future children be of a particular gender. Both
parents may prefer that land and possessions be passed on to their children upon their
death. As such, religious or societal rules that deny or limit inheritance or bequests to fe-
male children could negatively impact the relative demand for daughters [Oldenburg, 1992,
Dharmalingam, 1996, Carranza, 2012]. Prior to 1994 in Indonesia, there existed a conflict
between civil and Islamic law with respect to gender-specific inheritance: civil law allowed
for female children to be heirs and to exclude agnates6 from inheritance while Islamic law
6Other relatives from the same male line.
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allocated twice the female inheritance to all male heirs and prevented female children from
excluding any other heirs [Lukito, 2006]. A 1994 ruling by the Indonesian government
ended this inconsistency. In 1994, Islamic law was re-interpreted by the courts in Indonesia
to also allow daughters to exclude other potential heirs. Further, the majority of households
in Java, home to roughly 60% of Indonesia’s total population, have never subscribed to the
uneven inheritance rules prescribed by Islamic law, and instead, have typically bequeathed
equal shares to male and female children [Errington, 1990, Brown, 2003]. This suggests
that the vast majority of mothers included in this study should not desire future children to
be male as a result of differential inheritance laws.
Finally, individual tastes not reflecting economic or cultural gender differences might
contribute to maternal preference for children of a particular sex. Some mothers may sim-
ply derive more utility from daughters than sons or visa versa. Dahl and Moretti [2008]
provide evidence from the United States consistent with this theory. Fathers are more likely
to marry the mother of their first-born child, less likely to divorce conditional on marrying
the mother of their first-born child, and more likely to have visitation rights conditional on
being divorced if the child is a male. Survey and observed fertility responses support the
hypothesis that son-biased utility is responsible for this gender gap in paternal participa-
tion. Of course, mothers need not have gender-biased utility functions to prefer that future
children be of a particular sex at some point during their fertility. If the number of male
children and the number of female children enter the mother’s utility function as symmetric
but separate arguments then under standard preference convexity assumptions mothers who
have had more boys will desire more future girls and those that have had more girls will de-
sire more future boys, all else constant. This desire for a balanced sex ratio among children
is well established and has been used as an instrument for total fertility by a number of
previous authors, most notably to estimate the effect of family size on parental labor sup-
ply [Angrist and Evans, 1998, Cruces and Galiani, 2007]. Consistent with parental desire
for a balanced sex ratio among children, in all three countries studied (the United States,
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Mexico, and Argentina), this research finds that parents who have at least two children are
more likely to have a third child if the first two children were of the same sex. The few
papers that directly estimate whether past gender realizations, typically parameterized as
the male ratio among existing children, have any effect on stated parental desire for future
male and female children use data from countries where sex-selective abortion, infanti-
cide, and differential resource allocation have led to problems of “missing women” [Yount,
2005, Pande and Astone, 2007, Koolwal, 2007]. If, as seems likely, parental preferences
are correlated with the likelihood of differential mortality then the estimated coefficient on
the male ratio among existing children will be biased. However, in Indonesia, a setting with
no contemporary gender gap in mortality [Kevane and Levine, 2003], I should be able to
test whether maternal demand for sons and daughters is influenced by the male ratio among
existing children.
While past research provides a useful outline as to what factors might influence ma-
ternal gender preference, ultimately, the cultural, institutional, and individual taste-based
factors that impact the demand for male and female children among mothers in Indonesia
is a testable empirical question. Section V uses data from Indonesia to check the relative
importance of a number of different measurable characteristics including the male-ratio
among existing children.
This paper identifies the effect of a child being born of their mother’s pre-conception
preferred sex on early health outcomes. As I discuss in more detail later in the paper,
each mother’s pre-conception preferred sex is identified using the self-reported desired
number of future male and female children. While surveyors are instructed to interview
subjects alone, for women to be eligible to participate in the survey module pertaining to
desired future fertility, they must be currently married or have been married at some point
in the past. Therefore, elicited preferences are potentially influenced by the preferences
of the current or past husband(s). A simple empirical test confirms that there is a strong
correlation between maternal and paternal preferences: in cases where both the mother
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and father have a preference, that preference is the same 92% of the time. While this
strong correlation could be the result of bargaining between spouses, it could also result
from the matching of partners with similar tastes in the marriage market. Given the lack
of available information on pre-marriage preferences, I elect to remain agnostic about the
specific processes that result in the overwhelming agreement between maternal and paternal
preferences over the gender of the next child. That said, all of the main estimates of the
effect of being born of the mother’s preferred sex are robust to also controlling for whether
the child was born of the father’s preferred sex.
Background on Childhood Body Mass Index and Weight
To investigate whether being born of their mother’s preferred sex affects the resources
devoted to young children, I use two different categories of outcomes: anthropometric
measures (BMI-for-age, Weight-for-age) and mother-reported measures of the incidence of
different types of illnesses. Unfortunately, the data I use do not contain measures of parental
or child time use or individual-level measures of consumption. Although the availability
of these measures at the individual level would be ideal, inference based on them would
be fraught with its own set of potential problems resulting from the likely presence of
non-classical measurement error [Ahmed et al., 2005, Browning et al., 2014, Crossley and
Winter, 2015]. I argue that BMI-for-age, weight-for-age, and measures of the incidence
of illness accurately reflect the resources devoted to children and are predictive of other
important long-term outcomes.
Whereas height is typically used as a measure of long-term nutritional deprivation,
weight-for-height (BMI) and weight are generally thought to reflect more acute nutritional
deficiencies [WHO, 2014]. Specifically, BMI and weight-for-age deficiencies (moderate
malnutrition) result from one of three potential sources: inadequate caloric consumption
over a period of days or weeks, the incidence of illness which lessens caloric absorption
by the body, or a combination of the first two possibilities. Despite the fact that they only
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reflect short- to medium-term deficits, weight-for-age and BMI are important measures of
childhood well-being which are strongly associated with long-term outcomes. For example,
there is evidence that a large fraction of childhood illness and illness-induced mortality in
developing countries can be attributed to underlying moderate malnutrition [Pelletier et al.,
1995, Fishman et al., 2004]. As such, it seems logical to interpret any observed differences
in BMI and weight-for-age as manifestations of acute caloric deficits. Given the age of the
children studied here (below the age of seven), their lack of decision making power in the
household, and the likely balance in their unobservable characteristics including genetic
differences resulting from the identification strategy I employ, the deficits represented by
low BMI and weight-for-age can only be the result of differential resource allocation by
parents.
Beyond their use as measures of the resources devoted to children and their association
with childhood morbidity and mortality, BMI and weight-for-age in childhood are strongly
correlated with important standards of adult well-being. Recent research links low weight-
for-age and BMI in early childhood to lower levels of adult height, educational attainment,
and economic productivity [Victoria et al., 2008]. Perhaps surprisingly, there is also a
burgeoning literature linking childhood malnutrition (stunting, wasting, and underweight
status) to chronic disease [Gluckman and Hanson, 2004] and heart disease [Barker et al.,
1989, Eriksson et al., 2001] in adulthood.
3 Conceptual Framework
To help illustrate why the pre-birth maternal preference for children of a particular sex
might have real health consequences, Appendix A presents a simple formulation of the
mother’s choice problem. The intent of the model is to illustrate that even with no sex-
specific prices of investment and no overarching maternal preference for children of a par-
ticular sex (with respect to either quantity or quality) there will be differences in child
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health/quality between children that were born of their mother’s preferred sex and those
that were not. This section outlines the model assumptions and discusses the implications
of the model which are shown in more detail in the appendix.
Modeling Mothers’ Preferences
I assume that mothers receive utility from the number of children they have n, the average
health or quality of their children q̄ = 1n ∑ j q j, and their distance from an ideal sex compo-
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is that mothers will divide resources evenly across all existing
children, q̄ = ī = i. In practice, there are likely to be some locality-level gender differ-
ences in the price of investment and some mother-level differences in the marginal utility
mothers receive from investing in male and female children. However, the model assumes
away these differences to highlight the potential effect of one particular mechanism through
which a child’s being born of their mother’s preferred gender can lead to differences in re-
source allocation and health outcomes: the mother’s fertility response to the gender of her
most recent child. In addition, the model assumptions are consistent with the lack of ev-
idence of systematic differences favoring male or female children found in the previous
literature [Kevane and Levine, 2003] and in the empirical analysis undertaken later in this
paper.
I assume that maternal utility is concave in the net benefit from an additional child.
That is, it is concave in the sum of the direct utility increase from an additional child and
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the indirect loss in average child quality resulting from the decrease in available resource
per child. I also assume that the distance function mapping from the existing and desired
male ratios to utility is increasing and concave.
Mothers, knowing the price of investment, the resources available for investment, the
number of existing male and female children, and under the assumption that any future
child will be male with probability 12 , state which gender they would prefer for their next
child. They then observe the sex of their next child and elect whether to continue their
fertility. The model makes predictions about how the existing number of male and female
children influence stated maternal sex preference and how stated maternal sex preference
and the sex of the next child (the child whose birth is the subject of my analysis) influence
subsequent fertility and the health of the main child.
Stated Maternal Preferences Over Child Gender
Proposition 1: Mothers will prefer that their next child be of the gender that tales them
closer to a balanced sex ratio
In other words, mothers will prefer to have a daughter next if they have more existing sons
than existing daughters and they will prefer to have a son next if they have more existing
daughters than existing sons. This results directly from the assumption that γ , the ideal male
ratio, is equal to one half. Note that this pattern is not consistent with several alternative
theories. For example, if mothers systematically prefer children to be of the sex for which
investment is cheaper, there should be no relationship between the existing male ratio and
the desired sex of the next child as long as the existing male ratio is not manipulated by
parents. Similarly, if inputs differ by sex and at least some inputs are partially public,7 then
it will be cheaper for parents to have children of whichever sex they already have more of.
Thus, both of these alternative theories would suggest that parents prefer less balanced sex
ratios.
7Sex-specific hand-me-down clothing would create one such input.
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Continued Fertility and Resource Allocation
Proposition 2: If a mother decides not to have a child in one period, then she will also
elect not to have a child in subsequent periods.
Proposition 3: Mothers are at least as likely to continue fertility when they are farther
away from a balanced sex ratio.
Proposition 2 follows directly from the fact that the random part of the model, the sex of
the next child, is only relevant if the mother elects to have another child. As an implication
of Proposition 2, there is no need to consider the fertility decisions of mothers who elected
not to have a child in previous periods. Proposition 3 follows from concavity assumptions
on the mother’s utility function. That a mother would prefer to have a male child next
does not necessarily imply that she will treat her next child better if it is a male. However,
Proposition 3 suggests a mechanism which maps from stated maternal preferences and the
realized gender of the next child to differences in the observed health of the next child.
Further, this mechanism is present even without allowing for more preferred children to
receive a larger share of household resources. This is because more preferred children will,
on average, end up in smaller households.
Proposition 4: If the increase in marginal utility from an additional child is low, then
mothers will elect not to continue fertility regardless of whether they have a balanced
sex ratio.
Proposition 5: At lower birth parities, children who are born of their mother’s preferred
sex will be healthier (higher quality) than children who are born of their mother’s
less preferred sex.
Proposition 4 suggests that the mother’s desire for a balanced sex ratio should only be
relevant if the mother would actually consider having another child. If the marginal utility
increase from an additional child, absent any consideration of the existing sex ratio, is
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sufficiently low, then mothers will not have an additional child even if they are far from a
balanced sex ratio. For example, in the IFLS data, mothers report their ideal total fertility.
Birth parities beyond the mother’s ideal number of children are likely to bring smaller
marginal utility increases for the mother. Thus, Proposition 4 suggests that if the effect of
being born of the mother’s preferred sex works primarily through changes in fertility, the
effects should be more pronounced at parities below the mother’s ideal fertility level.
The model makes a clear prediction as to how an increase in fertility should affect the
resources devoted to children: an increase in the number of children reduces the total re-
sources available per child. This is essentially the quantity-quality tradeoff suggested in
Becker and Lewis [1973, 1974], Becker and Tomes [1976].8 In practice, as long as house-
hold members require non-zero resources in order to survive, an increase in the number
of children alive in a household results in a reduction in the resources allocated to at least
one family member.9 In the context of Indonesian households having another child, this
implies that either mothers must reduce their consumption or leisure [Angrist and Evans,
1998, Caceres-Delpiano, 2006] or they must reduce the resources or leisure allocated to
one or more older children. If, as discussed in the Appendix, health is most sensitive to
inputs at younger ages, then an equal reduction in resources for all children and parents
would disproportionally affect the younger children in the household. Therefore, it seems
reasonable that if all children experience a reduction in resources as a result of continued
fertility, and children who are born of their mother’s preferred sex at low birth parities are
exposed to less later fertility, then these more preferred children will receive more resources
8This does not imply that household members will always be made worse off by an increase in household
size. If at least one household member receives sufficient utility from the consumption or utility of other
household members, it may be possible for all existing members to be made better off.
9If children have some expected productive value, then this need not be true. Given the age range studied
(on average three and a half years of age), it is unlikely that these children have much current or past pro-
ductive value. That said, parents may expect their children to have a productive value at some point in the
future. If parents in Indonesia are able to borrow against the expected future productivity of young children,
they may not need to reduce the resources allocated to any household member in the present. However, it
seems unlikely that parents would be able to borrow enough to completely offset the increase in resources
necessary to sustain the life of a new child, especially given the lengthy expected time period before the new
child becomes a potentially productive asset.
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and be healthier than those children that were born of the mother’s less preferred sex, all
else equal. This is exactly what Proposition 5 predicts.
Of course, even the empirical confirmation of these propositions does not rule out the
possibility that there might be other reasons for children to be better off when they are
born of the sex that their mother desired more. It might still be the case that in addition to
changing their fertility behavior, mothers reduce their leisure or consumption or the leisure
or consumption of older children in order to shift resources to the main child. In this paper,
I am able to identify whether the continued fertility mechanism suggested by the model
is present and then to quantify how much of the variation in outcomes can potentially be
explained by this fertility mechanism.
.
4 Data
The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)
To estimate the effect of being born of the mother’s preferred gender on child outcomes, I
use RAND’s Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is a longitudinal household
survey containing information on over 66,000 individuals. The first wave of the survey
(IFLS1) was fielded in 1993 and subsequent waves were conducted in 1997 (IFLS2), 1998
(IFLS2+), 2000 (IFLS3) and 2007 (IFLS4). The IFLS is a representative sample drawn
from thirteen provinces which contain 83% of the total population of Indonesia. Surveyors
initially contacted 33,081 people across over 7,000 households. Subsequent waves were
conducted in . In later waves, attempts were made to contact all of the initial households as
well as any new household members. In all cases, surveyors attempted to interview respon-
dents alone. The IFLS contains detailed information about household consumption and the
educational attainment, work history, marital history, and fertility history of all adult house-
hold members. In addition, detailed health measurements are available for most household
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members. All of the health measurements, including height, weight, and hemoglobin level
were obtained by trained nurses. Each wave also contains surveyor and mother reported
general health, an illness history, and inpatient and outpatient medical center utilization for
each child.
Crucially for this analysis, each wave of the IFLS asks married adult subjects about all
existing and desired children. Data on existing children are collected through a fertility
history reported by the wife. By aggregating over all four survey waves, I am able to
build a complete fertility history for each mother including the sex, date of birth, and place
of birth for each child. Husbands and wives are queried separately about their desired
future fertility. Specifically, subjects are asked the following questions pertaining to desired
fertility: “How many (more) children do you wish to have?” and “Among the children that
you (still) wish to have, how many sons and daughters do you wish to have?” I classify
mothers as having a son-preference if they desire more future sons than future daughters
and a daughter preference if the reverse is true. Mothers who desire no future children or
equal numbers of each gender are classified as having no gender preference.
The panel structure of the IFLS data enables me to link elicited maternal preferences to
information about the next birth for that mother. As a result, I observe whether the realized
gender of the next child born following the measurement of maternal preferences matches
the stated preference of the mother. I construct an indicator variable equal to one if the
mother reported preferring future female children and her next child was born female or
if the mother reported preferring to have future male children and her next child was born
male. This indicator is equal to zero in all cases where the mother’s expressed preference
does not match the realized gender. This measure of whether children were born of the sex
that their mother preferred before their conception is the explanatory variable of interest. It
is important to note that this measure is distinct from the effect of being born to a mother
with a particular gender preference.
All anthropometric outcomes are standardized using the 2006 World Health Organiza-
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tion (WHO) Child Growth Standards [WHO, 2006] for children under five years of age and
the corresponding standards for children aged five to eighteen years [de Onis et al., 2007].
The WHO constructed the 2006 measurement and growth standards (CGS) by following
8,440 healthy, breastfed children of non-smoking mothers from Brazil, Ghana, India, Nor-
way, Oman, and the United States. The CGS are intended to represent the growth patterns
of children in ideal circumstances. The 2007 measurement growth standards (CGS2007)
are constructed by smoothing data from the 2006 WHO growth standards for children under
five and a National Center for Health Statistics/WHO growth reference for individuals un-
der age twenty-four. Combining the two sets of growth standards yields monthly standards
for boys and girls from birth to eighteen years of age.10
For each gender and age-in-month cell, the standards provide a median measurement,
a coefficient of variation, and a measure of Box-Cox power for height, weight, and BMI. I
construct Z-scores following the suggested WHO methodology by merging measurements
from children in the IFLS by month of birth and gender to the CGS.11 As a result of the
standardization, effects should be interpreted as standard deviations of the reference distri-
bution.
As with previous research employing anthropometric measures as outcomes, one poten-
tial caveat is that the setting-specific distribution of anthropometric measures might differ
by gender.12 For example, Indonesian women may be taller and heavier when compared
to international standards for women than Indonesian men are when compared to inter-
national standards for men. To account for this possibility, I include a male indicator in
all specifications with controls. In practice, the results are identical to those in the main
specification with no controls even when including a male indicator fully interacted with
10There are no children in the sample over the age of eight.
11To limit the influence of outliers, Z-scores are top (bottom) coded to 5 (-5). The results are not statisti-
cally different when I do not top and bottom code that data. Similarly, dropping observations that would have
been top or bottom coded has no effect on the results.
12In my sample, the standardized outcomes do not have significantly different distributions for male and
female children. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in
the distribution of BMI-for-age and weight-for-age by sex. Results available upon request.
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a quadratic polynomial in age-in-months. Further, results are also identical in sign and
significance when using similarly constructed deviation measures that employ only within-
sample variation from each gender by age-in-month cell.13
Additional outcome variables include mother reported measures of the general health
of each child, and two mother-reported measures of illness for each child: how many days
of their primary activity the child missed and how many days the child was bedridden
during the four weeks preceding the survey. Finally, I construct indicator variables that
measure whether the child is wasted, thin, or stunted. All three measures are also defined
according to the WHO growth standards: a Z-score below -2 for height-for-weight (BMI),
weight-for-age, and height-for-age, respectively.
In some specifications, an additional set of control variables is included. These vari-
ables include an indicator for whether the child is male, indicators for whether the mother
preferred to have a boy or a girl, age-in-months, year of birth indicators, month of birth
indicators, province indicators, a linear trend which is allowed to differ by province, an
indicator for whether the household lives in an urban setting, the mother’s age, survey
wave indicators, total household size including adults, and a full set of fixed effects for the
number of older brothers and the number of older sisters in the household.
I use the fertility history for each mother to identify whether the sex of the first two
children born to mothers is the same (i.e. both were girls or both were boys). In addition,
I observe whether they had children after the child included in the main sample. I create
an indicator variable for whether the mother had at least one additional child and another
variable with the total number of additional children birthed by the mother. For those moth-
ers who continue their fertility, I also generate a variable containing the time, in months,
between the birth of the main child and the birth of the subsequent child.
For ease of exposition, in the remainder of the paper children who are the more pre-
ferred gender of their mother are referred to as MP; Children who are the less preferred
13The point estimates are different in magnitude as they represent deviations from a different distribution.
That said, the estimates are identical in sign and statistical significance.
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gender of their mother are referred to as LP.
Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 displays summary statistics for the main analysis sample. To be included
in the main sample, children must be the first born to their mother after she responds to the
future fertility preference questions discussed above.
Just over 22% of children were born to mothers who would prefer to have a female
child and another 22% were born to mothers who would prefer to have a male child. The
remaining 56% of children were born to mothers with no stated preference for children
of either gender. Combining existing and desired future children, mothers desire roughly
1.039 male children for each female child in total. In 2004 in India, the corresponding
ratio was 1.39 male children for each female child. Thus, there is significantly less son-
preference in Indonesia than in India. On average, mothers desire 1.2 more children than
they already have. The mean number of older brothers and older sisters for the children in
the main sample sample is .93 and .88, respectively. 50.7% of the children in the sample
are male, which is not statistically significantly different from the estimated biological
likelihood of having a male child: 51.2%.
Mothers have completed 8.2 years of schooling on average. During the week before the
survey, just under 60% of mothers were primarily involved in housekeeping while another
39.1% spent most of their time working. Over 90% of mothers are Muslim, another 5% are
Christian and nearly all of the remaining 5% are Hindi.
On average, children were too sick to participate in normal activities 1.67 days and
bedridden .42 days out of the past twenty-eight. As expected, children are considerably
more likely to be wasted (BMI), lighter (weight-for-age), and shorter (height-for-age) than
children in the reference sample. Defined as having a Z-score below negative two, 11%
of children in the sample are classified as wasted (BMI), 26 percent are classified as thin
(weight-for-age), and nearly 39 percent are classified as stunted (height-for-age).
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Panel B of Table 1 displays summary statistics for the limited variables available for
children appearing in a mother’s fertility history. To be included in the sample, the require-
ments are minimal: children must have a non-missing year and month of birth, sex, and a
mother who completed a fertility history at some point. The purpose of this sample is to
test for sex-biased behavior on the part of mothers and to help estimate the effect of family
size on health outcomes later in the paper.
Table 2 compares a subset of the observable characteristics across three different clas-
sifications of maternal gender preference: mothers with no gender preference (NGP moth-
ers), mothers who prefer sons (SP mothers) and mothers who prefer daughters (DP moth-
ers). Column 1 contains the means for the children of NGP mothers, Column 2 for SP
mothers, and Column 3 for DP mothers. Columns 4 and 5 show the differences and p-
values from tests of whether there is no difference between columns 1 and 2. Columns 6
and 7 show the same differences and p-values for the comparison between NGP children
and DP children, and Columns 8 and 9 do the same for the comparison between SP children
and DP children.
There are a number interesting differences across the three groups. First, maternal gen-
der preferences are highly negatively correlated with the gender ratio of previous children.
SP children have, on average, only .26 older brothers. The corresponding averages for
NGP children and DP children are 1.043 and 1.343. The means for NGP and DP children
correspond to 4.01 and 5.16 times the mean for SP children. Similarly, DP children have
significantly fewer older sisters than SP children and NGP children. Converting the older
sibling counts into the ratio of male to female ratios, the average for NGP children is 1.063,
the average for SP children is .208, and the average for DP children is 5.415. These differ-
ences in means do not represent causal effects, but the strength of the negative correlation
between the son ratio of existing children and the demand for further sons is quite striking.
Comparing the likelihood that children of each maternal sex-preference type are male
reveals one important difference: SP children are significantly less likely to be male than
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children from the other two groups. Although biological birth patterns dictate that the frac-
tion of children that are male be .512 for each of the three preference types, this difference
is not terribly troubling for my identification strategy. Specifically, these differences are not
consistent with the primary concern that parents are manipulating the realized sex of their
subsequent child. If subsequent child gender were endogenous to maternal preferences, we
would expect the relationship to be the reverse. That is, SP children should have a higher
likelihood of being male. Despite this, later in the paper I check whether the differences
might be due to differential mortality.
NGP children have mothers who are younger and less educated than both SP and DP
children. There are no significant differences with respect to maternal years of education
completed or age between the SP and DP groups. The mothers of SP children are less likely
to be Muslim and more likely to be Hindu. This is consistent with evidence from Northern
India presented by Bhat and Zavier [2003].
Despite the observed differences in maternal education, age, and household composi-
tion, there is only one significant health difference across the three categories. DP children
are, on average, reported as being less healthy than the children of SP and NGP moth-
ers. The fact that there are differences in observable characteristics across NGP, SP, and
DP mothers does not pose problems for my identification strategy. Instead, it illustrates
why testing for the direct effect of different maternal sex-preference categories on child
health outcomes would be problematic: there is important selection into each of the three
categories.
Finally, Table 3 presents the raw, difference-in-means analog to the main regression
results presented later in the paper. Limiting the sample to GP children, Column 1 displays
means for LP children and Column 2 displays the corresponding mean for MP children.
I compare 52 different observable household and characteristics but to ensure the results
are legible Table 3 displays only 17. The remaining 35 means, differences, and P-values
are available on request. Of the 52 non-outcome variables tested, in only one case are
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the means significantly different from each other. LP children are slightly more likely to
be born in March (not shown). This difference is significant at the 10% level. The other
51 comparisons across the two groups are not statistically significant. This is strong evi-
dence that parents are not manipulating the sex of children through either active (abortion
or infanticide) or passive disparate treatment. Further, it suggests that MP and LP children
are well balanced on observable baseline characteristics. Thus, after matching maternal
preferences to subsequent child gender, Table 3 suggests I can proceed as though treat-
ment (whether a child is born of their mother’s preferred sex) is randomly assigned with a
treatment probability of one-half.
In a preview of the main estimation results, the bottom panel of Table 3 shows there
are a number of statistically significant raw differences in outcomes across MP and LP
children. MP children missed fewer days of activity due to illness over the previous four
weeks, they have higher BMI Z-scores, higher weight-for-age Z-scores, and are less likely
to be wasted. Most of the remaining differences in outcomes are marginally insignificant
but signed as to suggest that MP children are healthier than their LP counterparts.
5 The Determinants of Maternal Gender Preference
To build on the discussion in Section IIA, this section undertakes an empirical analysis of
the determinants of stated maternal sex preference for the mothers in my sample. In particu-
lar, I focus on testing the relative importance of the sex distribution among existing children
as compared to other individual, economic, cultural, and institutional factors. In addition
to providing an interesting insight into the nature of sex preference, an understanding of
why mothers desire that future children be male or female is critical for any policy impli-
cations. As noted above, previous empirical papers have been unable to estimate the causal
impact of the existing sex ratio on stated sex preference. As a result, the prescribed policies
focus on altering the individual, institutional, and cultural characteristics that influence sex
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preference. For example, if the relative wages of women are important determinants of the
demand for daughters, then policies that improve this relative wage should also increase
the demand for daughters. Alternatively, if gender-biased property or inheritance laws that
prevent daughters from owning historically familial lands or goods explain son preference,
then legislation that alters these laws could potentially reduce stated son preference. On
the other hand, if the sex ratio of existing children is the primary driver of the desire for
future children to be of a particular sex, it is less clear what policies could be implemented
to reduce any resulting disparities in resource allocation. If mothers are unaware of the real
consequences of the differential allocations, providing sound estimates of these parameters
could potentially lead them to reduce the disparity in treatment. Alternatively, policies or
transfers that directly provide health and human capital inputs to children during critical
periods of their development could reduce the negative consequences resulting from any
within-household allocative disparities that arise as a result of the maternal preference over
the sex of future children.
To interpret the coefficient estimates on the existing sex ratio as causal, it must be the
case that the existing sex ratio is uncorrelated with any unobserved heterogeneity. Although
ultimately untestable, at a minimum this requires that there is no sex-selective abortion,
infanticide, or mortality resulting from either conscious or passive unequal resource alloca-
tion. Any version of sex-biased early mortality would skew the observed existing sex ratio.
Further, the skewed sex ratios would occur in households with the strongest sex preference,
and therefore would bias estimates. To begin, I calculate the fraction of children who are
male at each birth order between one and seven.14 Figure 1 plots this fraction by the birth
order of the child as well as a 95% confidence interval for each parity. In addition, Figure
1 displays a horizontal line at the biologically expected fraction, .512. This corresponds to
a ratio of 105 male children for every 100 female children. At no parity between one and
seven does the fraction of children who are male differ from the biologically expected frac-
14Birth orders above seven represent the top one percent of the distribution. Including these observations
does not affect the results. I elect to omit them for ease of exposition.
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tion. This suggests there is little or no sex selective mortality in the sample and, therefore,
that the sex ratio among previous children can be included as an exogenous explanatory
variable.
Panel A of Table 4 turns to exploring the correlates of stated maternal sex preference.
I construct a measure of future son preference by taking the ratio of the number of desired
future sons to the total number of desired children. This ratio is bounded between zero and
one with values above one-half indicating the mother would prefer to have more future boys
and values below one-half indicating the mother prefers to have more future girls. I also
construct the analogous measure for existing children by dividing the number of existing
male children by the total number of existing children.
Next, within each of the thirteen provinces included in the data, I generate a measure
of the average value of the bride wealth provided to the bride’s family at the most recent
marriage. I also calculate the province level fraction of women who moved away from their
village of residence immediately following their last wedding. Together, I interpret these
variables as a summary measure of the expected value of daughters in a given geographic
area.
To provide insight as to what influences whether a mother prefers a male or a female
child next, I regress the measure of maternal son preference on the fraction of existing
children that are male, the province-level measures of average bride wealth, and the like-
lihood of moving post-wedding. In addition, I include a full set of number-of-children
dummies, a linear time trend, month of birth indicators, dummies for whether the mother is
Muslim, Hindu, or Christian, a set of indicators for the mother’s highest education level, a
dummy for whether the mother worked last week for pay, a quadratic in the mother’s age,
a continuous measure of total household size, a continuous measure of the household’s ex-
penditure and production of food per capita (in thousands of Rupiah), the total earnings of
the mother during the past year (in hundreds of thousands of Rupiah), and two measures
of maternal health: body mass index and height in meters. Standard errors are clustered
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at the kabupaten (district) level. I emphasize that interpreting the regression coefficients
other than the coefficient on the existing male fraction as causal parameters would require
making strong assumptions about unobserved heterogeneity and the direction of the rela-
tionship between each control and the dependent variable. That is not the intent of this
exposition. Instead, the aim is to highlight the strength of the partial correlation between
maternal gender preference and different cultural, religious, and household level factors.
Column 1 displays the estimated coefficient on the fraction of existing children that
are male, and the R-squared from the regression after controlling for all the characteristics
discussed above. The observed characteristics are highly predictive of maternal gender
preference with an R-squared of over .6.
Nearly all of the estimated coefficients have intuitive signs. For example, a higher aver-
age bride wealth and a lower likelihood of the bride moving to a new village immediately
following the wedding are associated with a decrease in stated son preference. Similarly,
mothers may desire more daughters if they expect to remain in closer geographic proximity
to their daughters after marriage. The negative time trend suggests that son-preference has
decreased over the study period.
Muslim and Christian women display lower son preference than Hindu women. This
is consistent with data from other Southeast Asian countries and potentially attributable to
the belief among Hindus that ascension to heaven requires a son to light a funeral pyre.
Higher maternal education and household food expenditures per capita are associated, al-
beit weakly, with stronger son preference. Conversely, there is a significant negative corre-
lation between the labor earnings of the mother during the past year and her son preference
suggesting that the economic opportunities available to women may play a role in determin-
ing the demand for female children. A one hundred USD (1.14 million Rupiah) increase in
the mother’s salary last year is associated with a statistically significant decrease of 1.2%
of the mean desired son ratio for the sample.
Both height in meters and BMI are positively associated with son preference in the
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sample. This suggests that mothers may not infer that their own health is indicative of
their genetic advantage at producing high quality female children. Instead, these health
indicators may be picking up residual effects of household wealth not captured by the
similarly signed coefficients on maternal education and weekly household food expenditure
per capita.
Column 2 displays the estimated coefficient on the fraction of existing children that
are male, the chi-squared statistic and p-value from a test of whether the coefficient on the
existing son ratio is equal with and without controls, and the R-squared from the regression
of the desired son ratio on the existing son ratio with no controls. Though several of the
variables included in Column 1 have a statistically significant relationship with the desired
son ratio, nearly all of the variation is explained by the fraction of existing children that
are male. The R-squared without controls is .589, just .022 below the R-squared with the
full set of controls. Consistent with mothers having no strong son or daughter preference,
mothers who have a higher number of existing sons, holding constant the existing num-
ber of daughters, desire fewer future sons. The point estimate suggests that changing the
sex of one existing child from female to male reduces the desired number of future male
children by nearly 3/4 of a child. This relationship is significant at the 1% level. Further,
the coefficient on the existing son ratio is not affected by the inclusion of the extensive set
of controls. A test of equality of the effect of the existing son ratio across the two specifi-
cations fails to reject the null hypothesis of no difference (p-value of .855). The coefficient
stability when including controls provides additional evidence that the estimated coefficient
on the existing son ratio is capturing a causal parameter.
To further illustrate the explanatory power of the existing son ratio, Panel B of Table 4
uses a linear probability model (LPM) to predict maternal son preference in the main sam-
ple, with and without controls. Predicted values from each LPM are generated and mothers
are classified on the basis of these predictions. Mothers with a predicted probability above
one half are classified as being likely to prefer a boy while those with a predicted proba-
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bility below one half are classified as unlikely to prefer a boy. These predictions are then
compared to the observed maternal son preference to gauge the accuracy of the LPM. The
LPM controlling only for the existing son ratio correctly predicts son preference 83.4% of
the time. Adding the full set of controls barely improves upon this figure, correctly predict-
ing son preference 84.5% of the time. A t-test of whether the two specifications are equally
accurate fails to reject the null hypothesis of no difference (p-value of .289).
Panels A and B of Table 4 and emphasize that the gender distribution among existing
children is the most important determinant of maternal gender preference for mothers in
the sample. Also, despite there being no immutable gender preference in the sample, at any
given point in time a large fraction of mothers do prefer to have their next child be born
of a particular gender. This preference is largely dictated by the gender distribution among
existing children.
6 Empirical Strategy
Given the evidence presented above that a child’s sex at birth is unrelated to family char-
acteristics and pre-birth maternal sex preferences, the main analysis of the paper assumes
treatment is as good as randomly assigned. A proof mapping from the average treatment
effect estimator and identification assumptions to the empirical implementation described
here is available upon request. I estimate the following model for child i born to mother m:
yim = α +βPre fim +ηXim + εim (1)
The outcome of interest yim, depends on a constant an indicator for whether the child
i was born of their mother’s preferred gender (Pre fim), and a vector of controls (Xim). In
my preferred specification, Xim is empty and (1) is simply the Ordinary Least Squares re-
gression of the outcome on the treatment indicator and a constant. In specifications with
controls, Xim includes an indicator for whether mother m preferred to have a female child
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immediately prior to the birth of child i, a male dummy, the child’s age in months, the
mother’s age, a full set of dummies for the number of older brothers child i has, a full set
of dummies for the number of older sisters child i has, household size including adults,
year of birth dummies, month of birth dummies, province dummies, a linear trend which
is allowed to differ by province, an indicator for whether the household lives in an urban
area, and a set of indicators for the wave of the survey the observation comes from. The
identifying assumption is that whether the child is born of their mother’s preferred gen-
der is independent of εim. As discussed in the introduction, if the sex at birth of child i is
random then this assumption will be satisfied. Further, because the basic specification in-
cludes no controls despite the extensive set of child, mother, and household characteristics
available in the data, I am able to test whether the estimated treatment effects are affected
by the inclusion of the full controls. It is extremely unlikely that there could be unobserved
heterogeneity that is correlated with both the treatment indicator and the outcome but not
with the control variables. I first estimate the preferred specification with no controls. I
next estimate (1) including the full set of controls in Xim and test whether the estimated β ′s
are equal. If the identifying assumption is correct, including a detailed vector of further
controls should not affect β , though the precision of the estimates is likely to change. To
maintain a consistent sample across the specifications with and without controls, I limit the
sample when estimating (1) to children with non-missing controls. In practice, few children
are missing controls so this restriction has no impact on the coefficient estimates or their
precision.
Because the data are pooled across all three waves of the IFLS, some mothers contribute
multiple observations. Therefore, standard errors are clustered at the mother level. Ideally,
the data would contain multiple observations from all mothers and mother fixed effects
models could be estimated. I have experimented with running mother fixed effects models
but there is not sufficient within-mother variation to generate precise estimates. However,
the point estimates from the within-mother specifications are similar in magnitude and sign
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to the less restrictive OLS estimates that use both between- and within-mother variation.
In practice, equation (1) could be estimated in three different ways. The sample could
be limited to the children of mothers who preferred one gender and the preference in-
dicator or the constant could be omitted. Alternatively, (1) could be estimated using all
children matched to maternal preferences, with both preference indicators, a constant, a
male dummy and with Pre fim defined such that NGP children of NGP are treated as MP
children. Finally, (1) could be estimated using all children, including a constant, both pref-
erence indicators, a male indicator and defining Pre fim such that NGP children are treated
as LP children. In practice, all three methods produce mechanically identical estimates of
β . This is because after including the set of maternal preference indicators, there is no
variation in the Pre fim variable within the group of NGP children. Thus, the variation for
this group is completely absorbed by the preference indicators and these children do not
directly contribute to the identification of β . However, if the effect of any of the control
variables that are included is different for NGP children than for SP and DP children, es-
timates of β could be slightly different for these two samples. As the main specification
does not include additional controls this becomes less of a concern. Ultimately, I elect to
exclude the NGP children to make the interpretation of the estimates as simple as possible.
I test for effects with a number of outcome variables intended to capture short, medium,
and long term differences in resource allocation. Specifically, I check whether children
who are born of their mother’s pre-conception preferred sex have higher BMIs, are heavier,
taller, and less sickly using the variables described in Section IV.
7 Results
Main Results
Table 5 displays the results from estimating (1) with and without controls. As explained
above, each column displays the constant and the coefficient on Pre fim from an OLS re-
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gression. The top panel specifications have no additional control variables while the bottom
panel shows results from specifications that include the full set of controls. The outcome
variable is listed at the top of each column. Finally, the p-value from a test of whether
the coefficient on Pre fimis equal with and without controls is presented at the base of each
column.
MP children have higher BMI Z-scores than their LP counterparts. On average, MP
children have BMIs that are .236 standard deviations higher, a difference that is significant
at the 1% level. Adding the full set of controls has no effect on the estimated treatment
effect (p-value .913). A .236 standard deviation increase is roughly equivalent to the mean
difference in BMI-for-age Z-score when comparing the children of mothers with no formal
education to the children of mothers with at least some middle school education (.243 stan-
dard deviations). Not surprisingly given the close relationship between BMI and weight,
column 2 indicates that weight-for-age is also significantly higher among MP children. Be-
ing an MP child leads to a .164 standard deviation increase in weight-for-age. Further,
column 6 shows that this variation is largely driven by increases in BMI among children at
the bottom of the BMI distribution: MP children are 3.2 percentage points less likely to be
wasted (Z-score below -2). Only 10.3% of the estimation sample is wasted implying that
being MP implies a 31% reduction in the likelihood of being wasted at the sample mean.
Together, the weight-for-age, BMI, and wasting results suggest that MP children are signif-
icantly bigger on average and that this difference is driven by reductions in the likelihood
of moderate malnutrition.15
Consistent with the anthropometric evidence, mothers report MP children are healthier
along a number of different metrics. On average, the mother reported general health of
the child is nearly a tenth of a standard deviation lower (healthier) for MP children than LP
children. Similarly, mothers reported that MP children missed nearly half a day less of their
primary activity and were bedridden for 0.16 fewer days over the four weeks preceding the
15Moderate malnutrition implies a child is either stunted, wasted, or both.
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survey. These differences are significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. Finally,
MP children were significantly less likely to have experienced a cough or a fever over the
same period.
The regression results support the conjecture that MP children receive more household
resources in early childhood than LP children. Importantly, they are less likely to be mod-
erately malnourished,16 a condition which, in addition to having direct consequences for
the productivity and skill accumulation of children, is responsible for approximately 50%
of the childhood mortality in developing countries [Pelletier et al., 1995, Caulfield et al.,
2004]. MP children are significantly bigger and otherwise healthier than LP children.
The inclusion of controls does not significantly change the estimate of the treatment
effect for any of the eight outcome variables. Together with the lack of observable differ-
ences, this supports the idea that whether a child is born of their mother’s pre-conception
preferred sex is exogenous to potential child health outcomes.
Robustness and Heterogeneity
The main results point to an important relationship between pre-conception maternal sex
preference and health in early childhood. Below I investigate how robust the main results
are to a number of additional restrictions. In addition, I test for heterogeneity along observ-
able dimensions with the intention of ruling out alternative explanations and identifying
potential mechanisms.
Selective Mortality
Section V shows that there is no sex-biased mortality in the sample. However, because
the sample is split evenly between mothers who preferred to have a son and mothers who
preferred to have a daughter, differential mortality between MP and LP children is still
16I elect not to show the height-for-age results because of space constraints. In neither panel does the es-
timated coefficient on Pre fim suggest any relationship between height-for-age and being born of the mother’s
pre-birth preferred sex.
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potentially problematic. Both prenatal and post-birth differences in treatment could in the-
ory generate an MP/LP mortality gap as prenatal sex-diagnostic technology was certainly
available for at least some households in the sample.
To understand why differential mortality would be problematic, consider the case where
prenatal mortality is artificially higher for LP children than MP children. If this differential
mortality occurs primarily in households with high potential child outcomes, as might be
the case if only “better” households had access to sex-diagnostic technology, there would
be more MP than LP children who survive to birth. Further, this difference would be
driven by children who had high potential outcomes. This would cause the main results to
wrongly attribute this positive selection for the MP group to the treatment effect leading to
a positively biased estimate. The same logic applies in the event of differential post-birth
mortality.
Therefore, to assess whether selective mortality is a problem, I test for both prenatal
and post-birth differences in mortality across MP and LP children. I use maternal reports
of miscarriages, abortions, non-live births, and live births that did not survive to the date of
the survey. From these reports, I generate two indicator variables: 1) whether the mother
had a conception that did not survive to term for any reason and 2) whether the mother
conceived a child that did not survive to the date of the survey. These measures, which
both cover the time period between when the mother stated her sex preferences and the
next survey wave, are intended to capture prenatal selection and any type of differential
selection, respectively. If differential mortality is important, I would expect to estimate a
positive, significant relationship between the likelihood of having a child of the mother’s
preferred sex and at least one of the two early mortality measures.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 present these results. All columns present OLS estimates
from a bivariate regression of an outcome on the treatment variable and a constant, the
same specification used in the “Without Controls” panel of Table 5. In both columns 1
and 2, the estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero and extremely small
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in magnitude. This suggests differential mortality is not confounding the main results.
Further evidence of this point was presented in Table 2. As discussed above, any differential
mortality should lead to there being more MP children than LP children. In fact, there are
fewer MP children in the sample. Thus, the available evidence suggests that differential
mortality does not pose a problem for the main estimates.
Early Conditions
With access to sex-diagnostic technology, mothers could begin differential treatment of
children while still pregnant [Bharadwaj and Lakdawala, 2013]. Even if the disparity is not
severe enough to cause a mortality gap, it could create a gap in development that would
eventually lead to starkly different health outcomes by Pre fim group. However, as long as
there is no mortality gap, differential prenatal treatment would not bias estimates. Instead,
it provides one plausible mechanism through which pre-conception maternal sex preference
could impact health in early childhood.
Fortunately, the IFLS contains information on both the birth weight and gestational
length of most children. There is a well-established relationship between birth weight,
gestational length, and later-in-life outcomes including health [Barker and Clark, 1997,
Black et al., 2007, Almond et al., 2009, Almond and Currie, 2011]. Given the similarly
well-known link between maternal nutrition and birth outcomes [Wu et al., 2004, Abu-Saad
and Fraser, 2010, Milazzo, 2014], there is good reason to believe differences in maternal
nutrition would lead to differences in early childhood health. To test whether prenatal
differences in treatment might help explain the results, I estimate (1) using birth weight
and gestational length as outcomes.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 present the results. If differential treatment occurs in the
womb, I would expect to see positive, significant estimates of the effect of being born of
the mother’s preferred sex. If, however, mothers do not observe the sex of children before
they are born or maternal nutrition is independent of fetal sex, there should be no signifi-
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cant relationship. Table 6 strongly supports the idea that there are no prenatal differences
in treatment. In neither column is the estimated effect significantly different from zero.
Further, the effect of being born of the mother’s preferred sex on birth weight is actually
negatively signed, the opposite of what would be expected. In sum, it does not appear
that the main effects are the result of differential investment and resource allocation before
birth.
Misclassification of Mothers
Another potential concern is related to the method used to categorize mothers by their gen-
der preferences. Specifically, it is possible that some mothers may be incorrectly assigned.
Mothers who desire at least one more child of each gender, but more boys than girls, will
be classified as having a preference for boys. It may be the case, however, that the mother
would actually prefer to have the girl first, followed by the boys. Because subjects are
not asked what gender they would prefer for their next child, there is no way to avoid this
type of misclassification with this data set. That said, despite being non-classical, this type
of measurement error should bias my estimates against finding any significant differences.
Consider the case of a mother who desires two future boys and one future girl who prefers
to have the girl first. For simplicity, also assume that the treatment effect is homogeneous.
Clearly, if the true treatment effect is zero, this misclassification will not impact the esti-
mates: they will still be zero. If the true treatment effect is positive, so that children who are
born of their mother’s preferred sex end up receiving more resources and therefore end up
healthier, this assignment error will bias the estimates downwards by missclassifying some
LP and less healthy children as MP children. Thus, the impact of the misclassification is to
bias my results against finding any effect.
The data also permit me to test empirically whether this type of misclassification is
important. In practice, nearly all mothers who I classify as having a preference for one
gender desire only children of that gender. Of the 1518 cases where mothers are classified
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as preferring either girls or boys, over 86% desire only girls or only boys. To test whether
including potentially misclassified mothers is important, Table 7 displays the results when
limiting the sample to cases where the mother desired that future children be of one gender
only. As expected given the paucity of potentially misclassified cases, the results in Table 7
are almost identical to the main results in Table 5. The difference between Table 5 and Table
7 is not significant for any of the eight dependent variables. Therefore, misclassification of
mothers is not impacting the results.
Heterogeneity by Child Gender and Maternal Preference Type
As mentioned several times throughout this paper, there appears to be little overarching
sex preference in Indonesia. Consistent with previous literature using data from Indonesia,
there are no skewed sex ratios, mother stated sex preferences do not favor either sex, and
there is no evidence that parents use sex-specific fertility stopping rules.17 Still, checking
for heterogeneity in the treatment effects by sex or maternal sex preference is important to
confirm that the standardization of anthropometric measures is not providing misleading
estimates. The first piece of supportive evidence comes from Table 5. Comparing the top
and bottom panels, the inclusion of a male indicator does not affect the estimates. In ad-
dition, when full controls, including a male dummy, are included in the “With Controls”
panel of Table 5, the estimated coefficient on the male dummy is never significantly dif-
ferent from zero. If the estimated effects for male and female children are different for
standardized variables but not for the other health outcomes it might indicate that the main
results are affected by the different relative heights and weights of Indonesian boys and
girls. For example, consider the case where Indonesian boys have higher BMIs relative to
17Yamaguchi [1989], Clark [2000], Jayachandran [2014] discuss several implications of simple sex-
specific fertility stopping rules. They should imply a negative relationship between the fraction of children
that are male and family size and the sex-ratio at last birth parity should be male-biased. Neither of these
relationships exist in the IFLS data. The correlation between whether a child is male and his/her family size
is a precisely estimated zero. Further, the sex ratio at the last birth is not significantly different from .512 for
families that have likely completed their fertility (those where the youngest child is at least five years of age)
nor for families that may not have completed their fertility.
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the male children in the reference distribution than Indonesian girls do relative to the female
children in the reference distribution and the true treatment effect is zero. The main results
could be positive simply because Indonesian boys are bigger than their female counterparts.
The separate estimates by child gender would then indicate that the main estimates were
driven entirely by male children. If, on the other hand, the sex-specific results are roughly
equal for boys and girls, it is extremely unlikely that the main results were driven entirely
by the standardization process. However, one caveat applies: there is no way to sepa-
rately identify heterogeneity by sex and heterogeneity by maternal sex preference category.
Therefore, these results should be interpreted as heterogeneity by both sex and maternal
sex preference category.
Table 8 presents the average marginal effect of being born of the mother’s preferred sex
for both male children and female children. The results do not support that there is any
important heterogeneity along this dimension. Only one of the eight columns estimates
a treatment effect that is significantly different for boys (mothers who desired a boy) and
girls (mothers who desired a girl). Also, this difference is for mother reported general child
health, not for one of the anthropometric outcomes.
Saturated Control for Existing Household Composition
Given how important the sex distribution among existing children is for predicting maternal
gender preference, an important question is whether the results truly measure the effect of
being born of your mothers more desired gender, or instead they simply reflect the direct
effect of the existing sex distribution on child health outcomes. The data provide reason
to doubt the this alternative explanation. First, consider the main estimates in Table 5.
For each dependent variable results are displayed with and without controls. Among the
included controls are a full set of indicators for the number of older male children in the
household and the number of older female children in the household. If the sex distribution
among existing children were driving the main results, I would expect the coefficient on
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“Born of Mother’s Preferred Sex” to change with the inclusion of these variables as the
estimate is purged of the source of the confounding variation. Instead, the estimates are
nearly identical for each of the eight outcome variables, with and without controls.
However, the full set of controls contains much more than just the older sister/brother
indicators. While unlikely, one might worry that the inclusion of just these indicators,
and the omission of all other controls could still lead to starkly different treatment effect
estimates. Further, while the older sister/brother indicators are fairly flexible, they do not
completely saturate all possibilities for the existing household composition. That is, it
may be the case that the effect of having one brother and one sister is not the same as the
sum of the effect of having one brother and one sister. To allow for this possibility and
to highlight the effect of just including controls for the existing household composition,
Appendix B Table B1 estimates the effect of being born of the mother’s preferred sex on
health outcomes with fully saturated controls for the existing household composition. This
is done through the inclusion of a full set of number of older sister indicators, a full set
of number of older brother indicators, and a full set of interactions between the sister and
brother indicators. All other controls from the “With Controls” panel of Table 5 are omitted.
The results in Table B1 confirm that the main estimates are capturing variation in health
outcomes generated by something other than the effect of the existing household composi-
tion. As was the case with Table 5, the inclusion of controls has no impact on the estimated
effect of being born of the mother’s preferred sex. For all outcomes, the coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable without any controls and with the fully saturated control for
household composition.
What does this homogeneity imply for the interpretation of the main results? While
Section V illustrates that the sex composition among existing children is the most powerful
predictor of maternal sex preference, it says nothing about the direct effect of the sex com-
position on child health outcomes. That the inclusion of a fully saturated set of controls
for household composition does not affect the treatment effects suggests that there is no
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direct effect of the sex composition on child health outcomes. Instead, the only potential
effect of the sex composition on health outcomes is an indirect effect: the sex composition
potentially influences continued maternal fertility (and therefore family size), which then
affects the health outcomes of the main child.
8 Mechanisms: Realized Gender and Subsequent
Fertility
As the predictions in the conceptual framework suggest, if continued maternal fertility is
an important reason why children born of their mother’s preferred sex receive are healthier,
I would expect this result to be concentrated at parities where mothers still receive a suffi-
ciently large marginal utility increase from an additional child. Specifically, the conceptual
framework section suggests the effect should be more pronounced at lower birth parities.
To begin, Figure 2 explores at which birth parities the effect of subsequent fertility are
concentrated. The figure plots a histogram of the ideal number of children that mothers in
the sample desire. To avoid using reports that have been affected by the sex realizations
of previous children, Figure 2 only uses information from women who had not yet begun
their fertility. As suggested by Table 1, ideal fertility in Indonesia is fairly low. Roughly
80% of women desire three or fewer total children. Thus, for the vast majority of the
mothers in the sample, Figure 2 suggests that they should begin facing a tradeoff between
higher-than-desired total fertility and a potentially more balanced sex ratio around parity
three.
Figure 3 investigates whether Proposition 5 is supported by the data. I do this by al-
lowing the effect of being born of the mother’s preferred sex to vary by birth parity. If the
model is correct, Proposition 5 suggests that we should only see differences in health out-
comes resulting from changes in fertility at parities one through three, or for children who
have zero to two older siblings. The graphs in Figure 3 suggest this is very much the case
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for BMI and weight-for-age. There is a drop in the estimated effect of being born of the
mother’s preferred sex between children who have two and children who have three older
siblings. This corresponds with the parity at which most mothers would likely not continue
fertility regardless of the sex composition among their existing children. Appendix Table
B2 further investigates this theory by interacting the treatment indicator with an indicator
for whether the child was born at parities one through three. The results indicate consider-
able heterogeneity in the treatment effect along this birth parity cutoff. For both BMI and
Weight-for-age, the effect is large, positive, and statistically significant for children born at
parities one through three. Conversely, the effect is negatively signed and never significant
from zero at higher birth parities. Further, the p-value from a joint test of whether the co-
efficients are equal for children of parities one through three and those at higher parities,
rejects the null hypothesis of no difference. The evidence supports the model prediction that
the effects should be concentrated at low birth parities because at higher parities mothers
will be unlikely to continue fertility regardless of the sex composition of existing children.
To continue exploring this potential mechanism, I directly estimate whether mothers
reduce or delay later fertility if they have a child of their preferred sex. Then, making use
of the fertility histories described in the data section, I calculate what fraction of the total
effect on BMI and weight-for-age from Table 5 can be attributed to changes in subsequent
maternal fertility.
Table 9 investigates whether mothers who have a child of their preferred sex are more
or less likely to continue their fertility. I test for this by estimating (1) with two different
dependent variables: an indicator for whether the mother continued her fertility and a count
of the number of additional children she had. A significant, negative estimate of β indi-
cates the mother is less likely to continue fertility if she had a child of her preferred sex.
Consistent with this theory, the coefficient on “Born of Mother’s preferred sex” is negative
and significant in both columns. The point estimates indicate that mothers who had a child
of their preferred sex were 5.8 percentage points less likely to have any additional children.
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This effect is significant at the 5% level. Similarly, these mothers have fewer additional
children. On average, mothers had .093 fewer additional children if they had a child of
their preferred sex. As was the case in Table 5, the inclusion of the extensive set of controls
has no impact on the estimated treatment effects. Both of these results are consistent with
Proposition 3 from the model: mothers with a balanced sex ratio, those who had a child of
their preferred sex, are less likely to continue fertility than those with a less balanced sex
ratio.
There is a substantial literature, using both structural and reduced form methods, that
finds birth spacing has important consequences for the health and human capital of the pre-
ceding and subsequent births as well as for the health of the mother [Palloni and Tienda,
1986, Bhalotra and Soest, 2008, DaVanzo et al., 2008, Buckles and Munnich, 2012]. There-
fore, columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 display estimates from an exponential hazard model of
the effect of having a child of the mother’s preferred sex on the percentage change in the
monthly hazard.18 Column 3 includes all children, regardless of whether the mother con-
tinued her fertility, and top codes the interbirth interval to seventy-two months. Column 4
includes only children whose mothers had an additional child but similarly top codes the in-
terval for those mothers who continued fertility to seventy-two months. Column 3 indicates
that mothers who had a child of the sex they desired are 17% less likely to give birth to a
subsequent child in each month. Column 4 suggests that much of the overall effect on birth
spacing is driven by mothers who are not observed having another child; when limiting
the sample to only mothers who have a subsequent child, the estimated effect decreases to
.0395, implying roughly a 4% decrease in the likelihood of having an additional child each
month. Still, even within the sample of mothers who continue their fertility, the interval
following the birth of the main child is four months longer at the median for mothers who
had a child of their preferred sex. Appendix Table C1 presents the non-parametric analogs–
Kaplan-Meier cumulative failure plots–of Columns 3 and 4. Both panels clearly illustrate a
18The estimated effect of “Born of the Mother’s Preferred Sex” on the hazard rate is nearly identical using
a Weibull or Gomperz distribution.
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difference in the likelihood of having had another child beginning around 24 months after
the birth of the main child. Whereas this difference persists indefinitely when including
mothers who do not continue their fertility, the difference fades around 60 months when
limiting the sample to mothers who continue their fertility.
Table 9 suggests that decreases in subsequent fertility could explain some of the main
effects from Table 5. To assess how important changes in subsequent fertility are for ex-
plaining the changes in BMI and weight-for-age, I leverage the fact that mothers in In-
donesia desire a balanced sex ratio among children. Section IV provides evidence that
this is true for the mothers in my sample. The sex distribution among existing children
explains a huge fraction of the variation in maternal desire for future sons and daughters.
The higher the fraction of males among existing children, the lower the fraction of males
the mother desires among future children. Further, the summary statistics in Table 1 in-
dicate that mothers report wanting roughly the same number of male children as female
children. Thus, stated maternal preferences for the women in the sample support the idea
that mothers desire a balanced sex ratio.
If family size could be treated as exogenous to BMI and weight-for-age, a simple OLS
regression could be used to identify the effect of family size on early health. Of course,
the assumption that family size is exogenous to child health is quite strong. Children from
larger families will differ from those in smaller families for a number of different reasons,
many of which I will not be able to measure with IFLS data. As a result, OLS estimates
of the effect of family size will likely be biased. To overcome this issue, I use the fertility
history of all mothers in the IFLS to create two new variables: the total number of children
born to each mother and an indicator for whether the sex of the mother’s first child is
different from the sex of her second child. Next, following Angrist and Evans [1998] and
Cruces and Galiani [2007], I estimate the effect of family size on BMI and weight-for-age
using an instrumental variables strategy where an indicator for whether the sexes of the
mother’s first two children are different (mixed sex indicator) is an excluded instrument for
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the total number of children. I use a mixed sex indicator instead of two separate indicators
for whether the first two children were male and whether the first two children were female
as in Cruces and Galiani [2007]. I do this for two reasons. First, fertility is, on average, the
same for mothers whose first two children were male and mothers whose first two children
were female.19 Second, my sample size is roughly one-twentieth of their sample. To ensure
the estimates are precise enough to be informative I elect to pool across the first two male
and first two female indicators.
Letting FSm represent the total number of children for mother m, SMm be the mixed
sex indicator, and suppressing all control variables from both equations, this two equation
system can be written as:
yi = α +θFSm + vim (2)
FSm = γ +φSMm +uim (3)
For the mixed sex indicator to be a valid instrument it must the case that it is uncorre-
lated with vim, the error term in the outcome equation, uncorrelated with uim, the error term
in the first stage, and that φ 6= 0, so that whether the first two children are of different sexes
has some effect on the total number of children born to the mother.
Ultimately, the first two assumptions are untestable. However, I argue that there are
good reasons to believe that both hold in this context. First, as discussed throughout the
paper, there are no skewed sex ratios in the sample. The ratio of males to females for the
sample is approximately 105 to 100, a figure which is not significantly different from the
biologically expected ratio of 104 males for every 100 females. This suggests there is no
gender gap in mortality in Indonesia. Additionally, there is no evidence that parents practice
sex-specific fertility stopping rules in Indonesia. Girls and boys have the same average
19To test this, I regress the total number of children for each mother on an indicator for whether her first
two children were male, an indicator for whether her first two children were female, and an indicator for
whether the first child was male. The test of whether the difference between the first two female and first two
male coefficients is zero fails to reject the null (p-value .76).
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family size in the sample and the sex ratio at the last birth (SRLB) is not significantly
different from 104 males per 100 females. Together, this evidence supports the idea that
the sex distribution is random in Indonesia and therefore SMm is uncorrelated with uim.
Whether φ 6= 0 is an empirical question. It amounts to the assumption that the first
stage effect is not zero. Unfortunately, the main sample used in this paper is not large
enough to precisely estimate a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model with the same set
of children. Therefore, I employ the Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS)
estimator proposed by Angrist and Krueger [1992]. This enables me to make use of the
larger sample of households that have non-missing values for the instrument and the en-
dogenous variable to more precisely estimate the first stage. To avoid weighting household
with more children more than those with fewer children, I keep only one observation per
mother for both the first stage and the second stage equations. For the second stage (re-
duced form) equation, I keep the oldest child for each mother in the data. The first stage
also retains only one observation per mother from the first wave the mother participated
in. Additionally, mothers must have at least two children and with non-missing values for
gender. The oldest main sample child for each mother is then used to estimate the reduced
form relationship between the instrument and the outcomes of interest. For the TS2SLS
estimator to be appropriate, it must be true that one sample contain the instrument and the
outcome measures, the other sample contain the instrument and the endogenous variable,
and that the two samples be independent and drawn from the same population. In the case
of the IFLS, not all children were selected for health measurement in the first three waves.
From the roster of all children in the household, measured children were selected at ran-
dom. If the randomly selected children was not also the child born immediately following
the elicitation of the mother’s sex preferences, then no mother-child observation from that
household is used in the main analysis. However, I am able to use the fertility informa-
tion, total number of children, and sex distribution among the oldest two children from that
observation to help estimate the first stage equation. Crucially, what dictates whether the
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mother-child observation can be used to estimate the reduced form, or just the first stage, is
random sampling chance. Therefore, the two samples meet the requirements necessary for
TS2SLS estimation.
Table 10 presents the results from the TS2SLS estimation. In both the reduced form and
the first stage, survey wave dummies are included as controls. Including further controls
for the sex of the child, the year of birth, month of birth, and birth order of the second stage
child has no effect on the estimates. Column 1 displays the result of the first stage. As
expected, mothers have significantly smaller families if their oldest two children are of the
opposite sex. On average, they have .142 fewer children. This result is significant at the
1% level and has an F-statistic of 17.61.
Columns 2 and 3 present the TS2SLS estimates of the effect of family size on BMI
and weight-for-age Z-scores, respectively. Standard errors are calculated based on 999
bootstrap repetitions.20 An increase in family size has a negative and significant effect
on the BMI Z-score and a negative, statistically insignificant effect on the weight-for-age
Z-score of children. The point estimates suggest an extra child leads to a 1.056 standard
deviation decrease in BMI and a .496 standard deviation decrease in weight-for-age in early
childhood. These effects are quite large, between three and four times the size of the main
results presented in Table 5.
With the TS2SLS estimates in hand, I now turn to calculating what fraction of the main
results might plausibly be explained by changes in subsequent fertility. To estimate this
fraction, I multiply the TS2SLS estimates of the effect of family size on each outcome by
the average increase in fertility resulting from mothers not having a child of their preferred
sex (Table 9). This product represents the average loss in BMI or weight-for-age that
children likely experienced as a result of the increase in fertility. Next, I take the ratio
20More precisely, indexing the repetition number with r ∈ {1, . . . ,R} , and letting β̄r be the mean














of this product to the corresponding effect from the main results in Table 5. The resulting
fraction provides an estimate of what percent of the total treatment effect could be explained
by changes in fertility. These fractions are shown in the bottom row of Table 10. I estimate
that the fertility response by the mother explains nearly half of the treatment effect for BMI
(42%) and almost thirty percent of the treatment effect for weight-for-age (28%).
9 Conclusion
I set out to investigate whether early childhood health is affected by whether children are
born of their mother’s preferred sex. Using an identification strategy that links a pre-
conception measure of maternal preference to the realized sex and several early health
indicators of each mother’s next child, I find evidence that children born of the sex that their
mother desired more are healthier along a number of observable dimensions. Children born
of their mother’s preferred sex have a significantly higher Body Mass Index, are heavier,
and are less likely to suffer from wasting than children born of their mother’s less preferred
sex. In addition, these children experience fewer days of illness, fewer episodes of cough-
ing and fever, and are reported as being generally healthier by their mothers. Together,
these results strongly suggest that children who were born of their mother’s preferred sex
are receiving more resources from parents.
To help interpret the main results, Section VI explored what drives mothers to prefer
that their next child be of a particular gender. In contrast to countries like India and China
where son preference is widespread and likely driven by a variety of cultural, religious, and
institutional factors, I find that nearly all of the variation in maternal desire for future sons is
driven by the sex distribution among the mother’s existing children. Mothers in Indonesia
desire a balanced sex ratio, roughly equal numbers of males and females, among their
children. This result is consistent with past literature on the relative lack of sex preference
in Indonesia.
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Leveraging the fact that mothers desire a mixed sex ratio, I estimate a TS2SLS model to
test whether changes in fertility might be an important causal mechanism behind the main
results. Using an indicator for whether a mother’s first two children are of opposite sexes,
I find that changes in fertility potentially explain 42% of the main effect on BMI and 28%
of the main effect on weight-for-age, with the residual effect likely a result of reductions in
parental consumption and the shifting of resources away from older children.
If parents have perfect information and they completely internalize the quantity-quality
tradeoff, then this heterogeneous treatment is utility maximizing from their perspective.
However, if parents are not fully cognizant of how continued fertility impacts the health
and resources received by previous children, then providing parents with this information
could reduce the disparity in continued fertility and the resulting gap in early childhood
health. Documenting parents’ beliefs about whether increased fertility negatively impacts
the resources and health of existing children would provide critical guidance about whether
disseminating information to parents is a viable policy tool.
Much of the policy discussion related to fertility and parental gender preference has
focused on how decreases in fertility will affect sex-selection and sex-biased resource al-
location. Taking as given the distribution of gender preferences, reductions in fertility are
expected to lead to increases in sex-biased resource allocation and sex-biased mortality.
The results of this paper suggest a policy instrument for affecting behavior in the opposite
direction. If parental gender preferences are malleable, reducing the likelihood that par-
ents prefer for their next child be of a particular sex will reduce total fertility. Focusing
on interventions that increase parental indifference towards the sex of their next child has
the potential to both lower total fertility and decrease disparities in early childhood health.
Of course, the effectiveness of any such policy will depend critically on whether parental
desire for the next child to be male or female can be influenced.
The results identified in this paper represent an important source of heterogeneity in
the treatment of children. These differences in treatment create variation in real health
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outcomes that are likely to persist into adulthood. Unrelated to health or skill endowments,
children who are born of their mother’s less preferred sex will face a gap in resources
relative to children who were born of their mother’s preferred sex. Identifying the optimal
policies to close this gap in early conditions remains a question for future research.
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10 Tables
mean sd min p50 max count
Panel A
Subsequent Child born of Mother's Preferred Sex 0.468 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 1517
Mother Prefers Girls 0.219 0.413 0.000 0.000 1.000 3490
Mother Prefers Boys 0.216 0.412 0.000 0.000 1.000 3490
Mother's Number of Desired Additional Children 1.209 1.091 0.000 1.000 12.000 3490
Mother's Total Ideal Number of Daughters 1.359 0.956 0.000 1.000 7.000 3753
Mother's Total Ideal Number of Sons 1.413 0.991 0.000 1.000 8.000 3753
Male 0.507 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 3755
Age in Months 41.241 26.845 0.000 35.000 98.000 3586
Number of Older Brothers 0.932 1.049 0.000 1.000 7.000 3695
Number of Older Sisters 0.876 1.021 0.000 1.000 7.000 3694
Years of Schooling Completed by Mother 8.228 4.364 0.000 7.000 20.000 3379
Mother is Muslim 0.903 0.296 0.000 1.000 1.000 3380
Mother is Christian 0.048 0.214 0.000 0.000 1.000 3380
Mother is Hindi 0.046 0.210 0.000 0.000 1.000 3380
Mother Ever Worked During Past Year 0.469 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 3381
Mother's Primary Activity: Working 0.391 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 2498
Mother's Primary Activity: Housekeeping 0.596 0.491 0.000 1.000 1.000 2498
Outcomes
Illness (4 Weeks): Days Primary Activity Missed 1.666 3.043 0.000 0.000 28.000 3743
Illness (4 Weeks): Days Bedridden 0.420 1.604 0.000 0.000 28.000 3743
BMI Z-Score -0.349 1.661 -5.000 -0.386 5.000 3540
Weight-for-age Z-Score -1.181 1.434 -6.000 -1.257 5.000 3578
Height-for-age Z-Score -1.540 1.672 -6.000 -1.620 6.000 3545
Child is Wasted (WHO Definition) 0.111 0.314 0.000 0.000 1.000 3540
Child is Thin (WHO Definition) 0.264 0.441 0.000 0.000 1.000 3578
Child is Stunted (WHO Definition) 0.389 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 3545
Panel B 
Child is Male 0.514 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 24348
Birth Order 2.547 1.643 1.000 2.000 17.000 24348
Number of Children 4.112 2.071 2.000 4.000 17.000 24348
Oldest Two Sibs Sex Mixed 0.468 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 24348
Age in Years 8.034 7.366 0.000 6.000 53.000 24348
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 N Obs 
LP
 N Obs 
MP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household and Child Characteristics
Mother Prefers Girls 0.504 0.500 0.004 0.866 807 710
Mother Prefers Boys 0.496 0.500 -0.004 0.866 807 710
Mother's Number of Desired Additional Children 1.442 1.424 0.018 0.693 807 710
Mother's Ideal Number of Daughters 1.481 1.442 0.039 0.340 807 710
Mother's Ideal Number of Sons 1.518 1.511 0.007 0.875 807 710
Male 0.504 0.500 0.004 0.866 807 710
Age in Months 40.922 40.396 0.525 0.703 767 681
Household Size 5.954 5.968 -0.013 0.910 807 710
Household Lives in an Urban Area 0.475 0.465 0.010 0.703 807 710
Number of Older Brothers 0.801 0.807 -0.006 0.901 799 704
Number of Older Sisters 0.763 0.730 0.034 0.455 799 703
Mother's Age 26.563 26.882 -0.319 0.225 807 709
Years of Schooling Completed by Mother 8.515 8.600 -0.085 0.703 730 648
Mother Ever Worked During Past Year 0.474 0.488 -0.014 0.613 732 650
Mother is Muslim 0.885 0.902 -0.016 0.324 731 650
Mother is Christian 0.059 0.040 0.019 0.109 731 650
Mother is Hindi 0.056 0.055 0.001 0.955 731 650
Child Outcomes
Mother Reported Health of Child Z-Score 0.049 -0.030 0.079 0.119 805 708
Surveyor Reported Health of Child Z-Score 0.024 0.042 -0.018 0.723 766 678
Illness (4 Weeks): Days Primary Activity Missed 1.954 1.510 0.444 0.008 804 708
Illness (4 Weeks): Days Bedridden 0.497 0.370 0.127 0.163 805 708
Hemoglobin Level (g/dl) 11.369 11.292 0.077 0.341 579 506
Anemic 0.380 0.387 -0.007 0.803 579 506
BMI Z-Score -0.470 -0.248 -0.222 0.010 761 667
Weight-for-age Z-Score -1.253 -1.097 -0.156 0.035 767 678
Height-for-age Z-Score -1.505 -1.528 0.022 0.799 761 669
Child is Wasted (WHO Definition) 0.117 0.087 0.030 0.063 761 667
Child is Thin (WHO Definition) 0.272 0.242 0.031 0.185 767 678
Child is Stunted (WHO Definition) 0.377 0.401 -0.023 0.364 761 669
TABLE 3: Summary Statistics by Preferred or Less Preferred Sex
Notes: See Table 1. The LP column (1) presents means for children born of their mothers ex-ante less preferred sex. The MP column (2) 
presents means for children born of their mothers more preferred sex. Column 3 displays the difference-in-means between columns 1 and 2, 
column 4 displays the associated P-value from a test of whether there is no difference between the two columns, column 5 shows the number 
of LP children with non-missing values, and column 6 shows the number of MP children with non-missing values. The child heath Z-scores 
are constructed so that lower values imply healthier children.
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Panel A: Full Controls No Controls
Variable (1) (2)
Current Male Ratio Among Children (Boys/Total) -0.735*** -0.735***
(0.016) (0.016)
Average Bridewealth Province of Residence (Thousands of Rupiah) 0.000
(0.000)








Mother Attended Primary School 0.072**
(0.035)
Mother Attended Junior High School 0.085**
(0.038)
Mother Attended Senior High School 0.093**
(0.038)






Chi-2 Stat: Coeff on Male Ratio is Equal in (1) and (2)
P-value
Panel B: Predicting Maternal Son Preference
% Correctly 
Predicted se
Full Controls 84.1 0.007
No Controls 83.4 0.008
Observations
Difference in % Correctly Predicted
P-Value: Difference is Zero
TABLE 4: Explaining The Desired Male Ratio 
Notes: See Table 1. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions of the mother desired fraction male among future children (desired future 
male children/total desired future children) on the fraction of existing children that are male. Column 1 also includes the full set of controls 
discussed in the text. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel B displays the accuracy of a linear probability model (LPM) for predicting maternal 
son preference using only the fraction of existing children that are male or the fraction of existing children that are mall as well as the full set of 
controls included in Panel A. Mothers are designated as having a "predicted son preference" if the LPM predicts a probability of son preference of 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 Appendix A: Model
To help illustrate the decisions mothers face, this section outlines a simple utility maxi-
mization problem. In keeping with the empirical findings in this and previous papers set
in contemporary Indonesia, the model assumes that there are no systematic individual, cul-
tural, or economic biases that lead mothers to favor male children over female children.
Specifically, the model assumes that mothers face the same price of investment for male
and female children, that mothers allocate resources equally across all existing children,
and that mothers value the quality and count of male and female children equally. De-
spite this lack of overarching gender bias, the model is able to produce differences in child
quality by gender. Instead of consistently favoring children of one sex, these differences
reflect heterogeneity in received resources and health according to whether the child’s sex
matched the sex the mother desired more before their birth.
Mothers receive utility from the number of children they have n, the average health or
quality of existing children q̄, and the sex composition of existing children mn where m is the
number of existing male children. The existing sex composition enters the mother’s utility
function as a distance from her ideal ratio, γ . As mentioned above, much of the subsequent
discussion will assume that γ = 12 , so that mother’s desire a balanced sex ratio among
children. Further, by maintaining that only average child quality enters the mother’s utility
function and that quality for each child q is simply defined as the investment i in that child
in a period, I assume away the possibility that mothers allocate resources unequally across
existing children: mothers will set investment (quality) to be equal across all children.
I do this to show that an unequal allocation of resources among existing children is not
needed to produce differences in health between children that were born of their mother’s
preferred sex and those that were born of their mother’s less preferred sex.21 Because
the only uncertainty in the model comes from the lack of control over the gender of future
21To the extent that this differential allocation across existing children is important, it should reinforce the
effects highlighted by this model.
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children, I focus on the static problem faced by mothers who had a child during the previous
period. After observing the sex of their most recent child, these mothers elect whether to
have an additional child or not c∈ {0,1}. Mother’s believe that their new child will be male
with probability 12 , they face a price of investment pi, and they receive exogenous resources
y to split evenly across existing children.
I assume the mother’s utility function is additively separable in n, q̄, and d (·), so the














With no opportunity to smooth consumption across periods, mothers face the per period
budget constraint:
y = piin (5)
I assume that the net benefit from an additional child, absent any consideration of the sex
ratio, is increasing and concave in n. That is, b(n)≡ f (n)+αg(q̄) is such that:
b′ (n)> 0, b′′ < 0 (6)
Similarly, I assume the distance function is increasing and concave in the distance between
the existing sex ratio and the ideal sex ratio (γ):
d′ > 0, d′′ < 0 (7)
Assuming that d (·) is concave amounts to assuming that mothers care more about
changes in the sex ratio close to their ideal ratio than they do about changes in the sex
ratio far away from their ideal ratio. For example, it implies that, ignoring utility differ-
ences resulting from changes in family size, a mother who desires an equal number of boys
and girls value a move from four boys and two girls to three boys and three girls more than
she would a move from five boys and one girl to four boys and two girls.
The scale factors α and θ capture the relative importance of average child quality and
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the distance from the mother’s ideal sex ratio as compared to the number of children the
mother has.










































This formulation of the mother’s problem is still powerful enough to generate variation
in outcomes between children that are born of their mother’s preferred sex and those that are
born of their mothers less preferred sex. In particular, the model suggests that at lower birth
parities mothers will be less likely to continue their fertility if the sex ratio among existing
children is equal to their ideal sex ratio γ . However, at higher birth parities mothers are
unlikely to continue fertility regardless of the sex ratio among their existing children.
Predictions for Stated Maternal Sex Preferences
To begin, consider how the model predicts that the mother’s stated sex preferences will
behave. Mothers who desire an additional child will prefer to have that child be of the sex
that maximizes their utility in the next period. For a mother with m = m̃, n = ñ, and γ = γ̃ ,
































Proposition 1 Mothers will prefer that their next child be of the gender that moves them
closer to a balanced sex ratio.
Unsurprisingly, the mother will state a preference for a child of whichever sex brings her
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closer to the ideal sex ratio γ̃ . If mothers desire a balanced sex ratio (i.e. γ̃ = 12 ), mothers
will state a preference for whichever gender child they have fewer of. In this way, even
without different prices of investment for male and female children, different marginal
utilities for female child quality and male child quality (i.e. u′q̄male 6= u
′





or mothers who desire unbalanced sex ratios (γ 6= 12 ), stated preferences will differ across
mothers as a result of the realized gender of previous children.
Predictions for Continued Fertility and Resource Allocation
Mothers who prefer to have a male child next will not necessarily treat their next child better
if it is a male.22 However, even when assuming that mothers can’t favor some of their
existing children by dividing up resources unequally, allowing future fertility to depend
on the sex of the most recent child produces the prediction that, at lower birth parities,
children that are born of the sex their mother desired before their conception will receive
more resources and have higher average quality. The following are the implications of the
model assuming γ = 12 so that mothers desire a balanced sex ratio among children.
Proposition 2 If a mother decides not to have a child in a period, she will also elect not to
have a child in subsequent periods.
Consider a mother with m male children and n total children. If the mother elects not to













































As the only randomness in the model is a result of the unknown gender of the next
child, the decision problem for a mother who elects not to have a child is exactly the same
22To see this, consider changing γ and allowing q̄male and q̄ f emale to enter the mother’s utility function
separately and asymmetrically. With γ < 12 , and MUq̄male > MUq̄ f emale , mothers will desire more female
children but they will invest more in male children.
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in the next period. Therefore, the mother will prefer u?s,c=0 to u
?
s,c=1 for all s≥ t.
Proposition 3 Mothers are at least as likely to continue fertility when they are farther away
from their target ratio.
Consider the decision faced by a mother who is under her target ratio by one mn <
1
2 versus
she is exactly at her target ratio m+1n =
1
2 .
In the former case (mn <
1

























































To her utility from not having an additional child:












In other words, letting bdi f f (n+1,n) ≡ b(n+1)−b(n), the mother will elect to con-
tinue fertility iff:
u1c=1 ≥ u1c=0


































In the latter case (m+1n =
1
2 ) the mother compares her expected utility from having an
additional child:























To her utility form not having an additional child:
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In other words, the mother will elect to continue fertility iff:
u2c=1 ≥ u2c=0


































This simplification to bdi f f (n+1,n) is possible because there are no direct impacts of
the sex ratio on the resources allocated to each child or their health and because in both
cases the total number of children is the same. Next, observe that by the concavity of d (·)




























































Together, this implies that if:


































Then it must also be true that:


































So that any mother who would continue her fertility with a balanced existing sex ratio
would also continue her fertility with a sex ratio that is lower than her ideal. I omit the iden-
tical proof for the symmetric statement that any mother who would continue her fertility
with a balanced sex ratio would also continue her fertility with a sex ratio that is higher
than ideal. Together these imply that mothers with balanced sex ratios are at most equally
likely to continue fertility as mothers that are not at their ideal sex ratio.
Clearly, the converse statements need not be true. A mother who would continue
fertility with an unbalanced sex ratio would not necessarily also continue fertility with
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a balanced sex ratio. This is the case when:
u1c=1 ≥ u1c=0 but u2c=1 < u2c=0 (10)
Which is not ruled out on the basis of assumptions (4)-(7).
Proposition 4 If the increase in marginal utility from an additional child is low enough,
mothers will elect not to continue fertility regardless of whether they have a balanced
existing sex ratio.
Though this model assumes away direct utility or financial costs of additional children,
each additional child imposes an indirect cost through the decrease in available resources
per child resulting from the increased family size. Thus, a low increase in marginal utility










is small, or even
negative. A sufficiently low value will imply that mothers elect not to continue fertility
even without attaining their ideal sex ratio.
At what parity is bdi f f (n+1,n) likely to be low? By (6), the net benefit of an addi-
tional child is decreasing in the existing number of children. This implies that the value of
bdi f f (n+1,n) will be low at higher parities. Intuitively, at high parities mothers, receiving
less marginal benefit from a new child, are likely to end their fertility regardless of the sex
composition among existing children. The expected benefit from potentially moving closer
to their ideal sex ratio must be exceptionally large to compensate for the smaller increase
in utility resulting from the additional child. Therefore, fertility will only differ with the
mother’s distance from her ideal sex ratio when the marginal benefit from a new child is
sufficiently high, i.e. at lower birth parities.
Proposition 5 Children who are born of their mother’s preferred sex and at low birth par-
ities will be healthier (higher quality) than children who are born of their mother’s
less preferred sex at low birth parities.
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From above, mothers stated sex preference will reflect the sex composition among existing
children. Those children who are born of their mother’s preferred sex will move their
mothers closer to the ideal sex composition, γ . Therefore, following the birth of this child,
the mother who had a child of her preferred sex will be less likely to continue fertility and
have another child as long as long as the set of mothers for which (10) is true is non-empty.
From Proposition 4, this set of mothers is less likely to be empty at low birth parities. Of
the children whose mothers satisfy (10), those who were born of their mother’s preferred
sex will split household resources y with at least one fewer child resulting in healthier
(higher quality) children on average: q̄n ≥ q̄n+1.
The Burden of Continued Fertility
The model above predicts that all children in households where the most recent child was
born of the mother’s preferred sex would be, on average, of worse health or lower quality.
It seems reasonable, however, to expect that a disproportionate amount of the difference
would be borne by the most recent child instead of older siblings. This is because, while
the model abstracts away from differences in the production function of health/quality, the
economics literature largely agrees that health and skills are most sensitive during early
childhood.23 Therefore, if the introduction of a new child results in an equal reduction in
resources for all existing children, it would likely still disproportionally impact the health
of the youngest existing child. In fact, as long as mothers do not completely account for
the gradient in health/quality productivity by age,24 the youngest child should be the most
impacted by continued fertility.
23See the main text of this paper for a more detailed discussion.
24This would be the case if mothers value, at least somewhat, ex-ante equality (i.e. they would prefer to
treat all children equally), or if the inputs for older children are less substitutable with the inputs for younger
children (i.e. solid food is less useful for infants than for teenagers).
68




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15 Appendix D: Identification of Treatment Effects
Let Ti ∈ {0,1} represent whether child i is born of their mother’s pre-conception preferred
sex. Denote whether child i is male using the male indicator Mi ∈ {0,1} and whether child
i’s mother preferred to have a male child before conception using PMi ∈ {0,1}.
Ti = MiPMi +(1−Mi)(1−PMi)
Define the potential early health outcomes for child i as:
yi1 = y(Ti = 1) , y0i = y(Ti = 0)
Finally, I observe:
yi = y1iTi + y0i (1−Ti)
I would like to estimate the average treatment effect of being born of the mother’s pre-
conception preferred sex:
τAT E = E [y1− y0]
Empirically, I observe:
τ̂ = E [yi|Ti = 1]−E [yi|Ti = 0]
I make the following assumptions:




Pr{Mi = 1|PMi = 1}= Pr{Mi = 0|PMi = 0} (12)
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y1,y0 ⊥Mi|PMi (13)
Assumption (11) requires that there not be any son (or daughter) preference in the sam-
ple. Table 1 Panel A shows that this assumption is met. Of mothers who have a gender
preference, fifty percent of mothers in the sample desire a female child next and the other
fifty percent desire a male child. Under Assumption (12), the likelihood of having a child of
the preferred sex must be the same for mothers who desire a son next and mothers who de-
sire a daughter next. The empirical justification for Assumption (12) can be found in Table
2. Pr{Mi = 1|PMi = 1}, the probability that the next child is male given that the mother
desired a male is .47; Pr{Mi = 0|PMi = 0}, the probability that the next child is female
given that the mother desired a female is 1-.533=.467. These probabilities nearly identical
and are not significantly different from one another. Also implied by Assumption (12) and
the information contained in Table 2 is that Pr{Mi = 1|PMi = 0}= Pr{Mi = 0|PMi = 1}.
Assumption (13), the conditional independence assumption in this context, is neces-
sary because identification uses the random allocation of gender at conception to create
variation in the treatment. In practice, I need the slightly weaker assumption of mean in-
dependence of potential outcomes and treatment conditional on the mother’s preferred sex.
As discussed in the main text, there is no evidence of sex-selective abortion in the sample.
As a result, any violation of Assumption (13) would require mothers to form accurate ex-
pectations about the relative health of not-yet-conceived male and female children and for
these expectations to be reflected in mothers’ stated sex preferences; there are few plausible
scenarios that satisfy these requirements.
One candidate, given the evidence that stated sex preferences are largely determined
by the existing sex distribution in the household, is that there are direct spillovers from
older siblings that impact the early health of the next child. If, for example, having more
older sisters negatively impacts the early health of subsequent female children for reasons
unrelated to parental behavior, then the estimated treatment effects without any additional
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controls will be biased. However, as Table B1 in Appendix B demonstrates, direct effects
of the previous sex composition are not driving the estimated treatment effects; including
a fully saturated control for the existing sibling composition has no effect on the estimates.
Therefore, it is unlikely that spillovers from the older sibling composition violate (13).
Alternatively, assumption (13) would be violated if mothers desire a particular gender
for their next child because they expect to produce healthier children of that sex for genetic
reasons. If parents believe they have a genetic advantage at producing a particular sex,
their beliefs about this comparative advantage are correct, and it makes them more likely to
desire a child of that sex, then my estimates will wrongly attribute this correlation between
stated sex preference and sex-specific genetic advantage to parental behavior.
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of this possibility. First, as discussed
above, stated sex preferences are largely determined by the existing sex distribution in
the household; observed fertility and stated sex preferences are consistent with parents
reacting to sex realizations in an attempt to achieve a balanced sex ratio. Second, if parents
are correct about having a genetic advantage at producing children of one gender, I would
expect to see that advantage reflected in child endowments at birth. Specifically, I should
observe that children born of their mother’s preferred sex are heavier at birth. Table 6
shows that children that are born of their mother’s preferred sex have no advantage in birth
weight. The treatment effects must therefore be the result of differential growth after birth.
Finally, if mothers form expectations about their genetic advantage at producing males or
females, I would expect the health of similarly-gendered older siblings to be an informative
signal. That is, mothers who have relatively healthier existing daughters than sons should
be more likely to demand a female child next.
To test whether this is the case, Appendix Table B3 checks whether the body mass
index (BMI), weight, and height of older siblings, measured prior to the conception of
the main child, have any effect on the likelihood that the mother preferred for the main
child to be male (or female). In each column, the sample is limited to mothers who have
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at least one older male child and one older female child with non-missing anthropometric
measures. BMI, weight, and height are standardized by sex and age in months using the
same WHO growth standards from 2006/2007 that were used to standardize outcomes for
the children used in the main analysis. The Table presents the estimated effects of the
anthropometric measure listed at the top of the column on the probability the mother wants
a male (or female) child next. All of the twelve coefficients are small in magnitude and only
one is even marginally statistically significant: mothers with taller existing male children
appear slightly less likely to desire a daughter next. However, mothers with taller sons are
not more likely to desire a son next. Overall, there does not appear to be evidence that
mothers with healthier existing daughters are more likely to desire future daughters, nor
that mothers with healthier existing sons are more likely to desire future sons as a violation
of Assumption (13) would predict.
Therefore, the available evidence fails to support any of the likely violations to As-
sumption (13). Making use of Assumptions (11), (12), and (13), the proof that τ̂ = τAT E is
presented below.
τ̂ = E [yi|Ti = 1]−E [yi|Ti = 0]
Focus on the first term:
E [yi|Ti = 1] =E [y1|Ti = 1] =E [y1|Mi = 1,PMi = 1]
Pr{Mi = 1,PMi = 1}
Pr{Mi = 1,PMi = 1}+Pr{Mi = 0,PMi = 0}
+E [y1|Mi = 0,PMi = 0]
Pr{Mi = 0,PMi = 0}
Pr{Mi = 1,PMi = 1}+Pr{Mi = 0,PMi = 0}
Using (13) this simplifies to:
E [y1|PMi = 1]
Pr{Mi = 1,PMi = 1}
Pr{Mi = 1,PMi = 1}+Pr{Mi = 0,PMi = 0}
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+E [y1|PMi = 0]
Pr{Mi = 0,PMi = 0}
Pr{Mi = 1,PMi = 1}+Pr{Mi = 0,PMi = 0}
Using (12) this further simplifies to:
E [y1|PMi = 1]
1
2
+E [y1|PMi = 0]
1
2
Now use (11) to rewrite the above as:
E [y1|PMi = 1]Pr{PMi = 1}+E [y1|PMi = 0]Pr{PMi = 0}
Using basic properties of expectations this is equivalent to:
E [y1|PMi = 1]Pr{PMi = 1}+E [y1|PMi = 0]Pr{PMi = 0}= E [y1]
Following analogous steps yields the following simplification for the second term:
E [y0|Ti = 0] = E [y0|Mi = 1,PMi = 0]Pr{PMi = 0}+E [y0|Mi = 0,PMi = 1]Pr{PMi = 1}
= E [y0|PMi = 0]Pr{PMi = 0}+E [y0|PMi = 1]Pr{PMi = 1}
= E [y0]
Combining the above steps implies that:
τ̂ = E [yi|Ti = 1]−E [yi|Ti = 0] = E [y1]−E [y0] = τAT E
=⇒ τ̂ = τAT E
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Part II
Parental Response to In Utero Shocks
1 Introduction
Until recently, unresolved empirical issues and a lack of adequate data prevented re-
searchers from claiming that correlations between poor early childhood conditions and
poor adult outcomes represented causal effects. In particular, researchers struggled to iden-
tify whether any component of adult outcomes was caused by early childhood conditions
or if both were simply influenced by the same unobserved factors.25
Recent developments in econometrics and an increased availability of large, detailed
panel data sets have made the identification of causal effects more feasible. Research across
a variety of disciplines now shows that poor early childhood conditions cause worse adult
health [Barker and Clark, 1997, Currie and Hyson, 1999, Almond and Mazumder, 2005,
Case et al., 2005] lower educational attainment and cognitive ability [Almond et al., 2009,
Maccini and Yang, 2009, Walker et al., 2011, Akresh et al., 2012], and depressed labor
market earnings [Black et al., 2007, Cunha and Heckman, 2007, Cunha et al., 2010, Gertler
et al., 2013].26 Clearly, early conditions27 and exogenous shocks in early childhood28 affect
multiple dimensions of well-being in adulthood. From the perspective of intergenerational
economic mobility, an individual’s social, economic, and health outcomes are limited by
factors beyond her control.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between one type
of exogenous shock in early childhood, rainfall exposure during the in utero period, and
25For example, persistent negative health shocks, low values of parental inputs, or unobserved genetic
components.
26See Almond and Currie [2010] for a review of the literature.
27e.g. schooling, early nutrition, and the general home environment.
28e.g. disasters, beneficial program rollouts, and random variation in weather conditions.
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long-term outcomes (height, weight, schooling attainment, and cognitive ability). In con-
trast to prior work, which generally focuses on identifying long-term causal effects, I con-
centrate on estimating short-term behavioral responses by parents. Conditional on early
parental behavior being important for long-term outcomes, behavioral changes in response
to early shocks are evidence of an indirect causal channel running from the initial shock to
parental behavior to long-term outcomes.
Most research on the long-term effects of early childhood shocks focuses on developed
countries. However, there are a number of reasons to think that these effects should be even
stronger in developing countries [Currie and Vogl, 2013]. Children in developing countries
are both more likely to experience negative shocks during childhood and less likely to live
in households that have the resources to remediate the initial impact of these shocks. Within
the development economics literature, several papers have used the exogenous timing of the
expansion of government programs to study the effects of early conditions on medium to
long-term outcomes [Maluccio et al., 2009, Ozier, 2011, Macours et al., 2012]. In general,
these studies find that exposure to health interventions29 leads to improved cognitive ability.
Another related set of papers tests whether variation in rainfall during early childhood
has long-lasting effects on well-being. In many developing countries, a majority of house-
holds rely on agriculture for their subsistence. As a result, rainfall can generate differences
in child endowments that may persist into adulthood. For example, in a similar context to
the one considered here, Maccini and Yang [2009] find that higher exposure to rainfall in
Indonesia during the year after a child is born is associated with better health, school, and
economic outcomes in adulthood. Interestingly, significant effects are found only for rural
girls. Urban children, if anything, are negatively impacted by the early rainfall. The au-
thors hypothesize that their finding is the result of a positive income effect (more rainfall is
associated with higher crop yields) during a crucial period of child development. In combi-
29In each case the treatment is a health intervention. Macours et al. [2012] examine a nutritional supple-
mentation program, Ozier [2011] studies a de-worming program, and Field et al. [2009] evaluate an iodine
supplementation program.
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nation with gender biased preferences among parents, less rainfall leads parents to reduce
nutrition for girls but not for boys. Maccini and Yang [2009] suggest that a reduction in
available nutrition may lead to worse early health among the rural girls in their sample.
However, they do not explicitly test for changes in parental behavior that might lead to
worse early health conditions.
In Burkina Faso, Akresh et al. [2012] use measures of exposure to drought while in
utero as the treatment. They find that children exposed to drought in utero perform signif-
icantly worse on cognitive tests than their unaffected siblings later in life. They attribute
this effect to a combination of epigenetic factors and a sibling rivalry for scarce household
resources. As with all household fixed effects strategies, measurement error is potentially
an important issue.
Using a different empirical methodology, Millett and Shah [2012a] find that children in
rural India who are exposed to drought in utero perform worse than non-exposed children
of similar ages on both math and reading tests later in childhood. A lengthy time series of
rainfall data allows them to compare the importance of rainfall exposure in utero with rain-
fall exposure later in childhood. They conclude that rainfall exposure only matters in utero
and during the first two years of life. A limitation of Millett and Shah’s analysis is that the
data do not contain precise information on date of birth. They are forced to assume that all
children are born at the midpoint of each year. At best, if there are no unobserved seasonal
differences in the “quality” of children, this strategy will lead to attenuated coefficients.30
Worse, as the authors note, if season of birth is correlated with unobserved characteristics
that are also determinants of ability, their results are biased in an ambiguous direction.31
In related work, Millett and Shah [2012b] test whether rainfall shocks might negatively
affect child ability as measured by test scores. Increased rainfall creates both a positive in-
come effect and a negative substitution effect. Specifically, parents may supply more labor
30The authors are aware of this possibility.
31See Buckles and Hungerman [2010] and Pitt and Sigle [2012] for two examples of how season of birth
might be important.
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in response to the increase in the marginal productivity of labor generated by rainfall. As
a result they may spend less time on activities that build human capital in children, creat-
ing a negative substitution effect. The net effect of increased rainfall is therefore unclear.
Using data from India, they find evidence to support the idea that higher contemporaneous
rainfall reduces school attendance and measured cognitive ability among children. In con-
trast, I use data that contain month and year of birth. Using the precise month of birth, I
generate month by month measures of in utero rainfall exposure for each child. Therefore,
my results should not suffer from measurement error in the timing of birth. I explore em-
pirically whether initial health is more influenced by the income effect or the substitution
effect and direct, negative health effects that epidemiological studies suggest may result
from an increase in utero rainfall.32
This paper contributes to the literature on reinforcing and compensating behavior by
parents. Within economics, this literature can be traced back to the seminal work by Becker
and Tomes [1976]. The authors provide a theoretical framework for how and why parents
might adjust investment (both time and monetary) in response to child characteristics.
More recently, Almond and Currie [2010] provide a simple model to illustrate com-
pensating and reinforcing behavior by parents. In the two period version of their model,
human capital in period t is a function of parental investment in contemporaneous and pre-
vious periods, several fixed parameters, and the realization of stochastic shocks. They show
that parents’ decisions to reinforce33 or compensate early shocks depend on the curvature
of their utility function and the shape of the child’s production function for human capital.
Several recent papers empirically test for compensating or reinforcing behavior by par-
ents. Royer [2009] uses data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Program, Birth Cohort
(ECLS-B) containing information on 856 twins to test for differences in parental invest-
ments. She finds no significant differences in parental investment34 behavior in response
32A third potential mechanism is worse maternal health. This channel is discussed in more detail below.
33That is, to respond to shocks by shifting investment in the same direction. E.g. respond to a positive
shock by increasing investment in the child or respond to a negative shock by decreasing investment.
34Royer considers two dimensions of early medical care: NICU use and the number of days spent in the
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to differences in birth weight between twins. Bharadwaj et al. [2012] use a regression dis-
continuity approach to test whether being classified as very low birth weight has any effect
on parental investments. The authors find no evidence that parents of children just below
the very low birth weight cutoff invest differently than parents of children just above the
cutoff.
Finally, Adhvaryu and Nyshadham [2012] consider how exposing a child to an iodine
supplementation program affects parental behavior in Tanzania. First, the authors show
that the supplementation program had significant, positive effects on long-term outcomes
(years of school completed) for their sample. Then, they test whether parental behavior
is responsive to the change in early childhood conditions induced by program exposure.
The authors find that exposure to the iodine program in utero significantly increased vac-
cination take-up and the length of breastfeeding. My paper compliments the literature on
compensating an reinforcing behavior by exploring whether parental investment responds
to exogenous negative shocks in early childhood. My analysis is distinct from that of Ad-
hvaryu and Nyshadham [2012] in that I consider how parents respond to negative shocks as
well as positive shocks. Parents might respond asymmetrically to shocks if, for example,
they have preferences that are asymmetric around a reference point for child quality or if
they suffer from credit constraints that are differentially affected by positive and negative
shocks.
Nearly all of the previous work estimating behavioral responses by parents uses either
extreme environmental events (e.g. droughts, epidemics, extreme birth outcomes)35 or ran-
domized interventions that are paired with informational treatments.36 While interesting,
extreme events are by definition rare. We might expect parents to respond quite differently
in extreme circumstances than they would to more typical environmental variation. The
rainfall data I use have the advantage of capturing more routine variation for households in
hospital.
35See Akresh et al. [2012], Bleakley [2010], Bharadwaj et al. [2012] for examples.
36See Adhvaryu and Nyshadham [2012], Aizer and Cunha [2012] for examples.
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developing countries. From a policy perspective, parental responses to both types of vari-
ation are potentially important, but estimates currently only exist for how parents adjust to
extreme events.
Randomized interventions provide clean identification of average treatment effect pa-
rameters. However, because they are generally paired with educational treatments that may
also shift parental preferences and expectations, the identified treatment effects average
parental responses to changes in early child quality (e.g. health, ability) and the interaction
between changes in child quality and changes in parental preferences/expectations. In con-
trast, rainfall deviation is unlikely to alter parental preferences in a meaningful way. Thus,
under modest assumptions, my results can be interpreted as capturing how parents respond
to exogenous changes in early childhood health.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance
of rainfall in Indonesia and, more generally, in developing countries. Section 3 provides a
brief theoretical framework while Section 4 summarizes the data. Section 5 presents results
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Rainfall
In the early 1990’s, approximately half of the 180 million inhabitants of Indonesia were
employed in agriculture. Though this figure has gradually decreased over the past two
decades, the agricultural sector still represents 15% of Indonesian GDP[CIA, 2012], a ma-
jority of which (56.5%) comes from farms under a half hectare in size[Sudaryanto et al.,
2009].37 Importantly, these small farms are less likely to have access to productivity en-
hancing physical capital and less likely to be irrigated. Rainfall is thus crucial for agri-
cultural production. Rice, the most common crop in Indonesia, is particularly sensitive to
rainfall. Therefore, rice output in Indonesia, like rainfall, is highly seasonal and fluctuates
37These figures likely understate the true importance of agricultural output in Indonesia because of the
relatively low value added of agricultural labor.
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both across seasons and across geographic locations within the same season. Figure 1 plots
the average rainfall by month over the 1970-1993 period for the province of West Java. I
observe a clear wet season (November through April) and a clear dry season (May through
October). The wet season months and dry season months vary slightly across provinces.
Though not shown here, there is also likely to be variation in the timing of the rainy season
within provinces. There is also variation within provinces across years. The variation in
the timing of the wet and dry seasons causes important changes in farmer behavior. For
example, farmers must wait until enough rain has accumulated to flood their fields before
they can seed. Late arrival of the rainy season therefore shortens the growing season. Rice
also requires a considerable amount of water to grow after seeding. Early arrival of the dry
season will also shorten the growing season and reduce output.
Empirical evidence underscores the sensitivity of agriculture, and rice in particular, to
fluctuations in rainfall. Parchure [2002] suggest that in India nearly 90% of agricultural
output variation can be attributed to rainfall. In Indonesia, Levine and Yang [2006] find
that 10% higher rainfall in a district is associated with an increase of 0.4% in the agricul-
tural output of rice. Further analysis by Maccini and Yang [2009] shows that this positive
relationship is monotonic. High levels of rainfall do not appear to hurt the production of
rice in Indonesia. While not all Indonesian adults are directly involved in agricultural pro-
duction, fluctuations in agricultural productivity have welfare implications for nearly all
Indonesians. For adults involved in subsistence farming, better harvests improve welfare
directly through an income effect. For adults who supply labor in agricultural markets,
agricultural productivity appears to be even more important[Jayachandran, 2006]. Even
adults who are not directly involved in agriculture may be indirectly affected through price
effects. In years when harvests are plentiful food is cheaper (all else equal). This should
shift budget sets outwards making net purchasers unambiguously better off. As I discuss
below, the effect of rainfall fluctuations on child welfare is less clear.
Highly variant rainfall, across both time and space, coupled with the strong relationship
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between rainfall and agricultural output, implies that crop production will vary consider-
ably across provinces within a year and within provinces across time. If households do
not have access to complete formal or informal risk-sharing instruments, consumption will
also fluctuate over time. A large literature in development economics focuses on whether
households are able to perfectly smooth consumption and income.38 The consensus in the
literature is that risk-sharing is incomplete for most households in developing countries.
As a result, there is strong reason to believe that deviations in rainfall will have important
effects on the level of nutrition available in households.
3 Theoretical Framework
The Initial Effect of Rainfall Shocks
Rainfall exposure in utero has a theoretically ambiguous effect on early childhood health.39
On the one hand, rainfall should increase the productivity of labor in agriculture. Agricul-
tural laborers should see their wages increase40 and farm owners (subsistence and oth-
erwise) should see their harvest and profits increase. If households are unable to per-
fectly smooth consumption across periods, this results in a positive income effect on fetal
health through an increase in available nutrition. Research in public health, economics,
and medicine shows that lack of nutrition during the in utero period is associated with
lower initial health endowments [Kowaleski-Jones and Duncan, 2002, Bitler and Currie,
2005a,b, Figlio et al., 2009, Almond et al., 2011, Almond and Mazumder, 2011, Hoynes
et al., 2011].41
38See Mazzocco and Saini, 2012,Morduch, 1995, Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997, Rosenzweig, 1988,
Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989, Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993, Townsend, 1994 for examples.
39I use the terms early childhood health and initial endowments interchangeably. In both cases I am
referring to the three measures discussed above: birth weight, relative size at birth, and the index combining
birth weight and relative size.
40However, there is some evidence that agricultural wages are asymmetrically sticky [Jayachandran,
2006].
41In general, the literature uses birth weight, APGAR scores, and gestational length as measures of initial
health.
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However, as pointed out by Maccini and Yang [2009] and Millett and Shah [2012b], in-
creased rainfall also generates a negative substitution effect by raising the opportunity cost
of parental time. The increase in agricultural productivity increases the marginal return to
supplying labor. This increases parental labor supply and, potentially, reduces the amount
of time spent on health seeking behaviors. If parental time inputs, and particularly mater-
nal time input, are important during the in utero period then an increase in rainfall may
negatively affect initial child health. As a result of how crops are grown in Indonesia, labor
supply is most likely to increase immediately following extended rainfall (when farmers
are seeding) and three months later (when it is time to harvest).
A third possibility is that an increase in rainfall increases the likelihood of illness for
the mother [Hunter, 1997, Curriero et al., 2001]. Maternal infection can divert energy and
nutrition away from the womb and towards fighting off the infection. This is harmful to
development of the fetus. Ex-ante it is unclear which of these three effects will dominate
but there are some testable predictions that arise from the theory.
1. If initial health are positively affected by in utero rainfall exposure the income effect
dominates.
2. If initial health are negatively affected by in utero rainfall exposure it must be a result
of either the negative substitution effect or the increased likelihood of disease.
3. If the results are negative and more pronounced among households that are a priori
more susceptible to waterborne illnesses then the increased probability of disease is likely
to be the driving factor.
The first two predictions are straightforward. If the income effect dominates we should
expect to see initial health endowments improved by in utero rainfall exposure. If not,
higher rainfall in utero should be associated with worse initial endowments.
The third prediction is less obvious. I do not currently have reliable measures of mater-
nal health during pregnancy. If I did, I would test whether maternal health during pregnancy
is negatively affected by rainfall exposure. However, if increased rainfall exposure in utero
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negatively affects the measures of initial endowments, I can test whether this effect is more
pronounced among households likely to be at high risk for waterborne diseases. If the
negative impact of rainfall is driven by high risk households, then a positive association
between rainfall and the probability of the mother contracting an illness while pregnant is
the most likely mechanism.
Further complicating the analysis is the possibility that in utero rainfall may have a dif-
ferent effect depending on gestational age at the time of exposure. In general, in developing
countries there appears to be a strong positive relationship between maternal nutrition and
birth outcomes.42 However, within the nine months prior to birth, maternal pre-natal nu-
trition may be relatively more important during certain months and maternal rest during
others. In practice, I use separate rainfall measures for each trimester of pregnancy and
therefore empirically test whether there are heterogeneous effects by gestational age.
The Long-Term Effect of Rainfall Shocks
The long-term effect of rainfall shocks depends on both the initial effect on infant health and
how parental investment after birth responds to the variation in early child health caused
by the shocks. One possibility is that there is no direct, long-term effect of shocks in
early childhood. Moreover, parental investment post-birth may or may not respond to the
changes in health induced by early shocks. If parental investment does respond to changes
in early health, it is also unclear in which direction it will respond. Theory suggests that par-
ents’ responses depend on both the shape of the production function for child quality43 and
the shape of the parents’ utility function. Specifically, the response depends on the parents’
perception of how effective investments in early childhood are at remediating lower initial
endowments. The more effective parents perceive their investments to be the more likely it
is that parents will compensate for initial negative shocks. With standard assumptions on
42See Abu-Saad and Fraser, 2010, Ceesay et al., 1997 for evidence from the epidemiological and medical
literature.
43In the context of this paper, I assume child quality can be represented by health and more general human
capital.
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parental utility and some substitutability between initial conditions and early investment,
negative shocks to early conditions should cause parents to increase early investment. By
reducing initial child quality, negative shocks increase the marginal utility of child qual-
ity relative to consumption. Thus compensating behavior should be expected[Almond and
Currie, 2010]. On the other hand, if parents are credit constrained, or if there are multiple
children in the household, parents might reinforce initial shocks instead.44
To help illustrate what contributes to compensating and reinforcing behavior, I present a
simple, static, deterministic model of the post-birth parental investment decision. I assume
that parents receive utility from child quality and from their consumption of other goods.
The parents’ maximization problem is to chose the level of investment in child quality and
consumption of other goods subject to the budget constraint and exogenous income, y:
max
is,c
u(qs,c) s.t. y≥ pis + c, qs = f (is,εs) (14)
Where qs, s ∈ { f ,m}, represents the quality of a child of sex s, and c is a numeraire
good. qs is determined by qs = f (is,εs) where εs captures the newborn’s initial health which
is modeled as an exogenous shock, and is is a measure of parental investment. Assuming
Inada conditions on the utility and production functions,45 first order conditions imply that
at the solution:
is :
uq ( f (i?s ,εs) ,c
?) fis (i
?
s ,εs)−λ p = 0 (15)
c :
uc ( f (i?s ,εs) ,c
?)−λ = 0 (16)
44For example, if parents get significantly more utility from child quality once it reaches a certain threshold
(being a college graduate, etc...), then reinforcing behavior may be more likely.
45Specifically,lim
x→0
uc (qs,x) =+∞, lim
z→0
uq (z,c) =+∞, uq > 0, uc > 0, uqq < 0, ucc < 0, f (0,ε) = f (i,0) =
0, fii < 0, fεε < 0, fi > 0, fε > 0.
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λ :
y = pi?s − c? (17)
Combining the first two conditions yields:
puc ( f (i?s ,εs) ,c




Which offers the usual intuition. Parents invest in child quality until the increase in
utility from an extra unit of investment is equated to the price scaled increase in utility
from an extra unit of consumption of the numeraire good. In other words, parents consume
until the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods equals the price ratio. For
my purposes, I am interested in how parents adjust their optimal investment in response
to changes in initial child quality. That is, I care about signing ∂ i
?(ε)
∂ε
. To do so, I rewrite
the two remaining first order conditions as functions of the choice variables and the child’s
initial health, and apply Cramer’s rule to the resulting system. See Appendix A for de-
tails. After applying some algebra, I get the following expression for how parents adjust













pucq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fi?s (·,)+uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fis (·)
2 +uq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fisis (·)
]
(19)
Without making any additional assumptions on either the shape of the parental util-
ity function or the shape of the production function it is not possible to sign the impact
that child quality shocks have on parental investment. Assuming that parental utility is
additively separable in the numeraire good and child quality simplifies the expression con-




[uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fεs (·) fis (·)+uq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fisεs (·)]
p [pucc ( f (·) ,c? (·))]−uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fis (·)
2−uq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fisis (·)
(20)
89
Based only on assumptions already made, this simplified expression still can not be
signed. The first term in the numerator is unambiguously negative but the sign of the second
term depends on whether initial endowments and parental investment are complements or
substitutes in the production function of child quality. The sign of the denominator is
also ambigious and depends on the curvature of the utility function with respect to both
arguments at the optimum and the curvature of the production function.
If I additionally assume that the production function of child quality is linear, the nu-
merator is negative:
uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fεs (·) fis (·)+uq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fisεs (·) = uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fεs (·) fis (·)< 0 (21)
Because the numerator is negative, the sign of the entire expression is the opposite of














−p2ucc ( f (·) ,c? (·))+uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fis (·)
2
}
While still of ambiguous sign, there are several reasonable predictions that fall out of
the model:
1. The likelihood that ∂ i
?(ε)
∂ε
> 0 is increasing in the price of investment.
This condition is quite intuitive: the more expensive it is for parents to remediate initial
deficits the less likely it is that they engage in compensating behavior. This also offers a
testable prediction for the model. In particular, as parental time becomes more valuable
in the labor market do parents reduce the time investment they make in child quality? In
the context of this paper where the majority of study subjects are involved in agricultural
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production, I check whether parents reduce investment when the labor market returns to
agriculture are likely to be high. Specifically, increased rainfall after initial child conditions
are observed by the parents should increase labor market productivity and increase the
opportunity cost of investment in children. The model predicts that more rainfall after birth
should therefore increase the likelihood that parents reinforce the initial health conditions
of the child. This can be estimated as the interaction between initial child health and a
measure of post-birth rainfall in a model where the dependent variable is a measure of
parental investment. A positive coefficient on the interaction would confirm the model’s
prediction.
2. The likelihood that ∂ i
?(ε)
∂ε
> 0 is increasing in ABS{ucc ( f (·) ,c? (·))} and decreasing
in ABS
{
uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·))
}
.
The greater the curvature of the parental utility function with respect to consumption
and the less the curvature of the utility function with respect to child quality, the more
likely it is that parents reinforce initial conditions. In other words, if the utility cost of
purchasing more child quality is low (relative to other consumption), taking into account
both the direct cost and the indirect cost which reduces the marginal utility of consumption
from additional consumption of child quality, parents are more likely to remediate initial
shocks to child quality.
3. The likelihood that ∂ i
?(ε)
∂ε
> 0 is decreasing in fis (·).
The greater the reduction in child quality resulting from a decrease in investment, the
less likely it is that parents reduce their investment in response to low initial quality.
Clearly, even after making strong assumptions, theory does not provide an unambigu-
ous prediction for how parents will respond to variation in initial child health. In practice,
different parents will respond differently and the same parents may even respond differ-
ently to distinct children. With respect to the latter possibility, we might expect parents to
respond differently to children that are observably different. One dimension of particular
relevance is gender. Parents could respond differently to initial health for children of dif-
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ferent genders if they perceive that the gradient of the production function for child quality
is larger for one gender or if they value child quality more for one gender than another. I
test whether parental responses differ by gender for the children in my sample. While this
paper does not explicitly test for why parents compensate or reinforce initial child health,
future work using similar data will focus on identifying the importance of elicited parental
gender preferences for compensating and reinforcing behavior.
It is likely that the full effect of in utero shocks is not captured by my measures of
initial child health. Health insults in utero may remain dormant for years before becoming
observable. For example, the incidence of heart defects and type 2 diabetes in middle
age have been linked to negative shocks in utero [Barker and Clark, 1997, Barker, 1998].
It seems plausible that there could be similar latent effects on cognitive ability or socio-
emotional skills. I am not able to completely rule out this possibility. That said, no previous
study has found evidence of such latent effects. In any case, parents will not observe these
latent effects and therefore will not respond by shifting investment.
4 Data
Rainfall Data
Obtaining detailed rainfall data is of critical importance to this project. The data I use are
from rainfall stations operated by the Indonesian Meteorological and Geophysical Agency.
The raw data were collected and organized with cooperation from the Japan Agency for
Marine-Earth Science and Technology. I begin with measures of daily rainfall in millime-
ters from 157 rainfall stations across Indonesia. For some stations, I have data covering all
of 1961-1993. Unfortunately, most rainfall stations are missing some data, most often dur-
ing the earlier years. In response, I drop all years before 1970.46 I generate monthly rainfall
46The data are also somewhat sparse for the years between 1991 and 1993. Including birth year and
province fixed effects should ensure that this does not bias my results. However, the lack of data for these
years may lead to relatively imprecise parameter estimates for the first part of my analysis.
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(in mm) for each rainfall station, for each month of the 1970-1993 period. I then map each
rainfall station to the province (provinsi) 47 where it is located. I average across all stations
within a province for each month in the study period. I am left with a data set where the unit
of observation is province-year-month rainfall. I create the total rainfall falling in each nine
month period, each year, and each three month period by summing across months within a
province. Next, I generate running averages for rainfall for each province by averaging over
every possible nine-month, year-long, and three-month period. I generate the natural log of
each running average (three-month, nine-month and year-long) and the natural log of real-
ized rainfall for every possible three-month, nine-month and year-long period in the data.
Thus, the deviation in rainfall for a nine-month period, for example, is calculated by sub-
tracting the natural log of the running average of rainfall for a nine-month period from the
natural log of realized rainfall for that nine-month period. This is done separately for each
province. A parallel procedure is used to generate deviations for annual and three-month
periods.48 Panel A of Figure 2 plots the distribution of province level rainfall exposure in
utero and province level rainfall exposure during the first year of life for my sample. Panel
B does the same for rainfall exposure during the third trimester and the first three months
after birth. Each graph also plots a normal distribution for comparison. Panel A of Figure
3 plots the distribution of in utero rainfall exposure by age, for the entire sample. Panel
B of Figure 3 does the same for province level rainfall exposure during the first year after
birth. Both rainfall in utero and rainfall during the first year of life appear close to normally
distributed.49 Rainfall for three month periods appears to be approximately log normally
47In 1993 there were 27 provinces. Since then eight more provinces have been created. Provinces are the
highest tier of local country government subdivisions in Indonesia.
48I also generate rainfall deciles and a mean zero, standard deviation one measure of rainfall for each
province. The mean zero measure is calculated by subtracting the mean rainfall for a particular province and
time period (nine-month or year-long) from the realized rainfall during each possible period and dividing
by the standard deviation for that province and time period. I drop any year-province combinations missing
more than two months of data and any nine-month-province combinations missing more than one month of
data. All of my results are robust to including dummies for the number of months used in calculating the total
rainfall for a particular period.
49The distribution of rainfall is essentially unchanged when weighting by the number of children born in
a province-year-month.
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distributed. The mean for in utero rainfall exposure is approximately 1500mm while the
mean for rainfall exposure during the year after birth is 2000mm. Figure 3 shows that there
is considerable variation in the rainfall children experience, both within a year and across
provinces and within a province across years.50
My primary explanatory variable is the deviation of the natural log of rainfall in a
particular period from the natural log of the running average of rainfall for a period of
that length within a province. I use this measure for two reasons. First, this measure is
utilized in prior economic research in Indonesia [Maccini and Yang, 2009]. Using a similar
measure facilitates comparison of results. Second, as Maccini and Yang [2009] point out
when justifying their use of log deviations, this rainfall measure can be interpreted as the
percentage deviation from the province level mean during a particular time period. Thus,
interpretation of the coefficient on rainfall deviation is relatively straightforward.
IFLS
For person level data I use RAND’s Indonesian Family Life Survey. The Indonesian Fam-
ily Life Survey (IFLS)51 is a longitudinal household survey containing information on over
66,000 individuals. The first wave of the survey (IFLS1) was fielded in 1993 and is de-
signed to be representative of 83% of the total population of Indonesia.52 Surveyors in
IFLS1 initially contacted 33,081 people across over 7,000 households. Subsequent waves
were conducted in 1997 (IFLS2), 1998 (IFLS2+), 2000 (IFLS3), and 2007 (IFLS4). In
later waves, attempts were made to contact all of the initial households as well as any
new household members. The IFLS contains detailed information about household con-
sumption, education history, work history, and marital history. In waves two through four,
respondents between the ages of seven and twenty-four are asked to complete two separate
50Since all subjects were initially surveyed during the same year (1993), graphing the distribution sepa-
rately by age is equivalent to graphing the distribution by year.
51For a more detailed description of the data see http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html.
52Some remote areas are excluded, likely because of the high expected cost of data collection.
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tests designed to measure cognitive ability.53 In all waves health measurements are ob-
tained by trained nurses. The IFLS also contains year, month, and location of birth for all
household members. Using the values of birth year, birth month, and household location,54
I am able to merge the person level characteristics to the rainfall data at the time of birth.
My final data set contains the amount of rainfall each child is exposed to during the nine
months prior to their birth (by trimester) and in the year after birth.
I focus on two separate samples: children aged three to five in the first wave and children
between the ages of six and ten in the first wave. Unfortunately, the IFLS only asks for birth
weight and relative size at birth for children under the age of five. Schooling outcomes are
not likely to be complete at the time of the fourth survey for these children. Because my
main focus is on how parents respond to changes in early childhood conditions, I will
primarily be using the younger sample. I do, however, use the older children to check
for effects of in utero rainfall on long-term outcomes. For each child between six and ten
in the first wave, I construct five separate outcome variables. Years of school completed
is constructed by summing the number of years of school the respondent has completed
by the fourth wave of the survey. Cognitive ability is measured by a Z-score constructed
from responses to the cognitive assessment portion of the IFLS4. I calculate the Z-scores
separately for the each of two test difficulty levels.55 Height is the natural log of height in
centimeters in wave four. Weight is the natural log of weight in kilograms in wave four.
For children aged three to five during the first wave, I generate three measures intended
53In wave two, one test measures math ability and a second measures Indonesian language ability. In
waves three and four respondents are asked to take a math test and a test to measure general cognitive ability.
Additionally, in waves three and four there are two difficulty levels for each test. The easy test is intended for
respondents between the ages of seven and thirteen. The hard test is given to respondents between the ages
of fourteen and twenty-four.
54In practice, the household location (province) at the time of the survey, when children the main sample
of children are between three and five, need not be the actual birth province. However, out-of-province
migration is extremely uncommon in the sample. For example, less than one percent of one to twenty-three
year-old subjects move out of province between 1993 and 1997. Additionally, households with small children
are almost certainly less mobile than adolescents and individuals in their early twenties. Thus, while there
may be some measurement error introduced by using household location as birth location, it is very unlikely
that my results are impacted.
55Younger children were given a slightly easier version of the test.
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to capture initial health. The IFLS1 contains mother reports of birth weight and relative
size at birth. A number of studies in epidemiology and public health suggest that maternal
reports of birth weight and other perinatal characteristics are reasonably accurate [Lucia
et al., 2006, Adegboye and Heitmann, 2008, Troude et al., 2008]. I generate Z-scores for
birth weight and relative size at birth and use these instead of the untransformed values.
I also generate a standardized index that combines birth weight and relative size.56 I do
this by summing the Z-scores for birth weight and relative size, subtracting the mean of the
sum, and dividing by the standard deviation of the sum.57 I standardize my measures of
relative size and birth weight for ease and consistency in interpretation.
Finally, I construct an indicator variable for whether a child lives in a household that
is at high risk for waterborne disease.58 I construct this measure from two separate survey
questions: “What is the main water source for drinking and cooking for this household?”
and “Where do the majority of householders go to the toilet?” Children are coded to “High
Risk” if their main source of drinking water is well water, rain water, or river/creek water
or if the majority of householders go to the bathroom at a shared toilet, a public toilet, in a
creek/river/ditch, in a yard/field, or in a sewer. This is a slightly ad-hoc measure of high risk
for waterborne illnesses. However, a number of studies in epidemiology and public health
suggest that poor quality water supply and poor sanitation conditions are associated with
an increased likelihood of contracting six main diseases: Diarrhea, Ascaris, Dracunculisis,
Hookworm, Schistosomiasis, and Trachoma [Gadgil, 1998]. The waterborne pathogens
associated with these six diseases are most often transmitted through contaminated drinking
water. Consumption of river/creek water and use of a non-private bathroom, particularly a
56Both measures of initial endowment are reported by the mother. Birth weight is in kilograms. Relative
size is constructed from the question “In your opinion, compared with other infants, was [...] bigger, smaller
or similar in size?”. Neither birth weight nor relative size is a perfect measure of initial endowment. Both
have been shown to be somewhat noisy proxies. However, birth weight in particular has been linked to a
number of long term outcomes (Almond et al., 2005,Black et al., 2007,Royer, 2009).
57This is the procedure outlined in Chetty et al. [2011] and a slight variation of the method used by Kling
et al. [2007].
58There is also some evidence that rainfall could increase vector-borne diseases (diseases spread by insect
vectors such as Malaria, Helminths, and Dengue). See Gubler et al. [2001].
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creek/river/ditch, yard/field, or sewer, puts people at an especially high risk of contaminated
drinking water. Furthermore, research by the Asian Development Bank suggests that piped
water is significantly less likely to be contaminated than the often stagnant water found in
wells [ADB, 2006].
I create two variables that capture early measures of parental investment: the number
of weeks a child is breastfed and the number of younger siblings in the family. Length of
breastfeeding is reported by the mother for all children under five years of age. Breastfeed-
ing requires a considerable investment of time and energy from the mother. In practice,
the importance of breastfeeding to the long-term well-being of a child will depend on how
mothers use time and energy if they are not breastfeeding, and the nutritional content and
price of available substitutes. In developing countries, where the quality of alternative nu-
trition is almost certainly lower, breastfeeding is likely to be especially important. A large
literature in medicine and public health focuses on the benefits of breastfeeding. Though
much of this literature relies on observational correlations, a recent randomized trial from
Belarus shows that breastfeeding does have a significant, positive impact on cognitive abil-
ity [Kramer et al., 2008].
In theory there might be positive cross-sibling spillovers that lead to a positive causal
relationship between family size and child outcomes. However, it is generally expected
that any potential positive spillover is wiped out by the reduction in parental investment
per child resulting from an increase in family size. Existing empirical evidence supports
this hypothesis. Black et al. [2010] use a Norwegian data set to test whether an increase in
family size has an effect on IQ. Using twins as an instrument for family size, the authors
find that an increase in family size significantly reduces child IQ. An increase in birth
spacing59 also appears to have positive effects on educational achievement [Buckles and
Munnich, 2012].
I generate a mean zero, standard deviation one, Z-score for the duration of breastfeed-
59Time between births
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ing. I also generate a Z-score for the inverse of the number of siblings. I use the inverse so
that, as with breastfeeding duration, higher values can be interpreted as more investment.
To do this, I subtract the number of younger siblings from the maximum number found in
the data (8). I identify the number of younger siblings using all three subsequent waves of
the IFLS. So for children who are two at the baseline, I observe all subsequent childbirth
for their mothers between the child’s birth and age seventeen. For children who are five
at the baseline I observe all younger siblings born until they are age twenty. I subtract
the mean and divide by the standard deviation of this inverse number of siblings to get a
Z-score. Finally, I generate a combined index by summing the two standardized measures
of investment, subtracting the mean of the sum, and dividing by the standard deviation of
the sum.
After merging rainfall data with person-level data from the IFLS and requiring that all
observations have non-missing controls, I am left with 2,403 children between the ages
of six and ten in the first wave (Sample 2) and 1,350 children aged three to five in the
first wave (Sample 1). The sample restrictions result in dropping around twenty percent
of children aged three to five and thirty percent of children aged six to ten. For Sample 1,
none of the basic demographic characteristics are predictive of sample inclusion. However,
with such a large proportion of children missing either rainfall data or basic demographic
characteristics, I can not rule out the possibility that my results are partially a result of
sample selection.
In general, Sample 1 is used for testing how rainfall exposure in utero affects initial
child health and subsequent parental investment. Sample 2 is used for illustrating the long-
term effects of rainfall exposure. Table 1 presents summary statistics for Sample 1 and
Table 2 does the same for Sample 2.
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5 Empirical Strategy
To test how rainfall exposure in utero affects the initial health endowments of children,
subsequent parental investments, and long-term outcomes, I assume the true model for
each dependent variable is the following:
Yc,p,y = αE +βERc,p,y + γEXc,p,y +φEZc,p,y + εc,p,y (23)
The outcome Y , for child for child c, in province p, in year y depends on rainfall (R)
and a vector of controls. More specifically, R is a vector of rainfall variables capturing
the percentage deviation in each trimester of the in utero period and during the year after
birth. The vector Xc,p,y includes age fixed effects interacted with child sex, birth month
fixed effects, province fixed effects interacted with child sex, a linear trend that is allowed
to differ across provinces and child sex, dummies for the mother’s age interacted with child
sex, a dummy for whether the child is male, and a dummy for whether the child’s household
resides in an urban setting interacted with whether the child is male. I assume these Xs are
exogenous.60 Yc,p,y is also likely to be a function of both time-constant and time-varying
unobserved family characteristics, Zc,p,y.6162 As these characteristics are unobserved, I am
unable to include them in my analysis. Unbiased estimation of βE will depend on whether
after conditioning on the Xc,p,y, the Zc,p,y are independent of the measures of rainfall, Rc,p,y.
In other words, I use OLS to estimate:63
Yc,p,y = α̂E + β̂ERc,p,y + γ̂EXc,p,y + ε̂c,p,y (24)
Where the plim
n→∞
β̂E need not be equal to βE . For β̂E to be an unbiased estimator of βE ,
60One could argue that mother’s age is not exogenous. The point estimates are essentially unchanged
when omitting mothers age.
61Parental ability is one example of what might belong in Zc,p,y.
62The vector of characteristics that matter likely differ for different outcome variables.
63I use Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and cluster at the province level.
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it must be true that conditional on the observed X ′s, the unobserved part of the error term
which is correlated with outcomes is independent of rainfall deviations. In other words,
unbiased estimation requires that the realization of rainfall be uncorrelated with the omitted
vector of child characteristics after conditioning on the observed variables Xc,p,y.
This assumption would not be met if unobservably better families were able to predict
future rainfall deviations and moved to “wetter” or “drier” provinces. For example, if more
educated mothers tend to have children with higher birth weights, have fewer children, and
are able to time their pregnancies to periods of higher than average rainfall then the above
specification would be biased. However, because my rainfall exposure variables capture
deviations in rainfall from the running average of rainfall within a province, unobservably
better families would have to predict when rainfall will be higher (or lower) than normal for
that province. This seems unlikely to be the case. If better parents move to better provinces
on average, using deviations in rainfall and including province fixed effects will prevent
this from being problematic. In practice, “migration selection” issues are unlikely to be
relevant. Movement across Indonesian provinces is very rare in my sample. For example,
between 1993 and 1997 less than one percent of one to twenty-three year-olds in the IFLS
data move across provinces.
Alternatively, one might worry that unobservably better parents are better at timing
their pregnancies to anticipated rainfall or lack thereof. There is some evidence of this in
both developing and developed countries [Buckles and Hungerman, 2010, Pitt and Sigle,
2012] though one recent paper [Currie and Schwandt, 2013] suggests that seasonal patterns
in the birth outcomes of children in the United States may be the result of the timing of the
influenza season. If the months that constitute the rainy season are constant over time, my
inclusion of birth month fixed effects and province fixed effects should absorb all of these
unobserved factors. However, if the timing of the rainy season changes during the study
period and some mothers are better able to time their pregnancies to changes in the timing
of the rainy season, the treatment effects I estimate will also include selection bias. There
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are three reasons why I believe this is unlikely to affect my results. First, the study period
is relatively short. Parents would have to pick up on small changes in the timing of the
rainy season over only a seven year period.64 Second, while there is evidence that parents
are able to time births to seasons, the change in the timing of the rainy season, if present,
will be very small. Thus, parents would need to be able to time childbirth with a level of
precision that is unlikely to be plausible. Finally, including a full set of month of birth by
province of birth fixed effects does not lead to statistically different estimates.
A final concern is selective mortality. If the true effect of in utero rainfall exposure is
positive, children who experience more rainfall in utero may be more likely to be alive at
the time of the IFLS1. The surviving children from provinces exposed to low rainfall would
be positively selected. This would bias the coefficients on in utero rainfall downwards.65
Similarly, if the true effect of exposure to in utero rainfall is negative then children who
are exposed to more rainfall in utero would be less likely to survive. Surviving children
from provinces exposed to high rainfall would then be positively selected. This would bias
the coefficient on in utero rainfall upwards. To test whether there is any selective mortality
in my data I collapse all observations by province/year of birth/month of birth. For each
cell, I generate a count of the number of children, the rainfall exposure in utero, the rainfall
exposure in the year after birth, the rainfall exposure 10 to 18 months before birth, and the
rainfall exposure 13 to 24 months after birth. Table 2 displays the coefficients on in utero
rainfall exposure from regressions of the count of the number of kids in each cell on rainfall
exposure in utero, birth month fixed effects, birth year fixed effects, province fixed effects,
and a linear trend for each province. Column 2 includes year of birth rainfall, rainfall
10 to 18 months prior to birth, and rainfall 13 to 24 months after birth. In no column is
the coefficient on in utero rainfall statistically significant. Thus, in utero rainfall exposure
appears to have no effect on the number of children found in a particular birth year/birth
month/province cell. Selective mortality is therefore unlikely to bias my results.
64I only use children between the ages of three and ten.




I begin by exploring the effect of in utero rainfall exposure on initial endowments as mea-
sured by birth weight, relative size, and an index combining birth weight and relative size.
I do this by estimating:
IEc,p,y = αE +βERc,p,y + γEXc,p,y + εc,p,y (25)
IEc,p,y are my measures of initial endowments. I estimate (4) on Sample 1, children
aged three to five in 1993. Table 3 displays the results. In column 1 the dependent vari-
able is the standardized combined index of early child health. In column 2 the dependent
variable is the standardized measure of mother reported birth weight. In column 3 the de-
pendent variable is the standardized index of relative size. All columns include the p-value
from a F-test of whether the effect of third trimester rainfall deviation is the same for males
and females. Rainfall exposure in utero is associated with significant increases in initial
endowments. The point estimates for each trimester are positive, although only the third
trimester rainfall deviations are significantly different from zero in each column. The re-
sults suggest that a 0.5 log point deviation increase of third trimester rainfall leads to a 0.12
standard deviation increase in the combined initial health index. This effect is significant
at the 1% level. Increased third trimester rainfall also has a positive, significant effect on
both birth weight and relative size. A 0.5 log point increase in third trimester rainfall is
associated with a 0.14 standard deviation increase in birth weight and a 0.10 standard devi-
ation increase in relative size. A 0.14 standard deviation increase in birth weight implies an
increase of approximately 0.094 Kg or about 3% of the mean birth weight for the sample.
A positive result implies that the income/nutrition effect of third trimester rainfall domi-
nates. Though negative substitution and direct health effects may still be present, they are
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outweighed by the increase in available income and nutrition resulting from the increase
in rainfall. Figure 4 presents local polynomial smooth plots of standardized birth weight
on rainfall deviations in the third trimester for children between the ages of three and five
in the first wave of the IFLS. Coinciding with the linear regression output, there is a clear
positive relationship between third trimester rainfall deviations and initial health.
Also displayed are the estimated coefficients on year of birth deviation in rainfall. Be-
cause mothers are reporting birth weight and relative size at the time of birth, neither mea-
sure should be impacted by rainfall during the year after birth. As expected, rainfall devi-
ation in the year after birth is never significantly associated with any of the initial health
measures. Similarly, the p-values at the base of each column indicate that I can never reject
that the effect of third trimester rainfall is the same for male and female children. This is
reassuring given that expectant parents in Indonesia over this time period had little to no
access to sex predicting technology. However, the estimates for males, while quantitatively
and qualitatively similar to those for females, are noisier despite a similar sample size.
Therefore, rainfall exposure in utero represents a positive shock to initial health endow-
ments for the children in my sample. This is consistent with prior literature which also finds
positive effects of in utero rainfall on both short- and long-term outcomes. The finding that
the effects of rainfall deviations are only consistently significant in the third trimester is
novel.
I now estimate whether long-term outcomes are also affected. To do so, I use Sample
2. Children who are aged three to five in 1993 are likely still in school at the time of
the fourth wave. Children ages six to ten in 1993, however, are between twenty-one and
twenty-five at the time of IFLS4. It is possible, but unlikely, that they are still in school.
Table 4 shows the estimated effect of in utero rainfall deviations by trimester on years
of school completed, wave four cognitive ability, and the natural log of wave four height
(Panels A, B, and C respectively). Each panel presents the coefficient on the third trimester
rainfall deviation, which was previously shown to have a significant and sizable effect on
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initial child health. Each column also controls for the first and second trimester rainfall
deviations, the rainfall deviation in the year after birth, and the same set of controls as
in Table 3. Despite a robust literature in economics linking early conditions to long-term
outcomes, Table 4 suggests there is little relationship between exogenous early rainfall
shocks and three measures of long-term well-being. None of the results are significant at
conventional levels. The point estimate in column 1 suggests that a 0.5 log point increase
in third trimester rainfall deviation leads to the completion of roughly .047 fewer years
of school for females. To give some context, Duflo [2001] finds that a massive school
construction program in Indonesia between 1973 and 1979 led to increases of between
0.25 to 0.40 years of schooling. Using the rapid construction of schools as an instrument
for years of schooling, Duflo estimates the return to an extra year of school in Indonesia
to be between 3.5% and 10.6%.66 If I assume the individuals induced to complete fewer
years of schooling because of increased rainfall exposure in utero have the same return to
education as those induced to complete more years of schooling by school construction67
this suggests that a 0.5 log point increase in the rainfall deviation in the third trimester
leads to a 0.11% to 0.50% reduction in earnings for females. Thus, even ignoring the lack
of statistical significance, the point estimates indicate that there is little long-term impact of
third trimester rainfall, despite the large and robust effect on early child health. As in Table
3, Table 4 presents the p-values from tests of whether the effect of third trimester rainfall is
different for males and females; I can never reject the null that the two effects are the same.
As discussed in the theory section, it is unclear whether this is purely a direct result of
rainfall shocks or if there are indirect effects working through other causal pathways. Of
particular interest is how parental investment mediates rainfall shocks.68 Here I provide
66The wide range is largely a result of different assumptions about the shadow wages for individuals not
participating in the wage labor market.
67I also need to assume that the rate of return to schooling has not changed since the 1990’s. Both of these
assumptions are unlikely to be met.
68In the treatment effects literature, these two effects are referred to as the average direct effect and the
average indirect effect[Huber, 2012]. Specifically, the average direct effect can be written as Y (R = r, I (r))−
Y (R = r−1, I (r)). The average indirect effect can be written Y (r, I (r))−Y (r, I (r−1)). Here Y (r, i(r)),
the potential outcome, is a function of realized rainfall and parental investment, which itself is a function of
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reduced form evidence on how the potential mediator (parental investment) responds to
rainfall shocks.
To test for responses in parental behavior I begin by estimating the following model
using the original sample of three to five year-olds in 1993:
PIc,p,y = α +βRc,p,y + γXc,p,y +uc,p,y (26)
Parental investment for child c in province p in year y depends on rainfall (R) and a vec-
tor of controls. Given the evidence already presented on the positive relationship between
third trimester rainfall exposure and initial child health, if parents compensate for early
conditions β will be less than zero. If parents reinforce initial shocks β will be greater than
zero. I consider three measures of parental investment: the number of younger siblings, the
length of breastfeeding, and an index combining the number of younger siblings and the
length of breastfeeding. Length of breastfeeding and the combined index are expressed as
Z-scores. Table 5 presents the results.
Table 5 presents evidence that parents compensate for initial health shocks. Though
not statistically significant for either sex, the point estimates for length of breastfeeding
are negative for both males and females. The combined result suggests a 0.5 log point
increase in rainfall deviation leads to roughly a 0.014 standard deviation decrease (a 1.5
day decrease) in length of time a child is breastfed.
Both the inverse of the number of younger siblings and the combined index are sig-
nificantly, negatively impacted for female children but not for male children. That is, an
increase in rainfall exposure in utero leads to significantly more younger siblings, but only
for female children. Though the p-value at the bottom of columns 8 and 9 suggests the
realized rainfall. Obviously only one term in each equation is actually observed. Therefore, identification
requires a number of assumptions: that the rainfall measure be as good as randomly assigned and that the
potential outcome variable be independent of the investment variable conditional on the realized values of
rainfall and any additional covariates included in the model. Future work will explore the feasibility of
estimating these effects separately.
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difference in the coefficients by child sex is not statistically significant it is nearly three
times larger for females than for males. This is also suggestive of compensatory behavior
on behalf of parents. The point estimate for females indicates that a 0.5 log point increase
in rainfall deviation induces a 0.064 standard deviation increase in the number of younger
siblings (decrease in the inverse number of younger siblings) subsequently born to the fe-
male child’s mother. This corresponds to, on average, 0.08 more younger siblings. The
point estimates for males are also negative but much less precise and never statistically
significant.
IV Estimates
Up to this point, the evidence presented on parental response to initial child health has been
indirect. In particular, I first showed that third trimester rainfall exposure has a positive ef-
fect on early health and then presented evidence that parents reduce subsequent investment
in response to more rainfall, particularly for female children. To provide more direct ev-
idence, I attempt to directly estimate how parents adjust their investment in response to
early child health. To do so, I estimate several different specifications with the combined
index of parental investment as the dependent variable and the combined index of early
health as an explanatory variable. That is, I estimate:
PIc,p,y = α +βEHc,p,y + γXc,p,y +uc,p,y (27)
Where EHc,p,y is the standardized measure of early health. Note that early health is
affected by a number of characteristics that I do not observe in the data. If these charac-
teristics are also correlated with parental investment, OLS estimates of β will be biased.
For example, Xc,p,y contains no measure of income, wealth, or parental quality. We ex-
pect all three of these unobserved characteristics to be positively correlated with both early
health and the measures of parental investment. Thus, the OLS estimate of β is likely to
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be positively biased. To deal with this issue, I also estimate instrumental variable specifi-
cations, using the rainfall deviation in the third trimester to generate plausibly exogenous
variation in early health. Specifically, I estimate limited information maximum likelihood
instrumental variables regressions where the first stage is given by:
EHc,p,y = α0 +θRc,p,y +ηXc,p,y + vc,p,y (28)









= 0 .69 That is, I need that rainfall deviations affect early child health
and that conditional on the X’s, rainfall deviations only affect parental investment through
their effect on early health. The latter assumption will be violated if all of the benefits
of third trimester rainfall exposure are not captured by my measures of initial health. For
example, if mothers receive higher wages and are able to reduce the amount of labor they
supply in future periods, allowing more time for breastfeeding, then the instrument would
be correlated with the error term in the outcome equation. However, as mentioned earlier,
households in developing countries frequently lack the ability to shift income across pe-
riods. Of particular relevance are the results of Jayachandran [2006], which indicate that
agricultural labor supply is extremely inelastic. Also important is the extensive literature
in development suggesting that many households are unable to smooth consumption over
time. Therefore, I feel comfortable making the assumption that rainfall deviations are not
correlated with the error term in the investment equation.
Because the OLS estimates from the previous section suggest there may be differences
across child gender in how parents respond, I would ideally instrument for two endogenous
variables: early health and the interaction between early health and a dummy for being
male. Unfortunately, the “first-stage” is too weak for male children. Therefore, in all IV
estimates, I pool across child sex. Estimating parameters separately by child sex or with
69At least in a homogeneous effects world. With heterogeneous effects a monotonicity assumption would
also have to be satisfied.
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an interaction on the endogenous variable and instrument yields point estimates that are
statistically indistinguishable across child sex.
Table 6 presents OLS and IV estimates of parental investment responses to early health.
Columns 1, 2 and 3 display the estimated coefficients for rainfall deviation in the third
trimester from OLS specifications for Males and Females, Females only and Males only,
respectively. All columns include the full set of Xs discussed in previous regressions.
As expected, the OLS estimates appear to be positively biased. When pooling across
child sex and for males and females separately, the OLS estimates are fairly precise ze-
ros. However, The IV estimate suggests that a one standard deviation increase in early
child health70 causes a 0.466 standard deviation decrease in parental investment. To offer
some context, a 0.466 standard deviation decrease in breastfeeding represents a seven week
reduction in breastfeeding length. A 0.466 standard deviation decrease in the number of
younger siblings represents a decrease of 0.60 younger siblings, on average. These esti-
mates indicate there are economically important reductions (increases) in parental invest-
ment in children in response to positive (negative), exogenous variation in early health.71
Testing The Model Prediction
The model in Section 3 offered one testable prediction:
1. The likelihood that ∂ i
?(ε)
∂ε
> 0 is increasing in the price of investment.
As mentioned above, an increase in rainfall should increase the return to supplying la-
bor or capital to agricultural production. Thus, an increase in rainfall should increase the
opportunity cost of investment in children. One period during which this may be partic-
ularly important is shortly after birth when the human capital of the child is still highly
malleable. However, as with in utero rainfall exposure, we might also expect there to be
a direct, positive income effect of rainfall after birth.72 That said, after conditioning on
70An increase that is induced by the rainfall deviation in the third trimester of pregnancy.
71The excluded instruments in the IV estimate presented in column 4 have a Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic
of 10.452, well above the critical values for a LIML test of 15% size outlined in Stock and Yogo [2002].
72See Maccini and Yang [2009] and Millett and Shah [2012a].
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rainfall exposure during the year after birth and early child health independently, it is dif-
ficult to see why their interaction would impact parental investment, except by increasing
the opportunity cost of investment. A positive coefficient on this interaction term would
then confirm the prediction of the model.
To test this prediction I generate a dummy variable that is equal to one if the rainfall
deviation a child experiences during the twelve months after birth is above the median for
the sample. I then interact this dummy with the rainfall deviation the child experienced
during the third trimester of pregnancy. Ideally, this test would be implemented using
the IV specification used in Section 6.0.2 with initial child health interacted with post-
birth rainfall exposure for both females and males. Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient
first-stage power to confidently instrument for two, let alone four different endogenous
variables. Therefore, I estimate this specification, separately for females and males and
pooling across child sex using OLS. Importantly, I condition on both the non-interacted
dummy variable for above median year after birth rainfall and a continuous measure of
the rainfall deviation in the year after birth.73 Together, these should capture any income
effect resulting from post-birth rainfall. In results not shown, I pool across child sex and
interact the endogenous variable (early health) and instrument (rainfall deviation in the
third trimester) with the indicator for whether the rainfall deviation in the year after birth is
above the median and estimate liml IV models. Though noisy, IV estimates are signed the
same as the OLS estimates discussed below.
Table 7 presents results. For both females and males the interaction term is positive and
significant. This suggests that parents are more likely to reinforce early conditions when
the opportunity cost of investment in children is higher as the model predicts. The point
estimates indicate that the investment response to the interaction between post-birth rainfall
and third trimester rainfall is slightly larger for females than for males. However, I fail to
to reject that the effect is the same across sex and the estimates are positive and significant
73I include the same set of controls used in the estimates from Section 6.0.1.
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for both males and females. For females, a log point increase in rainfall deviation during
the third trimester leads to a 0.216 standard deviation decrease in parental investment if the
child experienced below median rainfall in the year after birth but only a 0.047 standard de-
viation decrease if rainfall was above the median in the year after birth. The corresponding
effects for males are a 0.119 standard deviation decrease for below median rainfall children
and a .027 standard deviation increase for above median rainfall children.
To help illustrate the model prediction tested above consider two female children who
come from identical households and are exposed to the same negative, third trimester rain-
fall shock, but only one of is exposed to above median year after birth rainfall. The model
and data suggest that both children will be born smaller and lighter as a result of the rainfall
shock. However, while both sets of parents will compensate for this early deficit through
increased investment (an increase in duration of breastfeeding and a decrease in the number
of younger siblings), the child who experiences less rainfall during the year after birth will
benefit from significantly more compensating investment. Under the assumption that the
controls eliminate all potentially confounding factors this is evidence that compensating
behavior is decreasing in the price of investment and reinforcing behavior is increasing in
the price of investment.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that an increase in exposure to in utero rainfall has significant
short- and medium-run effects on individual well-being in Indonesia. Children exposed to
positive rainfall deviations in the third trimester of pregnancy are born significantly heavier
and significantly larger than their non-exposed peers. This suggests that increases in rainfall
may increase initial endowments through a positive income effect. Despite these early
advantages, long-term outcomes do not appear to be positively impacted by in utero rainfall
exposure. Differences in parental investment are one potential mechanism for explaining
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these results. IV estimates suggest that girls who were exposed to positive rainfall shocks
in utero have a greater number of younger siblings and were breastfed for less time. On
the other hand, the response in parental investment for boys, while negatively signed, is
imprecise, not significantly different from zero and qualitatively smaller than for girls.
Together these results suggest that parents in Indonesia compensate initial health conditions
and that this pattern is more pronounced for girls than for boys. More generally, the results
support the idea that changes in parental investment can remediate early health deficits and
nullify early health advantages.
111
8 Tables
General Characteristics: mean sd min p50 max count
Age in 1993 3.986 0.809 3.000 4.000 5.000 1350
Male 0.509 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 1350
Lives in and Urban Setting in 1993 0.449 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1350
Age of Mother in 1993 31.044 6.657 16.000 30.000 56.000 1350
Month of Birth 6.582 3.306 1.000 7.000 12.000 1350
Rainfall Variables:
Rain YOB (mm) 1681.692 615.011 204.500 1661.000 3520.000 1350
Rain In UT (mm) 1421.256 443.632 311.000 1366.100 2956.917 1350
Rain Third Trimester (mm) 459.312 291.910 1.000 453.100 2085.833 1350
Rain Second Trimester (mm) 488.333 295.265 1.000 474.100 2085.833 1350
Rain First Trimester (mm) 473.611 286.121 2.000 470.907 2085.833 1350
Rainfall Deviation YOB -0.209 0.442 -2.081 -0.125 0.690 1350
Rainfall Deviation In UT -0.061 0.307 -1.313 -0.067 0.866 1350
Rainfall Deviation Third Trimester -0.373 0.920 -5.596 -0.185 1.267 1350
Rainfall Deviation Second Trimester -0.268 0.836 -5.596 -0.099 1.267 1350
Rainfall Deviation First Trimester -0.309 0.852 -4.902 -0.099 1.310 1350
Early Health and Parental Investment:
Birth Weight (Kg) 3.167 0.660 0.300 3.030 7.000 508
Inverse Relative Size 2.171 0.725 0.000 2.000 4.000 883
Length of Time Breastfed (Weeks) 15.780 15.520 0.000 13.000 52.000 1157
Number of Younger Siblings 1.395 1.284 0.000 1.000 6.000 1350
Table 1 
Panel A: Summary Statistics Children Ages Three to Five in 1993
Note: Table 1 Panel A presents summary statistics for children matched to rainfall measures and ages three to five in 1993. Observations decrease for 
birth weight and relative size because some mothers elected not to respond to these questions. Rainfall deviations are calculated as ln(rain in period x) - 
ln(RA period length x) where RA period length x represents the running average over the entire sample for a period of length x. Rainfall deviations have 
negative means because rainfall for three month periods is distributed approximately log normally. This should not be problematic for the analysis since 
rainfall deviations are being compared only across children in this sample.
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General Characteristics: mean sd min p50 max count
Age in 1993 8.023 1.474 6.000 8.000 10.000 1980
Male 0.498 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1980
Lives in and Urban Setting in 1993 0.480 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1980
Age of Mother in 1993 34.518 7.033 20.000 34.000 70.000 1980
Month of Birth 6.578 3.328 1.000 7.000 12.000 1980
Rainfall Variables:
Rain YOB (mm) 1932.813 453.941 239.000 1926.667 3916.000 1980
Rain In UT (mm) 1454.785 430.652 327.500 1443.667 2868.000 1980
Rain Third Trimester (mm) 481.737 279.005 0.500 474.700 1716.000 1980
Rain Second Trimester (mm) 496.684 287.477 0.500 490.286 2085.833 1980
Rain First Trimester (mm) 476.364 292.020 0.500 472.714 1741.000 1980
Rainfall Deviation YOB -0.020 0.198 -1.314 -0.038 0.683 1980
Rainfall Deviation In UT -0.057 0.322 -1.344 -0.043 0.866 1980
Rainfall Deviation Third Trimester -0.325 0.907 -7.069 -0.120 1.334 1980
Rainfall Deviation Second Trimester -0.324 1.022 -7.069 -0.062 1.334 1980
Rainfall Deviation First Trimester -0.409 1.104 -7.069 -0.131 1.334 1980
Long-Term Outcomes:
Years of School Completed Wave 4 11.046 3.800 0.000 13.000 20.000 1966
Z Score Cognitive Test Wave 4 -0.008 1.026 -3.182 0.224 1.665 1948
Ln Weight(Kg) Wave 4 3.948 0.186 1.569 3.942 4.653 1836
Ln Height(Cm) Wave 4 5.051 0.117 2.815 5.059 5.209 1838
Table 1 
Panel B: Summary Statistics Children Ages Six to Ten in 1993
Note: Table 1 Panel B presents summary statistics for children matched to rainfall measures and ages six to ten in 1993. Rainfall deviations are 
calculated as ln(rain in period x) - ln(RA period length x) where RA period length x represents the running average over the entire sample for a period 
of length x. Rainfall deviations have negative means because rainfall for three month periods is distributed approximately log normally. This should 
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Notes: Figure 1 presents average rainfall (in mm) by month for the province of West Java between
1970 and 1990.


























kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 73.7330






















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 90.2212
Rain During the 12 Months After Birth
Notes: Figure 2 panel A presents a kernel density plot of rainfall (in mm) during the nine months prior to birth in the province 
of birth for children age 3 to 5 in 1993.
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Rain During the 3 Months After Birth
Note: Figure 2 panel B presents a kernel density plot of rainfall (in mm) during the year after birth in the province of birth 
for children age 3 to 5 in 1993.

























































Rain During the 12 Months After Birth
Panel B
Note: Panel A presents kernel density plots of rainfall (in mm) during the nine months prior to birth in the 
province of birth by year of birth for children age 3 to 10 in 1993. Panel B presents kernel density plots 
of rainfall (in mm) during the year after birth in the province of birth by year of birth for children age 
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Note: Figure 4 presents results from local polynomial regression of the standardized index of 
early child health on the rainfall deviation experienced by the child during the three months
prior to birth. The estimates employ an Epanechnikov kernel and the rule-of-thumb plugin 
bandwidth. The 95% confidence interval is represented by the gray lines. The density of the 
rainfall deviation variable is presented using a dotted line.
Third Trimester Rainfall Deviation and Early Health
Figure 4
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10 Appendix A: Model
max
is,c
u(qs,c) s.t. y≥ pis− c, qs = f (is,εs) (29)
Where qs, s ∈ { f ,m}, represents the quality for a child of sex s, andc is a numeraire good.
qs is determined by qs = f (is,εs) where εs captures exogenous, initial conditions and is is
a measure of parental investment. Assuming Inada conditions on the utility and production
functions74, first order conditions imply that at the solution:
is :
uq ( f (i?s ,εs) ,c
?) fis (i
?
s ,εs)−λ p = 0 (30)
c :
uc ( f (i?s ,εs) ,c
?)−λ = 0 (31)
λ :
y = pi?s − c? (32)
Combining the first two conditions yields:
puc ( f (i?s ,εs) ,c




Which offers the usual intuition. Parents invest in child quality until the increase in
utility from an extra unit of investment is equated to the price scaled increase in utility
from an extra unit of consumption of the numeraire good. In other words, parents consume
until the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods equals the price ratio. For
my purposes, I am interested in how parents adjust their optimal investment in response
to changes in initial child quality. That is, I care about signing ∂ i
?(ε)
∂ε
. To do so, I rewrite
the two remaining first order conditions as functions of the choice variables and the initial
child condition and apply Cramer’s rule to the resulting system. See Appendix A for details.
74 lim
x→0
uc (qs,x) = +∞, lim
z→0
uq (z,c) = +∞, uq > 0, uc > 0, uqq < 0, ucc < 0, f (0,ε) = f (i,0) = 0, fii <
0, fεε < 0, fi > 0, fε > 0
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After:
F1 (c?, i?s ;εs) = puc ( f (i
?
s (εs) ,εs) ,c
? (εs))−uq ( f (i?s (εs) ,εs) ,c? (εs)) fis (i?s (εs) ,εs) = 0 (34)
F2 (c?, i?s ;εs) = y− pi?s (ε)− c? (ε) = 0 (35)
Applying the chain rule and writing the result in matrix form yields:

























































Each of the terms in this expression can be calculated using relatively simple algebra75.
∂F1
∂c? (ε)
= pucc ( f (·) ,c? (·))−uqc ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fis (·) (39)
∂F1
∂ i?s (ε)
= pucq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fi?s (·)−uqq ( f (·) ,c
? (·)) fis (·)
2−uq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fisis (·) (40)
∂F1
∂ε
= pucq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fεs (·)−uqq (·,c? (·)) fεs (·) fis (·)−uq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fisεs (·) (41)















pucq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fεs (·)−uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fεs (·) fis (·)−uq ( f (·) ,c
? (·)) fisεs (·)
][




pucq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fi?s (·)−uqq ( f (·) ,c
? (·)) fis (·)












pucq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fi?s (·,)+uqq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fis (·)
2 +uq ( f (·) ,c? (·)) fisis (·)
]
(46)
This expression captures the prediction from this simple model for how parents invest-
ment behavior responds to early conditions.
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Part III
Childhood Housing and Adult Earnings:
A Between-Siblings Analysis of Housing
Vouchers and Public Housing
1 Introduction
In the year 2000, over 2.7 million children under the age of eighteen lived in voucher-
supported or public housing, the two most popular subsidized housing programs run by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Although large-scale assisted
housing programs have been in place for some time, research on the long-term effects for
resident children is scarce, and hampered by methodological and data limitations.
This paper estimates the causal effect of participation in voucher-supported and pub-
lic housing as a teenager on employment and earnings in early adulthood. To do so, we
develop a novel data set that combines information on housing assistance, earnings, house-
hold structure, and neighborhood and demographic characteristics. By linking these differ-
ent data sources together at the person level, we are able to track millions of children as
they progress through voucher-supported, public, and unassisted housing as children, and
into the labor market as adults.
There are a number of channels through which childhood participation in subsidized
housing might impact adult outcomes. Both voucher and public housing provide a positive
income effect for households. By expanding the budget set faced by participating house-
holds, these programs may enable parents to devote more time and financial resources to
develop the human capital of children residing the household. This increase in human cap-
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ital should be reflected in higher labor market earnings, suggesting that assisted housing
residence in childhood would positively impact adult labor market outcomes.
However, other pathways would yield a negative relationship between subsidized hous-
ing participation in childhood and adult labor market performance. Oreopoulos [2003]
raises the possibility that subsidized housing participation might impact outcomes through
peer or neighborhood effects. If, as argued by Oreopoulos [2003] and Newman [1972],
available subsidized housing units are located in worse neighborhoods—i.e. neighborhoods
with higher crime rates and lower quality schools–than participants’ counterfactual housing
options, then public and voucher-assisted housing could have negative neighborhood and
peer effects and therefore decrease adult earnings. Ex-ante, the sign of any neighborhood
or peer effects, as well as the overall impact of subsidized housing participation, is unclear.
Our results identify the net long-term effect on adult earnings of childhood participation in
subsidized housing.
Implicitly assumed in the previous paragraphs was the idea that the impact of housing
vouchers and public housing participation during childhood is the same. This need not be
the case. In fact, the thought that the two programs might have different effects is one
element underlying the shift in subsidized housing policy in the U.S. to provide housing
choice through vouchers. The argument is that in the absence of discrimination on the part
of potential landlords, voucher housing should offer households increased neighborhood
choice. As such, any adverse consequences of public housing projects could be avoided
while the positive income effect for households would still be present. The debate about
housing vouchers vs. public housing has been the subject of previous research, but most
of it has focused on the difference in short-term effects. For example, recent evidence
indicates that female youth moving to lower-poverty neighborhoods experience improved
mental and physical health [Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011]. We contribute to this debate by
examining the differences in long-term labor market outcomes between public and voucher-
subsidized housing.
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The core identification challenge facing all research on subsidized housing is how to
overcome the selection problem associated with a household’s decision to participate in
the program. That is, households that decide to participate in public housing and voucher-
assisted housing are different from those that do not. The growing literature that uses
instrumental variables procedures, experimental evidence, or quasi-experimental evidence
regularly finds that the impact of subsidized housing is more positive when unobserved
heterogeneity is taken into account.76
We make use of the large sample size and longitudinal nature of the administrative data
set available to us and employ a household fixed-effects specification that exploits variation
in voucher-supported housing and public housing participation across siblings over time
within households. This allows us to isolate the effect of each type of subsidized housing
on labor market outcomes from observed and unobserved household-level heterogeneity
that may impact both labor market outcomes and the program participation decision.
Our results confirm that selection into subsidized housing matters. Whereas OLS esti-
mates show a substantial negative effect of housing subsidies when young on later young
adult earnings and employment outcomes, the household fixed-effects estimates are sub-
stantially less negative and, for many demographic groups, significantly positive. For ex-
ample, for females, we find that being in public housing as a teenager yields a 29 percent
premium for young adult earnings, and voucher housing, a 14 percent premium. These pos-
itive effects for females are mostly driven by the estimated effects for Black non-Hispanic
households. Our approach, while superior to naïve OLS estimates, still may be subject
to time-varying unobserved characteristics related to both adult earnings and household
subsidized housing participation. We include several sensitivity checks to address these
concerns.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background infor-
mation and reviews the existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 the
76See the more detailed literature review below for relevant citations.
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research design, hypotheses, and identification issues. Section 5 describes the study sample
and Section 6 provides the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Of the nearly 9 million Americans who participated in any subsidized housing program
in the year 2000, well over half (6.4 million) were either in public or voucher-assisted
housing. As of 2000, about 1.8 million American households lived in voucher-supported
housing and about 1.3 million lived in public housing, made affordable by HUD subsidies.
An even larger number were income eligible but elected or were unable to participate.
In recognition of the fact that the primary types of federally subsidized rental housing
differ along important dimensions, this paper compares the effects of living in subsidized
rental public housing and subsidized voucher housing. In 2000, a central year in our study,
45 percent of public housing households and 61 percent of voucher households included
children (see Table 1). A description of the major federal housing assistance programs that
we consider appears in Appendix A.
HUD defines eligibility for its assistance programs based on family income as a per-
centage of Area Median Income (AMI), which adjusts for area income and for family size.
Under most HUD programs, households pay 30 percent of their income for rent with HUD
subsidizing the remainder to cover operating costs or up to a fixed local “Fair Market Rent”.
Actual program requirements vary by subsidy type, but generally require residents to earn
less than 80 percent of AMI (low income), with additional requirements dictating the per-
centage of residents that must be “very low income” (at or below 50 percent of AMI) or
“extremely low income” (at or below 30 percent of AMI).
There is a broad literature estimating the economic effects of housing subsidies, al-
though studies of the long-run impacts on children are scarce. In this literature, conclu-
sions about the effects of subsidized housing vary considerably. In part, the mixed results
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are likely a reflection of different study designs – many of the studies estimate the impact
of moving from one type of subsidy to another. While certainly an interesting and pol-
icy relevant parameter, these studies are unable to answer how the different subsidy types
compare to receiving no subsidy. Others that do compare subsidized households against
non-subsidized households do not distinguish among different subsidy types and thus miss
potentially important distinctions among the different programs.77 Studies that have been
able to compare multiple subsidy types to private, unassisted households typically do so
for a limited geographic area (a city or metropolitan area) and focus on short-term, rather
than longer-term outcomes.78
As we discussed in the introduction, the biggest challenge is dealing with selection.
Subsidized housing residents differ observably from non-subsidized housing residents, of-
ten having characteristics typically associated with worse employment and educational out-
comes. This implies that extensive controls are needed if the identification approach uses
a selection on observables approach. However, if subsidized housing residents also have
unobserved characteristics associated with worse labor market outcomes, then the esti-
mated effects of assisted housing on outcomes are likely biased (for a general discussion,
see Shroder, 2002). Previous research has employed a variety of approaches to deal with
unobserved heterogeneity.
Some prior work relies on propensity score matching and other control variable-based
methods to measure how outcomes differ among households in different public housing
projects or programs. For example, Susin [2005] uses a rich set of controls from survey
data to match households from project-based subsidized housing and Section 8 Housing
77For example, Olsen et al. [2005] used longitudinal HUD administrative data from 1995 to 2002 com-
bined with data from other sources and a large, nationwide random sample to assess the employment results of
multiple types of assistance. The authors found that each type of housing assistance has substantial negative
effects on labor earnings that are somewhat smaller for tenant-based housing vouchers than for project-based
assistance.
78For example, Bania et al. [2003] compares welfare leavers who received Section 8 housing vouchers or
project-based housing, with other welfare leavers. The study was limited to Cuyahoga County (Cleveland),
Ohio, and followed residents from 1996 through 1997 using administrative data. They found no significant
effect from the receipt of housing assistance, and no difference between voucher and project-based assistance
recipients.
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with low-income non-recipient control households in the Survey of Income and Program
Participation. He finds that housing subsidies reduce incentives to work and reduce earn-
ings relative to control individuals but finds no difference in outcomes between voucher
and project-based assistance recipients. However, he acknowledges some potential biases;
for example, households with permanently low incomes may be matched to those with
temporarily low incomes.
Recent work by Carlson et al. [2012b, 2012a] also uses a propensity score approach.
As in this paper, the authors focus on employment and mobility outcomes for those re-
ceiving housing vouchers. The data come from administrative records in two databases
maintained by the State of Wisconsin combined with Census Bureau public use microdata.
Specifically, they draw a sample from the state’s Client Assistance for Re-employment and
Economic Support system, with 12,170 cases in the voucher group and 342,000 cases in the
control group for up to 6 years after receipt of vouchers. Because the entire sample receives
some sort of public assistance, their identification strategy is the equivalent of propensity
score matching with a “receives public assistance” fixed effect. The results suggest that,
6 years after voucher receipt, there is little effect on employment, but housing voucher re-
cipients experience a negative effect on earnings that diminishes over time [Carlson et al.,
2012b]. Additional work indicates that voucher receipt resulted in both short- and long-
term mobility and had little to no effect on four measures of neighborhood quality in the
short term, but led to small long-term improvements in all four quality indicators [Carlson
et al., 2012a].
The aforementioned studies rely on selection on observables identification approaches.
With a rich set of controls, they are able to make progress on difficult selection issues but
are subject to the concerns raised by Shroder [2002] and discussed above. As such, the
literature has increasingly moved to alternative identification approaches to deal with these
issues. Some researchers have used instrumental variables (IV) to identify the effect of
public and assisted housing on outcomes. In one such study, Currie and Yelowitz [2000]
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identify a regulation in housing assignment that provides an extra bedroom to households
with two children of different genders, as compared to those with two children of the same
gender. They use this rule based variation as an instrument to estimate the effect of public
housing on child outcomes. They find that households entitled to an extra room because of
the gender composition of their children are 24 percent more likely to participate in public
housing and their children are less likely to have been held back in school. This suggests
public housing participation has a positive impact on children’s educational outcomes.
Newman and Harkness [2000] also use an IV strategy to identify the effect of partic-
ipation in public housing on children’s educational attainment. With a sample of about
1,000 individuals from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they develop a county-level
measure of public housing availability by regressing the number of assisted housing units
per income-eligible family in each county on county characteristics, and use the regression
residuals for each county as an instrument for public housing participation. The authors
find that public housing has no effect on children’s education.
Other research takes advantage of public initiatives that resulted in the random assign-
ment of program participation. For example, the Gautreaux project, which ended in 1998,
involved the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) distributing Section 8 housing vouchers to
7,100 African-American families on welfare. The vouchers were to be used to rent private
market apartment units in either suburban or urban locations chosen at random by the CHA.
Rosenbaum [1995] surveys 332 adults from the Gautreaux sample, and conducts detailed
interviews with another 95. He finds that adult suburban movers (voucher recipients) ex-
perienced higher employment but no change in wages or hours worked relative to control
adults.
Inspired in part by the Gautreaux project, HUD’s Moving to Opportunity (MTO) project
randomly assigned 4,600 households living in public housing projects in five cities to re-
ceive Section 8 housing vouchers, either with no restrictions or only for use in areas with
a poverty rate below 10 percent. Despite the fact that MTO generated persistent improve-
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ments in neighborhood conditions for treatment households, there was no significant effect
on employment or earnings outcomes for adults or their grown children as reported by the
parents [Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011].
The Welfare-to-Work Voucher Program provided housing vouchers to 50,000 families
receiving or eligible to receive welfare. Mills et al. [2006] use an 8,371-household sample
from seven public housing agencies to evaluate the differences in outcomes between those
receiving vouchers and those not receiving vouchers. They find that vouchers somewhat
improve the neighborhoods in which extremely low-income families live, but over a 3½-
year study period, vouchers had no impact on employment or earnings.
Jacob [2004] makes use of the schedule of public housing demolitions in Chicago,
and the Chicago Housing Authority’s (CHA) policy of providing residents of demolished
projects with Section 8 housing vouchers, to generate plausibly exogenous variation in
public housing and Section 8 voucher participation. After matching administrative data
from the Chicago Public Schools containing places of residence and test scores for 94,000
students to public housing addresses, Jacob finds that children leaving public housing fared
no better or worse than their peers who remained in public housing for longer.
Jacob and Ludwig [2012] evaluate a CHA program that randomly assigned applicant
households to a position on a waiting list for housing vouchers. Of the 82,607 households
who applied for Section 8 vouchers between 1997 and 2003, they focus on the 90 percent
of applicants living in private-market housing. Thus, they are able to compare housing
voucher recipients to households who do not participate in subsidized housing. They find
that vouchers reduce quarterly employment rates and earnings and increase participation in
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program.
Oreopoulos [2003] uses another quasi-experiment, the random initial assignment of
households to heterogeneous housing projects in Toronto, to estimate neighborhood effects
on children. By matching earnings from Canadian tax data to historical information on
parental residential location, he is able to reconstruct the childhood public housing experi-
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ences of adult workers. The results indicate that neighborhood conditions as a child have
no effect on adult earnings or welfare participation.
3 Research Design, Hypothesis, and Identification Issues
Our primary goal is to identify the causal effect of living in subsidized rental housing as a
teenager on eventual labor market success. To do so, we begin by specifying a linear, con-
stant effects regression model for a particular labor market outcome (the inverse hyperbolic
sine of total earnings from 2008 to 2010 in this paper), y, of teenager i as
yi f = α +β ′Hi +φ ′Xi f + γ ′Zi f + εi f (47)
Where f indexes the household including child i in the year 2000. The outcome mea-
sures the teen’s earnings as an adult; α is an intercept. The variables of interest, Hi, are
dummy variables that measure participation in subsidized housing (public housing or hous-
ing voucher) as a teenager. The vector Xi f includes observable child and household control
variables. The vector Zi f contains a set of unobserved characteristics that may be related to
yi f . Lastly, εi f is an independent error term.










. The first factor, Z f is the composite of all observed and unobserved
time-invariant characteristics for each household f that are common to all children i ∈
f and γ f is the associated effect. The remaining factor, Zi, contains other unobserved
characteristics that vary by child, such as behavioral characteristics or disability status.
Consider estimating equation (47) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and, thereby,
omitting the unobserved characteristics in Zi f . The estimated coefficient β̂OLS will include
both the true effect of subsidized housing participation and a term arising from omitted
variable bias. The sign of the bias will depend on the effect of the omitted, household-
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specific characteristics on earnings (γ) and the covariance between participation in subsi-
dized housing and the omitted characteristics. For example, if households with unobserved
characteristics that tend to depress child outcomes are also more likely to enter public hous-
ing, then β̂OLS will be biased downward. Thus, a finding that subsidized housing depresses
child outcomes may be spurious unless the specification controls for these potential biases.
To account for the possibility that estimates are contaminated by household-level hetero-
geneity, we propose an alternative identification strategy. To the extent that the bias in OLS
estimates is solely attributable to the omission of time-invariant heterogeneity at the house-
hold level that is correlated with both program participation and labor market outcomes,
then conditioning on household fixed effects will eliminate the bias.
To that end, we specify a household fixed-effects regression that exploits within-
household variation in program participation (across siblings) to identify to identify the
impact of housing subsidies.
Griliches [1979] provides a summary of the early literature that makes use of sibling
fixed effects and points out a number of potential issues. Recent studies include Royer
[2009] who used over 3,000 twin pairs and twin fixed effects to estimate the effect of birth
weight on long-term outcomes, Currie and Walker [2011], who used mother fixed effects
to estimate the impact of the introduction of EZ-Pass in New Jersey and Pennsylvania on
infant health outcomes, and Currie et al. [2010], who employed sibling fixed effects to
identify the relationship between early childhood health problems and outcomes in early
adulthood. An especially relevant siblings study is Aaronson [1998], who estimated the
effect of neighborhood characteristics on children’s educational outcomes. Aaronson used
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine over 2,000 individuals in over 700 families
and measures differences in exposure to high poverty neighborhoods across siblings. He
found negative effects on high school graduation with and without the household fixed
effects.






. The household fixed-effects (HFE) regression
estimates the effect of subsidized housing participation on labor market outcomes using
only variation in housing participation and outcomes across teenagers within the same
household. In practice, we subtract out the household mean of each dependent and in-
dependent variable from each observation within a household.79 Therefore, HFE only uses
observations from household f to help identify β̂HFE if there are at least two teenagers
i and j aged 13-18 in the household in 2000 where Hi 6= H j. For example, consider a
household in the year 2000 with a 17 year-old and a 14 year-old that does not enter HUD-
subsidized housing until 2003. The older sibling, who leaves the household in 2002, would
have Hi = 0 and the younger sibling would have Hi = 1.
The HFE model is written as:
yi f = α +β ′HFEHi +φ
′Xi + γ f + γ ′Zi + εi f (48)
Where γ f gives the fixed effect for all children in household f . The effects of observed
characteristics common among all children in a household are not separately identified, but
instead subsumed in γ f , so only a subset of Xi f remains. In practice, Hi is a vector con-
taining measures of participation in both public housing and housing voucher programs as
a teenager, Xi contains an indicator for whether the teenager is male, a set of age dummies,
and, in some specifications, an interaction between whether the teenager is male, the full
set of age dummies, and the race/ethnicity of the household. We also interact each of the
subsidized housing measures with whether the teenager is male to allow for heterogeneous
effects by teenager gender, and we estimate separate regressions for each race/ethnicity to
allow all coefficients to vary along this dimension. We estimate both a “dummy” version
where the “treatment” H is a set of two binary indicator variables for whether an individ-
ual resided in each type of subsidized housing as a teenager and a “dose” version where
treatment is the number of years an individual resided in each type of subsidized housing
79We also cluster standard errors at the household level.
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between ages 13 and 18.
The HFE estimation provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of teenage subsidized
housing residence on labor market outcomes under much less stringent conditions than
a typical conditional on observables approach (including propensity-score matching ap-
proaches which also hinge on controlling for all relevant observables that determine selec-
tion and impact outcomes). There are, however, two types of characteristics contained in
the child-specific factor, Zi, that could lead to bias in β̂HFE . First, any household-specific
and time-varying characteristic that is correlated with both subsidized housing residence
and labor market outcomes will lead to bias. For example, if families enter subsidized hous-
ing in response to negative economic shocks, and these negative shocks are also harmful
to the subsequent labor market outcomes of the child, β̂HFE would be a downward-biased
estimate of the true effect.80 In fact, HUD strongly prefers and in some cases requires
that program households be below a certain income threshold. This suggests that if any
bias from unobserved, time-changing heterogeneity is present, this bias is likely to be neg-
ative. To address this possibility, we also consider HFE specifications where we control
for the parents’ earnings while the teenager is between 13 and 18. This variable will cap-
ture differences in parental earnings across siblings that have different subsidized housing
experiences.81
A second potentially confounding unobserved characteristic is any within-household,
teenager-level heterogeneity that is correlated with both labor market outcomes and sub-
sidized housing participation. In this case, the direction of the potential bias is less clear.
However, it seems implausible that this type of bias would contaminate the HFE estimates.
80Job loss by a household member is an example of an economic shock, though it is unlikely that housing
subsidies are responsive to transitory events as the waiting lists are typically substantial. Another plausible
scenario given eligibility requirements imposed by HUD is that households are more likely to be admitted
into subsidized housing after a household member develops a disability. Again, under the assumption that
exposure to this disability worsens potential labor market outcomes, this would lead to a downward-biased
estimate.
81Aaronson [1998] also evaluated the validity of using across-sibling variation by examining whether
moves into or out of high-poverty neighborhoods co-vary with other household characteristics, such as par-
ents’ income.
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The decision to move into subsidized housing is made at the household level. In effect, for
this to be a concern, households would have to be making housing decisions in response
to the characteristics of one teen but not the characteristics of the other teenage household
members. Another factor that might mitigate concerns of correlation of housing treatment
and child characteristics is the waiting periods typical for receipt of a housing subsidy.
Such delays would tend to reduce any correlation of housing treatment and unobserved
characteristics, which should attenuate any bias. Indeed, waiting times are one reason that
siblings may have different housing treatment experiences (in terms of dummy or dose),
which is ideal variation for our analysis.
4 Description of the Data
Siblings Sample Frame
The core data set brings together person- and household-level records from the 2000 De-
cennial Census and several different administrative files. To begin, we use the responses
from the 2000 Census to construct a frame of over 1.8 million youth aged 13-18 and their
households. Because our focus is on employment outcomes from 2008 to 2010,82 we re-
quire that children are at least age 13 in 2000, meaning they will be at least 21 by 2008 and
may be entering the labor force even if they attained some higher education. We cap the
sample at age 18 and require that in 2000 the child was in a household with their parent(s).
Including older youths would undermine the focus of the paper, and our identification ap-
proach relies on the assumption of parents making housing decisions for children.
Because our aim is to estimate the effect of childhood environmental factors on later
life outcomes, we derive most of our demographic characteristics from the base year 2000
Census short form responses, when subjects are still children.83 We retain responses for
82We recognize that 2008-2010 is a sluggish period for the national labor market, but our identification
approaches are designed to exploit the cross-sectional variation. In future work we may consider whether the
effects vary across the business cycle.
83We chose to use all households in the U.S. rather than the 1-in-6 sample filling out the long form
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one or two parents as well as all youth between the ages of 13 and 18.84 We use time-
invariant explanatory variables relating to the child such as date of birth, gender, race,
and ethnicity, and characteristics of the household in the base year such as housing tenure
(rent or own), number of people, number of children.85 We also construct a household
race/ethnicity variable to allocate households to race/ethnicity subsamples. Specifically, we
define a household as Hispanic if any member reports being Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic
(Black) if no member reports being Hispanic and at least one member reports being Black,
White non-Hispanic (White) if no member reports being Hispanic or Black and at least one
member reports being White, and Other non-Hispanic (Other) if no member reports being
Hispanic, Black, or White.
Youth in the Census 2000 frame are then matched to administrative records on hous-
ing subsidies from the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s HUD-PIC86 file,
place of residence from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) main-
tained Composite Person Record (CPR), and subsequent earnings from the LEHD87 using
a unique person identifier. Person-level record matching is done by way of a Protected
Identification Key (PIK), which is assigned to survey and administrative records based on
personally identifying information. The 2000 Census has PIKs for over 89 percent of the
person-records, while almost 98 percent of HUD records have a PIK, and all LEHD records
have a PIK. We only retain households with a parent who has a PIK and at least two children
aged 13 to 18 that have a PIK and non-missing basic characteristics.88 From the full sam-
for the principal analysis in order to have a larger sample size. While the long form would allow us to
include variables such as parent’s education, such time-invariant explanatory factors will be subsumed into
the household fixed effects in any case.
84We define the head of household and the spouse of the head of household as the parents for each MAFID.
MAFIDs, or addresses, constitute the residence frame for Census Bureau surveys. In some cases these
individuals may be grandparents, other relatives, or even unrelated adults.
85We exclude households including more than 15 residents or more than 10 teenagers.
86PIC refers to Public and Indian Housing Information Center. The data file contains an annual extract of
recipients of voucher-supported housing and public housing, submitted by housing authorities and providers.
For other research using the HUD-PIC extract file, see Lubell et al. [2003]; Mills et al. [2006]; Olsen et al.
[2005]; Shroder [2002]; and Tatian and Snow [2005]. We do not use the HUD-TRACS (Tenant Rental
Assistance Certification System) since those data apply to project-based Section 8 subsidies.
87For a description of the LEHD infrastructure files and public statistics, see Abowd et al. [2004].
88For cases where a PIK has been assigned to multiple responses (less than 1 percent) we drop all cases,
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ple including records with no PIK, we estimate a logistic regression for whether or not a
person response has a PIK, with explanatory variables including the number of persons in
a household, the number of children, housing tenure as well as person age, gender, race,
ethnicity and state fixed effects based on the year 2000 location.89 To retain a representa-
tive sample of records with a PIK, we reweight them using the inverse of the probability of
having a PIK, based on the model.
Housing Subsidy
The HUD-PIC file provides detailed information on public housing and Housing Choice
Voucher recipients during our study period from 1997 to 2005. As part of their housing
occupancy verification process, local housing authorities provide HUD with the identities
of residents, which HUD then compiles into an annual relational database. Table 1 presents
characteristics of public and voucher supported housing participants from public use data
derived from the HUD-PIC file. In 2000, households averaged approximately $10,000 in
annual income, which was about a quarter of metropolitan area median income.
The person-level file used at the Census Bureau includes demographic and housing
unit information, but this study only makes use of occupancy as an indicator of housing
treatment. We match PIKs from the decennial file to the HUD-PIC file and identify whether
a child resided in public or voucher housing in each year from 1997 to 2005. We consider
a child to be a HUD-subsidized resident in a particular year if their PIK appears in the
HUD administrative data and if that individual is still under the age of 18.90 Thus, the
maximum number of years a child could reside in HUD housing is 6 years before turning
18, which could occur for a 13-year-old first residing in subsidized housing in or before
2000. An 18-year-old in 2000 could only reside in HUD-subsidized housing for at most 4
unless all observable characteristics (date of birth, race, ethnicity, gender, geographic location) are identical,
in which case one record is retained.
89Characteristics highly associated with not having a PIK include race, ethnicity, age, and sex.
90We do not count individuals who are under 18 in 2000 but over 18 when we observe them in the HUD
administrative data as being HUD residents.
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years (beginning in 1997).
We construct an indicator variable for whether a teen resided in either public or voucher
housing any time between 1997 and 2005. Our goal is to estimate the effect of this binary
treatment variable on labor market outcomes. We also examine the effect of a treatment
“dose” variable that could take on values from 0 to 6 for the count of (post-1996) years a
child resides in voucher or public housing.
There are three exclusions we found necessary to avoid sample contamination due to
possible measurement error. First, we exclude all households owning a home in 2000
(based on the decennial census response). While individuals in such households could end
up in subsidized housing later in the decade, we decided they may not be representative of
renter households eligible for subsidized housing. Second, we require that each teenager’s
parents earn less than 50 percent of HUD-specified Area Median Income (AMI) on average
while the child is a teenager.91 Third, we excluded households who lived in the 119 coun-
ties participating in HUD’s Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration (see Abravanel et al.
2004). Local housing authorities participating in the demonstration were permitted to stop
reporting administrative data to HUD on participants. We excluded these counties to avoid
misinterpreting changes in housing authority reporting requirements as within-household
differences in subsidized housing participation.
Labor Market Outcomes
LEHD, a partnership between the Census Bureau and all 50 states and the District of
Columbia, produces public use data tabulations that are widely used by state and local
governments.92 At its core are two administrative records files provided by states on a
quarterly basis: (1) unemployment insurance (UI) wage records, giving the earnings of
91We use average annual total labor income from years where the child is between 13 and 18 years of
age. To avoid dropping observations that do not match to the Composite Person Record (CPR) we use the
2000 census residence county to define AMI. HUD defines AMI using American Community Survey data;
specified proportions of AMI are used as eligibility and priority criteria.
92LEHD data products include the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, the LEHD Origin-Destination Em-
ployment Statistics (LODES), Job-to-Job Flows.
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each worker at each employer, and (2) employer reports giving establishment-level data,
also known as the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), but often re-
ferred to as the ‘ES-202’ program. The coverage is roughly 96 percent of private non-farm
wage and salary employment [Stevens, 2007].93
The longitudinal LEHD data are based on quarterly earnings information for more than
130 million U.S. workers and their employers covered under state UI systems beginning in
the mid-1990s and continuing to the present, essentially a universe of workers. The longi-
tudinal data thus permit the measurement of complete employment “histories” beginning
with a person’s entrance into the labor force. This information includes earnings, employ-
ment status and industry, along with other work and home location information. Thus,
LEHD wage data matched to the Census 2000 data enable us to track a large set of children
into adulthood and measure earnings and employment outcomes. For our purposes, the
national nature of the files and complete work histories enable us to compute outcome
measures for individuals over any given horizon such as the number of quarters worked,
cumulative number of jobs, the number of spells of joblessness, the durations of spells of
joblessness, and the earnings levels and its growth within and between jobs.
For regression purposes, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of earnings94 rather
than the more traditional log of earnings because estimated coefficients can be interpreted
in the same way as with a log transformed dependent variable but, unlike with the log of








where yi is total earnings for individual i (see Burbidge et al., 1988).
93LEHD is in the process of integrating data on self-employed individuals and independent contractors
who are not covered in the UI files but are available from the Census Bureau’s Business Register which
contains the universe of all businesses including all sole proprietorships on an annual basis (whether the sole
proprietor has employees or is a non-employer). In addition, the LEHD project has acquired the personnel
records from Office of Personnel Management (OPM) so that federal workers are now also tracked in the file
system. This study does not yet make use of these new data sources, but may in future versions. For more
information on the LEHD, see Abowd et al. [2004].
94Annual earnings are deflated to their 2000 purchasing power equivalent using the U.S. city average
annual purchasing power for all urban consumers.
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Other Factors Varying Within Households
We introduce additional geographic data to address time-varying but spatially constant
household factors. The LEHD program maintains an annual place of residence file com-
posed of federal administrative data known as the Composite Person Record (CPR). LEHD
uses CPR residences, which begin in 1999, for imputation models and for the residence
component of publis use data. We identify a residence census block for each child from
1999-2005 where available (approximately 10 percent of children are missing a CPR res-
idence in each year). Where possible, we match the child residence to block group-level
tabulations from Census 2000, giving neighborhood characteristics such as the poverty rate.
In addition to using LEHD earnings to construct outcome measures for the teenagers,
we use parent’s LEHD earnings to determine sample eligibility and to construct an annual
measure of household income for 1997 to 2005 to use as a control variable. HUD defines
eligibility for its assistance programs based on family income as a percentage of Area
Median Income (AMI), which adjusts for area income and for family size.95 For each teen,
we calculate average parents’ earnings (the sum of earnings for the head of household and
the spouse of the head of household) while the child was a teenager (also transformed into
the IHS of average income to match the dependent variable). Additionally, we use each
household’s location in 2000 and household size in 2000 matched to their average parents’
LEHD earnings to identify AMI figures at the county level. We then create a ratio of
parents’ earnings to AMI in order to account for the differences in average earnings across
regions, which can vary by almost $75,000 for metropolitan areas within the U.S. Since
local housing authorities often require that a household earn less than 50 percent of AMI to
be eligible for assistance, we retain only children in households with a parents’ earnings-
to-AMI measure below 0.5, so that the analysis sample includes only those widely eligible
95Under most HUD programs, households pay 30 percent of their income for rent with HUD subsidizing
the remainder or up to a fixed local “Fair Market Rent.” Actual program requirements vary by subsidy type,
but generally require residents to earn less than 80 percent of AMI (low income), with additional requirements
dictating the percentage of residents that must be “very low income” (at or below 50 percent of AMI) or
“extremely low income” (at or below 30 percent of AMI).
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for the subsidized housing treatment. As with the labor market outcomes, some households
may appear to have lower incomes because they do not work in UI-covered employment. In
future work, we will assess the significance of such omissions for our sample composition.
We employ both the composite of neighborhood (at the Census block group-level)
poverty and the IHS or average annual parents’ earnings between the ages of 13-18 as
control variables in some specifications. Aaronson [1998] examined whether cross-sibling
variation in household income is associated with moves across neighborhoods. Likewise,
we acknowledge that changes in household income may be directly associated with moves
into and out of subsidized housing. Controlling for the household income during the period
each sibling is between 13-18 should alleviate these concerns. Controlling for changes in
the poverty rate when each sibling is between 13-18 is designed to capture one of the mech-
anisms for the impact of subsidized housing. As such, we interpret adding each of these
two longitudinal controls somewhat differently. We interpret specifications with controls
for parents’ earnings as a robustness check on the importance of unobserved, time-varying
characteristics, and those with controls for block group percent poverty as a test of one
potential causal mechanism.
5 The Sample: Basic Facts
In sum, to be included in the estimation sample, we require that individuals have been
between 13 and 18 years of age in the year 2000, have non-missing values for age, gen-
der, ethnicity, treatment status, and residential location, have successfully been assigned
a unique PIK based on the 2000 Census, and be from the same 2000 renter household as
at least one other teenager. Finally, because not all households are eligible for subsidized
housing, we limit our sample to teenagers from households more likely to qualify for hous-
ing assistance, with average annual earnings below 50 percent of local AMI (see above).
Of the 2.8 million children aged 13-18 in the U.S. in 2000, we end up with a final sample
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size of 521,000 teenagers.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for this sample.96 The first column presents sum-
mary statistics for the sample used in estimation – teenagers living with another sibling
aged 13-18. This sample is subdivided further, into those who were in households not
in subsidized housing anytime during the 1997-2005 study period (column 2), and those
who were (column 3); the latter are then subdivided further, into those who never lived in
subsidized housing as a teenager 13-18 (column 4), and those who did (column 5). The
comparison between columns 4 and 5 is the raw differences analog to our main empirical
results.
There are a few minor differences between the estimation sample (column 1) and the
full sample of teenagers; that is, the sample including cases in which there is only one
teenager in the household (not shown). Of course, since we require that the estimation
sample have at least two teenagers aged 13-18, the average household size is bigger. In
the estimation sample, the proportion which is non-Hispanic Black is slightly higher, the
proportion in single-parent households is slightly lower, and the proportion receiving a
housing subsidy is slightly higher. These differences relate to the generalizability of the
study, but have no bearing on the identification approach.
Comparison of columns 2 and 3 foreshadow the likely findings from an OLS regression.
There are substantial differences in the outcome variables examined – those in subsidized
housing earned less during the 2008-2010 period ($24,651 versus $32,443 on average),
they worked fewer quarters (6.540 versus 7.209 on average), and a lower percentage had
any labor market earnings during the 2008-2010 period (80.6 percent versus 83.3 percent).
Comparisons of columns 4 and 5 foreshadow the likely findings from a household fixed
effects regression–there are few differences apparent from the comparison. But uncondi-
tional differences are not likely to tell the whole story, nor do these comparisons only use
96Confidentiality restrictions preclude us from releasing summary statistics for the entire sample of 13-18
year old children from the 2000 census.
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within-household variation, so we now turn to the regression analysis.97
Figure 1 displays the distribution of within-household differences—each teenager’s
own subsidized housing participation net the household mean for all teenagers–we use to
identify our regression model. The figure is based on the sample in Table 2, Column 3, but
teenagers are also required to be from households with at least some within-household dif-
ference in subsidized housing participation among the household members aged 13-18.98
This sub-sample included 41.7 percent of housing voucher participants and 69.3 percent of
public housing participants. The distribution is unimodal and symmetric around zero, with
an overwhelming majority of teenagers within two years of the household mean participa-
tion.
Given the identification strategy we employ, an important question is what causes the
observed within-household differences in subsidized housing participation?
We define treatment as teenage—i.e. between the ages of 13 and 18—participation
in subsidized housing. However, for sample members who are 17 or 18 years of age in
2000, we are unable to observe their subsidized housing participation at age 13 (or age
14 for individuals aged 18 in 2000) because our administrative records begin in 1997. As
a result, it is possible that some of the within-household variation results from this left-
censoring of treatment. We test for the importance of censoring by limiting the sample
to only teenagers aged 13-16 in 2000; that is, those teenagers with uncensored treatment.
We find no differences between our main estimates and the results run on the age-limited
sample.99 Therefore, while some of the observed within-household variation may result
from age censoring, this variation does not drive the empirical results we present later.
Similarly, measurement error in the administrative subsidized housing records could
create within-household variation. For example, if for some reason HUD’s enumeration of
97Only 15 percent of children in the ever-subsidized household sample receive no subsidy between the
ages 13-18. This might seem to be a small subset to serve as a “control” sample for the effect of a subsidy in
the dummy treatment variable regressions. Note, however, that we also estimate models with a dose treatment
variable, allowing for wider variation in subsidy receipt.
98The restriction that teenagers have some within-household variation is made for expositional purposes.
99Results available upon request.
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children in a household is incomplete in one year, we would incorrectly interpret the in-
complete record as within-household heterogeneity in subsidized housing participation. To
account for this possibility, we present a robustness check that predicts subsidized housing
participation for each teenager using just their age and the observed participation of their
head of household from the 2000 census. This predicted treatment is not subject to differ-
ential measurement error within a household. We show both reduced form estimates that
use predicted participation to define treatment and IV estimates that instrument for actual
participation with the predicted participation. The results suggest that measurement error
in the administrative records does not drive our estimates or explain the within-household
differences we observe.
A third possibility, is that changes in parental income or earnings could alter house-
hold eligibility for different types of subsidized housing. This is potentially problematic
for our identification strategy as household fixed effects do not account for this type of
time-varying heterogeneity. As we discuss in more detail later in the paper, we develop
a longitudinal, child-specific measure of parental earnings using the LEHD data and test
whether our results are affected by its inclusion as a control variable. In short, the main
estimates are unaffected. Given the extensive literature suggesting parents earnings have
a strong positive relationship with child earnings (see Chetty et al., 2014 for a recent ex-
ample), this suggests that within-household (i.e. longitudinal) changes in parental income
and earnings are unlikely to explain much of the within-household variation in subsidized
housing participation.
In their research estimating the impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on
earnings, Chetty et al. [2013] use changes in information about the existence and shape
of the EITC benefit for identification. As with EITC, it is possible that eligible house-
holds are not aware of the location of public housing projects, their own eligibility for
public or voucher-assisted housing, or how to apply to either program. If households ac-
quire information about one or both programs while they have multiple teenage children,
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it could prompt them to apply for subsidized housing or to switch between the two pro-
grams. This would then create within-household variation in teenage subsidized housing
participation. Further, this within-household variation would be unrelated to the potential
outcomes of children, having been driven instead by the timing of an information shock
to the household. Unfortunately, while this seems plausible and remains a likely explana-
tion for within-household variation in treatment, we have no way to test empirically for the
existence of such information shocks.
Finally, as pointed out by Jacob and Ludwig [2012] and others, subsidized housing
programs are frequently oversubscribed, leading to lengthy lags between when households
apply for a particular program and when they are allotted a voucher or public housing unit.
Households that apply to an oversubscribed subsidized housing program may end up with
children exposed to different amounts of the program purely as a result of their mandated
wait time. Consider a household with one 13-year-old and one 12-year-old that applies for
a public housing program, is placed on the waitlist for one year, and then remains in that
project. In the absence of the wait time, both children would experience the same amount
of teenage public housing participation: six years each. However, because of the one year
wait, the 13-year-old will end up spending only five teenage years in public housing while
the 12-year-old will spend six.
There also appear to be substantial wait times for both public and voucher-assisted
housing in our sample. To illustrate these wait times, we use data on all subsidized housing
participants from the year 2000. For most households, the data contain information on the
date they entered a waitlist as well as the date they were granted admission to the program.
In some cases the two dates are the same, indicating there was no wait for the program.
For most households there was a non-trivial wait between when they were placed on a
waitlist and when they were admitted. Figure 2 displays the distribution of wait times for
individuals in voucher and public housing who entered subsidized housing no earlier than
1995 and who were found in subsidized housing in 2000. We restrict the entrance date to
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be after 1995 because data quality decreases rapidly in the early 1990s and because these
waits are likely to be a better approximation to the waits experienced by the households
in our sample. Figure 2 indicates that about 12% of public housing residents and 29% of
housing voucher recipients faced wait times of one year or more. Clearly, many perspective
subsidized housing participants face lengthy lags between when they apply and when they
are admitted to programs. These lags offer another plausible explanation for the observed
within-household differences in subsidized housing participation.
6 Empirical Results
Samples and Specifications
The key question we address is whether living in voucher-supported or public housing
affects a teenager’s labor market experiences as an adult. We compare the effects on earn-
ings over the 2008-10 period of each of these two HUD housing types with nonsubsidized
housing.100
Table 3 presents results for teenagers from all households while Tables 4, 5, and 6
present results for teenagers from non-Hispanic White households, non-Hispanic Black
households, and Hispanic households, respectively. Each table presents results for a
“dummy treatment,” which consists of a binary measure of whether an individual ever par-
ticipated in each type of subsidized housing as a teenager, and a “dose treatment,” which is
defined as the number of years an individual participated in each type of subsidized hous-
ing while under the age of 18. As described above, the dependent variable is the inverse
hyperbolic sine of total earnings over the 2008-10 period. In addition to the treatment
variables interacted with gender, unlisted controls include age, gender, age by gender, and
100In unreported results, we have also used the total number of quarters worked over the 2008 to 2010
period and an indicator for whether the individual ever worked during the 2008 to 2010 period as dependent
variables. The results are qualitatively consistent regardless of which measure of labor market performance
is used.
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household race/ethnicity by gender.101 Table 7 presents the effect of each type of housing
subsidy, separately for each sex and household race-ethnicity type, and it compares the
estimated effect across gender and across the two subsidized housing types within each
possible sex/household race-ethnicity combination.
In Tables 3 through 6, the first column presents OLS estimates of the specification de-
scribed in equation (47). The coefficients capture the correlation between earnings and the
two different types of subsidized housing participation after controlling for observed co-
variates, but, as discussed before, are susceptible to bias as a result of selection based on
unobservable factors. The second column in each table presents estimates from the house-
hold fixed effects (HFE) specification, described in equation (48). By using only within-
household variation, these estimates purge the treatment effects of all bias resulting from
time-invariant, household-level unobserved characteristics. We believe these estimates bet-
ter capture the causal effect of subsidized housing participation as a teenager on adult labor
market earnings.
The third, fourth, and fifth columns in each table presents results from a HFE specifi-
cation that, in addition to the controls in column (2), also includes, in column (3), a control
for the average parents’ earnings that each individual experienced between 13 and 18 and
its interaction with a male dummy, in column (4) a control for average block group per-
cent poverty that each child experienced between 13 and 18 years of age and its interaction
with a male dummy, and in column (5) controls for both parents’ earnings and block group
poverty and their interactions with male dummies. We interpret the estimates in Column 3
as a test for whether our household fixed effects are effectively ridding the treatment effects
of bias from unobserved, time-varying heterogeneity. Specifically, if our treatment effects
do not change after the inclusion of parents’ earnings, then either the within-household
differences in subsidized housing participation or the within-household differences in adult
earnings (or both) are unrelated to within-household differences in parents’ earnings. Sim-
101The complete regression results as well as the results for the other measures of labor market performance
(cf. footnote 24) are available from the authors.
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ilarly, the estimates in column 4 are an indicator of whether neighborhood quality, as prox-
ied by block-group percent poverty, is a potential mechanism for the estimated treatment
effects. Column 5 accounts for both factors.
Results for all Households
We now turn to the coefficients of interest beginning with the estimates that pool across
household race/ethnicity in Table 3. In column (1) , for both the dummy and dose treat-
ments, the OLS results show that there are significant negative effects on subsequent total
earnings with larger negative effects for males. Significant negative relationships between
the two types of subsidized housing participation and adult earnings also occur in each of
the race/ethnicity groups (Tables 4-6), although magnitudes vary.
However, the HFE results, which control for all household level time-invariant het-
erogeneity, paint an entirely different picture; the HFE results for females and males are
summarized in Table 7, Panel A. The negative effects from OLS are attenuated or reversed.
Housing voucher participation is not negatively related to adult earnings for females in
the HFE specification. Both living in public housing and living in a housing voucher-
subsidized unit lead to positive and significant effects on later earnings for females. The
effect of voucher participation remains negative and statistically significant for males with
the dummy treatment, and is not statistically different from zero for public housing. The
effects estimated for the dose treatment (years) reinforces the findings of the dummy treat-
ment. The effects for males are significantly more negative than the effects for females in
both the dummy and dose case. For the dummy treatment, public housing is more bene-
ficial than housing vouchers for both females and males (no difference was found for the
dose treatment).
The point estimate suggests that ever having lived in voucher-supported housing as
a teenager increases early adult earnings by roughly 14 percent for females and reduces
earnings by roughly 24 percent for males. The dose results indicate that each additional
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year of voucher participation increases adult earnings for females by about 6 percent and
reduces adult earnings for males by 3 percent. For public housing, the relationship between
participation and future earnings is not significantly different from zero for males, in both
the dummy and dose cases, but is positive and significant for females. The point estimate
suggests that for females, ever having lived in public housing as a teenager increases adult
earnings by roughly 29 percent. The dose result suggest that each additional year of public
housing participation increases early adult earnings for females by 9 percent.
The results in columns 3 and 4, which add controls for average parents’ earnings and
average block group percent poverty, are essentially unchanged. In the following subsec-
tion, we find that columns 2 and 3 are similar even when allowing the results to differ for
different race/ethnicity samples. We believe this indicates that the household fixed effects
specification is effectively ridding the treatment effects of bias from unobserved, time-
varying heterogeneity. Consequently, we report just the simple HFE results in the text (and
Table 7) below.
Race/Ethnicity Samples
To help understand the results in Table 3, we investigate whether the results differ by house-
hold race-ethnicity. Tables 4 through 6 thus explore whether there is treatment effect het-
erogeneity by household race-ethnicity. We do this by estimating coefficients separately
for non-Hispanic White households, non-Hispanic Black households, and Hispanic house-
holds. Comparing results across these three subgroups (see Table 7 for a summary), we
find important differences. For example, the HFE results show substantial positive effects
of both living in voucher-supported housing and in public housing on young adult earnings
for Black females, but not for Black males or for any subset of Hispanics or non-Hispanic
Whites (there is actually a negative effect of housing vouchers on earnings for Hispanic
males). The dose results generally echo the dummy results, except that we find a positive
effect on later earnings for non-Hispanic Black males who lived in public housing. Clearly,
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there is important heterogeneity across race/ethnicity groups, affirming the importance of
considering these groups separately.
The positive effects for non-Hispanic Black females suggest they receive an earnings
premium of 15 percent from participating in the housing voucher program and 18 percent
from living in public housing relative to not having participated in either program. The
dose results indicate that each program increases earnings relative to non-participants by
about 6 percent per year. Non-Hispanic Black males also see their adult earnings increase
as a result of public housing participation, by about 7 percent per year of residence. The
estimate for Hispanic males indicates that voucher housing decreases adult earnings by
about 8 percent.
Table 7, in addition to displaying the average partial effects of each type of subsidized
housing separately by gender, also displays tests of whether the effects of each type of
subsidized housing are equal. For example, we test whether the effect of voucher housing
for females is the same as the effect of public housing for females. We conduct this test
for each possible household race/sex combination, and for both the dummy and dose treat-
ments. For the combined sample, we find that vouchers lead to lower male outcomes than
public housing for the dummy but not the dose treatments. For the subsamples, this result is
apparently driven by the result for non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic males; there was one
significant dose treatment difference – for non-Hispanic Black females. When comparing
the estimates for females to those for males, the results differ for non-Hispanic Blacks in
voucher housing, and for non-Hispanic Whites in public housing. Though there are dif-
ferences between males and females for the combined sample, there are no statistically
different effects when the samples are disaggregated by race/ethnicity.
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7 Extensions and Robustness Checks
We undertake three extensions in an attempt to understand these results in more detail. As
much of the discussion of public housing in the popular media concerns high-rise projects
primarily found in urban areas, we check whether the effect of living in a large public hous-
ing project is different from the overall results. That is, we allow for the effect of public
housing participation to differ according to project size (population). To do so, we defined
person-weighted project size quartiles by considering all public housing projects over the
period 1997-2005. On the basis of these quartiles, it was determined whether each indi-
vidual in our sample who ever participated in public housing was also a resident of large
public housing (the top quartile). We then included either an indicator for whether each
teenager in our sample ever lived in a large public housing project or a count of the number
of years each teenager lived in a large public housing project in addition to the measures of
housing voucher participation and general public housing participation included in previ-
ous specifications. The coefficient estimates from household fixed effects specifications for
these large public housing measures capture any differential effect that large public housing
residence as a teenager has on adult earnings. Table 8 presents these results. The estimated
coefficients on the housing voucher and general public housing measures are almost iden-
tical to those from the more basic household fixed effects specification. This suggests the
heterogeneity with respect to project size in the effect of public housing is not particu-
larly important empirically. In no column is the differential effect of large public housing
significantly different from zero for females or for males. We therefore find no evidence
to support the idea that living in a large public housing project is particularly harmful for
children’s later earnings.
Similarly, it might be the case that being assigned to a public housing project where
households earn relatively low annual incomes has a differential impact on adult outcomes.
Such a differential effect could exist as a result of role model effects (e.g. observing adults
who supply more labor while a teenager increases labor supply as an adult) or if project
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level social networks enable individuals to find a job or a higher paying job more eas-
ily. To test for heterogeneity by project-level household income, we compute the person-
weighted median household adjusted income for each project year.102 Next, we create
year-specific quartiles and assign each project-year to a quartile. Teenagers in our sample
are then matched to the public housing project and the associated household income quar-
tile for each year they participated in public housing. We define the lowest-income public
projects as those that fall into the bottom quartile with respect to median household annual
adjusted income. This match is used to create an indicator for whether each teenager ever
resided in a lowest-income public housing project and a count of the number of years they
resided there. These measures are then included, in addition to the housing voucher and
general public housing measures, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Table 9 presents
the household fixed effects estimates from these specifications. Allowing for the effect of
public housing to differ by median household income has almost no impact on the main
estimates. Further, there appears to be no additional impact of living in one of the lowest-
income public housing projects for either males or females. Taken together, Tables 8 and
9 indicate little heterogeneity in the estimated treatment effect of public housing along
project-type dimensions.
One additional robustness check we conduct deals with possible measurement error as
well as endogenous changes in the structure of households. Specifically, in Table 10 we
use a predicted rather than the actual indicator of being in public or voucher housing. To
construct the predicted value, we use the age of the children in the household and the actual
information on whether the parent is in subsidized housing. That is, for any given year, if
a parent is in subsidized housing and the child is in the 13-18 year-old age range, then the
“predicted” participation measure indicates that the child is in subsidized housing. Differ-
ences between actual and predicted measures of participation might arise for two reasons,
both of which we would like to avoid. The first is measurement error. The second is that
102HUD computes adjusted annual income on the basis of household-type (elderly, disabled, family), the
number of dependents in the household and income net of certain child care, medical and disability expenses.
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the child left the household while still aged 13-18. Such departures might reflect events
(e.g. a child leaving to live with a member of the extended family such as a grandparent)
that have an impact on later outcomes but are unrelated to the mechanisms we are seeking
to identify. Using this approach, Table 10 reports results for using the actual treatment
(the same as Table 3), using the predicted treatment instead of the actual treatment, and
instrumenting the actual treatment with the predicted treatment. The results in Table 10
are strikingly similar when using any of the participation definitions. This suggests that
measurement error and household departures/dissolutions are not importantly affecting the
estimated effects of subsidized housing participation.
8 Concluding Comments
In spite of the policy relevance of having a sound understanding of the effects of subsidized
rental housing on long-term outcomes, the existing literature is clearly lacking. In this pa-
per, we report results from a project that fills important gaps in this literature by estimating
the long-term causal effects of public housinng and voucher assisted housing participation
as a teenager on adult earnings.
Our use of national data on housing assistance, households, and earnings from adminis-
trative records, censuses, and surveys at the U.S. Census Bureau makes these contributions
possible. The data permit us to identify households with children between the ages of 13-18
in the year 2000, follow those children across a variety of settings of assisted and unassisted
rental housing, and then to investigate their employment and earnings up to 10 years later.
We recognize that unobserved heterogeneity and the associated selection bias is an ob-
stacle to estimating causal effects of housing. To overcome this issue, we exploit the very
large sample size and longitudinal nature of the data and estimate household fixed effects
models that identify the impact of assisted housing by exploiting variation within house-
holds. We also consider specifications that include time-varying household measures that
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may vary across children, including parent’s income and average neighborhood poverty, but
these controls do not affect our estimates. One main finding is that the substantial negative
effects of subsidized housing often found in the literature may be largely attributable to the
negative selection of households entering assisted housing. A second main finding is that
having controlled for unobservable heterogeneity with household fixed effects, subsidized
housing participation as a teenager yields large positive effects on young adult earnings for
females. For males we generally find no effect though in some cases the effect on earnings
appears slightly negative.
The point estimates suggest that young adult females earn 14 percent more if they ever
resided in voucher housing and 29 percent more if they ever resided in public housing.
The corresponding estimates from the dose treatment indicate that each additional year of
voucher-supported housing participation increases earnings by 6 percent for females while
each additional year of public housing increases female earnings by 9 percent.
We disaggregate our sample by the race/ethnicity of households, to reflect the differ-
ent contexts in which households select into assisted housing. We find results that differ
considerably by race/ethnicity. IN particular, non-Hispanic Blacks, and especially non-
Hispanic Black females, benefit more than Hispanics or non-Hispanic Whites. Thus, the
main finding of a large, positive effect for females is primarily driven by the impact on
Black females. The findings for Black teenagers are in strong contrast to the findings for
non-Hispanic White and Hispanic teenagers. There were no significant positive or negative
findings for Non-Hispanic White male or female earnings as a young adult. We also find
few significant results for Hispanic teenagers.
We also investigated heterogeneous treatment effects by type of public housing (project
size and project median income). We found no evidence that the effects of public housing
on labor market outcomes varies along these dimensions. We also conducted robustness
checks for measurement error and endogenous changes in family structure and found our
results were robust to these concerns.
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There remain a number of limitations of our analysis. First, our results apply to just two
of the many subsidized housing programs, albeit the largest – public housing and housing
vouchers. Second, our results might not be representative of all subsidized households (that
is, households with younger children, and those with just one teenager). In this regard, our
results pertain only teenagers between the ages 13 and 18. While this is a formative pe-
riod, other research on siblings has shown that within-sibling differences in environment
occurring early in childhood or even before birth can be critical. Future work should inves-






Number of people per unit 2.3 2.7
Rent per month $202 $226 
Household income per year $10,000 $10,600 
Average months on waiting list 15 26
Average months since moved in 107 52
Percent of households where majority of 
income is derived from welfare
11% 12%
Percent of metropolitan area median income 25 23
Percent of households with children 45 61
Percent minority 69 61
Percent moved in past year 10 15
Percent with 0 or 1 bedrooms 48 25
Percent with 2 bedrooms 25 39
Percent with 3 or more bedrooms 27 35
Total Households 1,282,099 1,817,360
Source: HUDUSER, HUD Public Use Data.
Table 1: Characteristics of Households Receiving
 Federal Rental Subsidies in the 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Females (F) 0.135** 0.292*** Yes** 0.062*** 0.088*** No
0.046 0.059 0.012 0.018
Males (M) -0.236*** -0.068 Yes* -0.027** 0.002 No
0.048 0.064 0.013 0.019
Are Subsidy Effects Different? (F vs. M) Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Non-Hispanic White Households
Females 0.005 -0.082 No 0.033 0.016 No
0.088 0.125 0.026 0.045
Males 0.003 0.165 No 0.025 0.066 No
0.09 0.136 0.026 0.048
Are Subsidy Effects Different? (F vs. M) No Yes* No No
Non-Hispanic Black Households
Females 0.145* 0.177* No 0.061*** 0.058* Yes*
0.066 0.078 0.018 0.024
Males -0.084 0.126 Yes** 0.028 0.070*** No
0.071 0.087 0.019 0.025
Are Subsidy Effects Different? (F vs. M) Yes*** No No No
Hispanic Households
Females -0.159 0.108 No 0.005 0.033 No
0.101 0.133 0.026 0.038
Males -0.184* 0.089 Yes* -0.014 0.016 No
0.104 0.137 0.026 0.039
Are Subsidy Effects Different? (F vs. M) No No No No
Dummy Dose
Table 7: Summary of the Household Fixed Effects Estimates 
 By Gender and Race/Ethnicity
NOTES: All columns present household fixed effects estimates of the effect o subsidized housing 
participation as a teenager on the inverse hyperbolic sine of total earnings 2008-2010. Estimates do not 
control for parents’ earnings as a teenager or average block group percent poverty as a teenager but include 
a male indicator and a full set of age in years by male fixed effects. Observations rounded to the nearest 
thousand (All: 521,000; non-Hispanic White: 197,000; non-Hispanic Black: 162,000; Hispanic: 123,000). 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.135** 0.168* 0.194* 0.062*** 0.045** 0.054*
0.046 0.066 0.099 0.012 0.017 0.021
-0.371*** -0.403*** -0.474*** -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.108***
0.04 0.04 0.047 0.01 0.01 0.012
0.292*** 0.217* 0.278 0.088*** 0.043 0.052
0.059 0.091 0.15 0.018 0.025 0.033
-0.360*** -0.383*** -0.460*** -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.105***
0.053 0.054 0.065 0.014 0.014 0.017
Male*Lives in public housing
NOTES: Number of observations = 520,000. Table 10 presents only the coefficients on the two housing subsidy measures 
and their interactions with a male indicator from six different specifications. The HFE columns repeats the estimates from 
our main household fixed effects specifications to simplify comparison. The HFE Predicted columns present household 
fixed effects regressions where we define participation in subsidized housing using the 2000 head of household’s 
movements in and out of subsidized housing, as well as an individual’s age, to define program participation, instead of 
observed participation from the teenager's administrative record. The HFE IV columns use the predicted treatment as an 
instrument for the teenager’s actual treatment in a fixed effects instrumental variables specification. In both cases, the first 
stage F-statistics are well above conventional thresholds for weak instruments. In all columns the inverse hyperbolic sine of 
earnings between 2008 and 2010 is the dependent variable.
Table 10: Subsidized Housing Residence and Adult Earnings 
Using Actual Participation, Predicted Participation, and Actual Instrumented by Predicted Participation
Dummy Dose
Lives in a household receiving a housing 
voucher
Male*Lives in a household receiving a 
housing voucher
Lives in public housing
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11 Appendix A: Major U.S. Subsidized Rental Housing
Programs
There are a wide variety of subsidized housing programs in the United States. Beginning in
the 1930s, the U.S. government built public housing projects, and for decades, the program
continued to be the primary means of federal assistance for rental housing. The Housing
Act of 1949 introduced income limits and “Fair Market Rents” along with subsidies that
would incentivize private development of low-cost housing and were further expanded in
the late 1960s. In the 1980s, production was drastically reduced as housing assistance be-
came a more decentralized effort, and no federal public housing has been built since 1981.
A “regime change” in the mid-1980s additionally introduced even stricter requirements to
focus assistance on the poorest households. There were about 1.4 million public housing
units in 1990, falling to just under 1.3 million in 2000, and about 1.1 million in 2008. The
reduction in these numbers reflects demolition of the worst-performing projects starting in
the 1990s. In these cases, under the HOPE VI program, tenants are typically given housing
vouchers to find housing elsewhere (Popkin et al. 2004). Today, over 3,000 Public Hous-
ing Authorities administer public housing projects, mostly for the very poor and typically
neighborhoods that are predominantly low-income.
The Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP) provides direct rental assistance to
housing tenants through vouchers. The Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Reha-
bilitation project-based subsidy program assists owners of housing units so that they may
charge affordable rents; it accounted for almost 900,000 units in 2000. Note that these
households are much smaller and live in smaller dwellings than their counterparts in resid-
ing public housing or receiving vouchers. This reflects in part the large share of elderly
occupants.
While Section 8 subsidized housing began as project-based housing subsidy in 1974 and
at that time was based on new construction, now much of the housing historically referred
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to as Section 8 housing is found in the tenant-based HCVP program. HCVP has developed
more recently and is solely a demand-side, tenant-based subsidy program. Stemming from
the ambitious Experimental Housing Allowance Program of the 1970s (see Friedman and
Weinberg, 1982, 1983) this program brings a different perspective to housing policy by
separating itself from new production. Rather than choosing among specific subsidized
housing locations, voucher recipients may live in any structurally adequate rental housing in
a specified rent and size range, with the Federal subsidy making the unit affordable. Public
Housing Authorities may to allocate up to 20 percent of their HCVP funds for project-based
vouchers that are tied to specific private housing developments, rather than to the tenant.
Tenant vouchers can be used by those wishing to live in Low Income Housing Tax Credit
housing (described below) and thus there is the potential for multiple types of subsidies
for a given unit. This program provides anonymity and a choice of locations, although
landlord willingness to participate limits its extent. There were about 1.1 million voucher
households in 1990, growing dramatically to 1.8 million in 2000, and continuing to grow.
Currently, over 30 percent of U.S. subsidized housing is provided by vouchers.
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program began with the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act, and was expanded by 40 percent in 2001. Unlike the “deep subsidies” provided
by the other three programs discussed here, LIHTC provides “shallow subsidies” in that
no ongoing operating costs are covered by the government. In this program, the U.S. gov-
ernment (through the Internal Revenue Service), provides tax credits to for-profit and non-
profit developers to build income-restricted housing. In 1990, there were about 140,000
units, growing to almost 1 million in 2000, and growing further to almost 1.7 million units
in 2008. While LIHTC housing has significant income limits for eligibility, this program
does not provide housing for the very poor. Another concern raised about the LIHTC pro-
gram is that it may crowd out nearby private investment in affordable rental housing, as
Eriksen and Rosenthal [2010] find.
173
References
Country water action: Indonesia. simple solution for drinking water makes big difference,
March 2006. URL http://www.adb.org/water/actions/ino/simple-solution.
asp.
Daniel Aaronson. Using sibling data to estimate the impact of neighborhoods on children’s
educational outcomes. The Journal of Human Resources, 33(2):915–946, 1998. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/146403.
John Abowd, John Haltiwanger, and Julia Lane. Integrated longitudinal employee-
employer data for the united states. American Economic Review, 94(2):224–229, 2004.
Kathleen Abu-Saad and Drora Fraser. Maternal nutrition and birth outcomes. Epidemio-
logic Reviews, 32:5–25, 2010. doi: 10.1093/epirev/mxq001.
A. R. A. Adegboye and B. L. Heitmann. Accuracy and correlates of maternal recall of
birthweight and gestational age. BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics & Gy-
naecology, 115(7):886–893, June 2008. ISSN 14700328. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-0528.
2008.01717.x. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0528.2008.01717.x.
Achyuta R. Adhvaryu and Anant Nyshadham. Endowments at birth and parents’ invest-
ments in children. Technical report, Yale University Working Paper, 2012.
Naeem Ahmed, Matthew Brzozowski, and Thomas F. Crossley. Measurement Errors in
Recall Food Expenditure Data. Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population Re-
search Reports, McMaster University 396, McMaster University, October 2005. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/qseprr/396.html.
Anna Aizer and Flavio Cunha. Child endowments, parental investments and the devel-
opment of human capital: Evidence from siblings. Technical report, Brown University
Working Paper, 2012.
174
Richard Akresh, Emilie Bagby, Damien de Walque, and Harounan Kazianga. Child labor,
schooling, and child ability. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 61(1):157–
186, 2012.
Douglas Almond and Janet Currie. Human capital development before age five. Technical
report, NBER, 2010.
Douglas Almond and Janet Currie. Killing me softly: The fetal origins hypothesis. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 25(3):153–72, Summer 2011. URL http://ideas.repec.
org/a/aea/jecper/v25y2011i3p153-72.html.
Douglas Almond and Bhashkar Mazumder. The 1918 influenza pandemic and subsequent
health outcomes: An analysis of sipp data. American Economic Review, 95(2):258–262,
May 2005. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v95y2005i2p258-262.
html.
Douglas Almond and Bhashkar Mazumder. Health capital and the prenatal environment:
The effect of ramadan observance during pregnancy. American Economic Journal: Ap-
plied Economics, 3(4):56–85, October 2011. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/
aejapp/v3y2011i4p56-85.html.
Douglas Almond, Kenneth Y. Chay, and David S. Lee. The costs of low birth weight.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3):1031–1083, August 2005. URL http:
//ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v120y2005i3p1031-1083.html.
Douglas Almond, Lena Edlund, and Mårten Palme. Chernobyl’s subclinical legacy: Prena-
tal exposure to radioactive fallout and school outcomes in sweden. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 124(4):1729–1772, November 2009. URL http://ideas.repec.org/
a/tpr/qjecon/v124y2009i4p1729-1772.html.
Douglas Almond, Hilary W. Hoynes, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach. Inside the war
on poverty: The impact of food stamps on birth outcomes. The Review of Economics
175
and Statistics, 93(2):387–403, December 2011. URL http://www.nber.org/papers/
w14306.
Joshua D. Angrist and William N. Evans. Children and their parents’ labor supply: Evi-
dence from exogenous variation in family size. The American Economic Review, 88(3):
pp. 450–477, 1998. ISSN 00028282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/116844.
Joshua D. Angrist and Alan B. Krueger. The effect of age at school entry on educational
attainment: An application of instrumental variables with moments from two samples.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 87(418):328–336, June 1992. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2290263.
Fred Arnold, Minja Kim Choe, and T. K. Roy. Son preference, the family-building pro-
cess and child mortality in india. Population Studies, 52(3):pp. 301–315, 1998. ISSN
00324728. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2584732.
Michael Baker and Kevin Milligan. Boy-girl differences in parental time investments: Evi-
dence from three countries. NBER Working Papers 18893, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, March 2013. URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/18893.
html.
Neil Bania, Claudia Coulton, and Laura Leete. Public housing assistance, public trans-
portation, and the welfare-to-work transition. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Develop-
ment and Research, 6(2):7–44, 2003.
Silvia H. Barcellos, Leandro Carvalho, and Adriana Lleras-Muney. Child gender and
parental investments in india: Are boys and girls treated differently? Working Pa-
per 17781, National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2012. URL http://www.
nber.org/papers/w17781.
David J.P. Barker and Phillipa M. Clark. Fetal undernutrition and disease in later life.
Reviews of Reproduction, 2:105–112, 1997.
176
DJ Barker, PD Winter, C Osmond, B Margetts, and SJ Simmonds. Weight in infancy and
death from ischaemic heart disease. Lancet, 2(8663):577–580, 1989.
D.J.P. Barker. Mothers, Babies, and Health in Later Life. Churchill Livingstone, 1998.
Gary S. Becker. An economic analysis of fertility. In Demographic and Economic Change
in Developed Countries, NBER Chapters, pages 209–240. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, December 1960. URL http://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/
2387.html.
Gary S Becker and H Gregg Lewis. On the interaction between the quantity and quality
of children. Journal of Political Economy, 81(2):S279–88, Part II, 1973. URL http:
//ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v81y1973i2ps279-88.html.
Gary S Becker and H. Gregg Lewis. Interaction between quantity and quality of children. In
Theodore W. Schultz, editor, Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human
Capital. UMI, 1974.
Gary S Becker and Nigel Tomes. Child endowments and the quantity and quality of
children. Journal of Political Economy, 84(4):S143–62, August 1976. URL http:
//ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v84y1976i4ps143-62.html.
Jere R Behrman, Robert A Pollak, and Paul Taubman. Parental preferences and provision
for progeny. Journal of Political Economy, 90(1):52–73, February 1982. URL http:
//ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v90y1982i1p52-73.html.
Yoram Ben-Porath and Finis Welch. Do sex preferences really matter? The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 90(2):285–307, May 1976. URL http://ideas.repec.org/
a/tpr/qjecon/v90y1976i2p285-307.html.
Sonia Bhalotra and Arthur van Soest. Birth-spacing, fertility and neonatal mortality in in-




Prashant Bharadwaj and Leah K. Lakdawala. Discrimination begins in the womb: Evidence
of sex-selective prenatal investments. Journal of Human Resources, 48(1):71–113, 2013.
URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/uwp/jhriss/v48y2013i1p71-113.html.
Prashant Bharadwaj, Katrine Vellesen Loken, and Christopher Neilson. Early life health
interventions and academic achievement. Technical report, Working Paper, 2012.
P. N. Mari Bhat and A. J. Francis Zavier. Fertility decline and gender bias in northern india.
Demography, 40(4):pp. 637–657, 2003. ISSN 00703370. URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/1515201.
Marianne P. Bitler and Janet Currie. Does wic work? the effects of wic on pregnancy and
birth outcomes. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24(1):pp. 73–91, 2005a.
ISSN 02768739. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326170.
Marianne P. Bitler and Janet Currie. The changing association between prenatal partic-
ipation in wic and birth outcomes in new york city: What does it mean? Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 24(4):pp. 687–690, 2005b. ISSN 02768739. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30162674.
Sandra E. Black, Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes. From the cradle to the labor mar-
ket? the effect of birth weight on adult outcomes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
122(1):pp. 409–439, 2007. ISSN 00335533. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
25098846.
Sandra E. Black, Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes. Small family, smart family?
family size and the iq scores of young men. The Journal of Human Resources, 45:
33–58, 2010. URL http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/45/1/33.refs.
178
Hoyt Bleakley. Malaria eradication in the americas: A retrospective analysis of childhood
exposure. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2:1–45, 2010. doi: 10.
1257/app.2.2.1.
Peter Boomgaard. Bridewealth and birth control: Low fertility in the indonesian
archipelago, 1500-1900. Population and Development Review, 29(2):pp. 197–214, 2003.
ISSN 00987921. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3115225.
Jennifer Brown. Rural women’s land rights in java, indonesia: Strengthened by family law,
but weakweak by land regulation. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 12, 2003.
Martin Browning, Thomas F. Crossley, and Joachim Winter. The measurement of house-
hold consumption expenditures. Annual Review of Economics, 6(1):475–501, 2014. doi:
10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041247. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-economics-080213-041247.
Kasey Buckles and Daniel Hungerman. Season of birth and later outcomes: Old questions,
new answers. Technical report, NBER Working Paper, 2010.
Kasey S. Buckles and Elizabeth L. Munnich. Birth spacing and sibling outcomes. Journal
of Human Resources, 47(3):613–642, 2012. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/uwp/
jhriss/v46y2012iii1p613-642.html.
John B Burbidge, Lonnie Magee, and A Leslie Robb. Alternative transformations to handle
extreme values of the dependent variable. Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, 83(401):123–127, 1988.
Julio Caceres-Delpiano. The impacts of family size on investment in child quality. Journal
of Human Resources, 41:738–754, 2006.
Deven Carlson, Robert Haveman, Thomas Kaplan, and Bar. Long-term effect of pub-
179
lic low-income housing vvoucher on neighborhood quality and household composition.
Journal of Housing Economics, 21:101–120, 2012a.
Deven Carlson, Robert Haveman, Thomas Kaplan, and Barbara Wolfe. Long term earnings
and employment effects of housing voucher receipt. Journal of Urban Economics, 71
(1):128–150, 2012b.
Eliana Carranza. Islamic inheritance law, son preference and fertility behavior of Muslim
couples in Indonesia. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5972, The World Bank,
February 2012. URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/5972.html.
Anne Case, Angela Fertig, and Christina Paxson. The lasting impact of childhood health
and circumstance. Journal of Health Economics, 24(2):365–389, March 2005. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jhecon/v24y2005i2p365-389.html.
Laura E Caulfield, Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blossner, and Rober E Black. Undernutrition
as an underlying cause of child deaths associated with diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria, and
measles. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 80(1):193–198, 2004.
S.M. Ceesay, A.M. Prentice, T.J. Cole, F. Ford, L.T. Weaver, E.M. Poskitt, and R.G. White-
head. Effects on birth weight and perinatal mortality of maternal dietary supplements in
rural gambia: 5 year randomized controlled trial. British Medical Journal, 315:786–790,
1997. URL http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2127544/.
Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hilger, Emmanuel Saez, Diane Whitmore
Schanzenbach, and Danny Yagan. How does your kindergarten classroom af-
fect your earnings? evidence from project star. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 126(4):1593–1660, 2011. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/
v126y2011i4p1593-1660.html.
Raj Chetty, John N Friedman, and Emmanuel Saez. Using differences in knowledge across
180
neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the eitc on earnings. American Economic Re-
view, 103(7):2683–2721, 2013.
Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez. Where is the land of
opportunity? the geography of intergenerational mobility in the united states. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 129(4):1553–1623, 2014.
CIA, 2012. URL https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.
CIA. The world factbook: Indonesia. website, June 2014. URL https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.
Shelley Clark. Son preference and sex composition of children: Evidence from india.
Demography, 37(1):95–108, February 2000. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/
demogr/v37y2000i1p95-108.html.
TF Crossley and JK Winter. Asking households about expenditures: What have we learned?
In C Carroll, TF Crossley, and J Sablehaus, editors, Improving the measurement of con-
sumer expenditures. University of Chicago Press, 2015.
Guillermo Cruces and Sebastian Galiani. Fertility and female labor supply in Latin Amer-
ica: New causal evidence. Labour Economics, Elsevier, 14(3):565–573, June 2007. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/labeco/v14y2007i3p565-573.html.
Flavio Cunha and James Heckman. The technology of skill formation. The American
Economic Review, 97(2):pp. 31–47, 2007. ISSN 00028282. URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/30034418.
Flavio Cunha, James J. Heckman, and Susanne M. Schennach. Estimating the technol-
ogy of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation. Econometrica, 78(3):883–931, 2010.
URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w15664.
181
Janet Currie. Healthy, wealthy, and wise: Socioeconomic status, poor health in childhood,
and human capital development. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(1):87–122, March
2009. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jeclit/v47y2009i1p87-122.html.
Janet Currie and Rosemary Hyson. Is the impact of health shocks cushioned by socioeco-
nomic status? the case of low birthweight. The American Economic Review, 89(2):pp.
245–250, 1999. ISSN 00028282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/117114.
Janet Currie and Hannes Schwandt. Within-mother analysis of seasonsl patterns in health at
birth. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
110(30):1–6, 2013. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1307582110.
Janet Currie and Tom Vogl. Early-life health and adult circumstance in devel-
oping countries. Annual Review of Economics, 5:1–36, 2013. doi: 10.1146/
annurev-economics-081412-103704. URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/
abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-081412-103704.
Janet Currie and Reed Walker. Traffic congestion and infant health: evidence from e-zpass.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3:65–90, 2011.
Janet Currie and Aaron Yelowitz. Are public housing projects good for kids? Journal of
Public Economics, 75:99–124, 2000.
Janet Currie, Mark Stabile, Phongsack Manivong, and Leslie L Roos. Child health and
young adult outcomes. Journal of Human Resources, 45:517–548, 2010.
F.C. Curriero, J.A. Patz, J.B. Rose, and S. Lele. The association bewteen extreme pre-
cipitation and waterborne disease outbreaks in the united states, 1948-1994. American
Journal of Public Health, 91:1194–1199, 2001. URL http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/11499103.
182
Gordon B. Dahl and Enrico Moretti. The demand for sons. Review of Economic Studies,
75:1085–1120, 2008.
J DaVanzo, L Hale, A Razzaque, and M Rahman. The effects of pregnancy spacing on
infant and child mortality in matlab, bangladesh: how they vary by the type of pregnancy
outcome that began the interval. Population Studies, 62(2):131–154, July 2008. doi:
10.1080/00324720802022089.
Mercedes de Onis, Adelheid W Onyango, Elaine Borghi, Amani Siyam, Chizuru Nishida,
and Jonathan Siekmann. Development of a who growth reference for school-aged
children and adolescents. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 85:660–667, 2007.
URL www.who.int/growthref/growthref_who_bull.pdf.
Arunachalam Dharmalingam. The social context of family size preferences and fertility
behavior in a south indian village. Genus, 52(1/2):pp. 83–103, 1996. ISSN 00166987.
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/29789222.
Esther Duflo. Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in indone-
sia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment. The American Economic Review,
91(4):pp. 795–813, 2001. ISSN 00028282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2677813.
Tim Dyson and Mick Moore. On kinship structure, female autonomy, and demographic
behavior in india. Population and Development Review, 9(1):pp. 35–60, 1983. ISSN
00987921. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1972894.
Avraham Ebenstein and Steven Leung. Son preference and access to social insurance:
Evidence from china’s rural pension program. Population and Development Review,
36(1):47–70, 2010. ISSN 1728-4457. doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00317.x. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00317.x.
183
Michael D Eriksen and Stuart Rosenthal. Crowd out effects of place-based subsidized
rental housing: new evidence from the lihtc pro. Journal of Public Economics, 94(11-
12):953–966, 2010.
J.G. Eriksson, T Forsen, J Tuomilehto, C Osmond, and DJ P Barker. Early growth and
coronary hearth disease in later life: longitudinal study. BMJ, 322(7292):949–953, April
2001.
Shelly Errington. Recasting sex, gender, and power: A theoretical and regional overview.
In Jane Monnig Atkinson and Shelly Errington, editors, Power and Difference: Gender
in Island Southeast Asia. Stanford University Press, 1990.
Erica Field, Omar Robles, and Maximo Torero. Iodine deficiency and schooling attainment
in tanzania. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(4):140–69, October
2009. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejapp/v1y2009i4p140-69.html.
David Figlio, Sarah Hamersma, and Jeffrey Roth. Does prenatal wic participation im-
prove birth outcomes? new evidence from florida. Journal of Public Economics, 93
(1-2):235–245, February 2009. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0047272708001266.
Steven M Fishman, Laura E Caulfield, Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blossner, Adnan A
Hyder, Luke Mullany, and Rober E Black. Childhood and maternal underweight. In
Comparative Quantification of health risks: global and regional burden of disease at-
tributable to selected major risk factors. World Health Organization, 2004.
Joseph Friedman and Daniel H Weinberg. The economics of housing vouchers. Academic
Press, 1982.
Joseph Friedman and Daniel H Weinberg. The great housing experiment. SAGE Publica-
tions, 1983.
184
Ashok Gadgil. Drinking water in developing countries. Annual Review of Energy and the
Environment, 23:253–286, 1998. doi: 10.1146/annurev.energy.23.1.253. URL http:
//www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.energy.23.1.253.
Paul Gertler, James Heckman, Rodrigo Pinto, Arianna Zanolini, Christel Vermeersch, Su-
san Walker, Susan M. Chang, and Sally Grantham-McGregor. Labor market returns
to early childhood stimulation: A 20-year followup to an experimental intervention in
jamaica. Technical report, NBER Working Paper, 2013.
PD Gluckman and MA Hanson. Living with the past: evolution, development, and patterns
of disease. Science, 305:1733–1736, 2004.
Z Griliches. Sibling models and data in economics: beginnings of a survey. Journal of
Political Economy, 87:S37–S64, 1979.
D.J. Gubler, P. Reiter, K.L. Ebi, W. Yap, R. Nasci, and J.A. Patz. Climate variability
and change in the united states: Potential impacts on vector- and rodent-borne diseases.
Environmental Health Perspectives, 109:223–233, 2001. URL http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1240669/.
Monica Das Gupta, Jiang Zhenghua, Li Bohua, Xie Zhenming, Woojin Chung, and Bae
Hwa-Ok. Why is son preference so persistent in east and south asia? a cross-country
study of china, india and the republic of korea. The Journal of Development Studies, 40
(2):153–187, 2003.
Hilary Hoynes, Marianne Page, and Ann Huff Stevens. Can targeted transfers improve
birth outcomes? evidence from the introduction of the wic program. Journal of Public
Economics, 95:813–827, 2011.
Luojia Hu and Analia Schlosser. Prenatal sex selection and girls’ well-being: Evidence
from india. IZA Discussion Papers 5562, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), March
2011. URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp5562.html.
185
Martin Huber. Identifying causal mechanisms in experiments (primarily) based on in-
verse probability weighting. Technical report, University of St. Gallen School of
Economics Working Paper, 2012. URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/usg/econwp/
201213.html.
P.R. Hunter. Waterborne Disease: Epidemiology and Ecology. Wiley, 1997.
Atsushi Inoue and Gary Solon. Two-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimators. The Re-
view of Economics and Statistics, 92(3):557–561, August 2010. URL http://ideas.
repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v92y2010i3p557-561.html.
Brian A Jacob. Public housing, housing vouchers, and student achievement: evidence from
public housing demolitions in chicago. American Economic Review, 94(1):233–258,
2004.
Brian A Jacob and Jens Ludwig. The effects of housing assistance on labor supply: evi-
dence from a voucher lottery. American Economic Review, 102(1):272–304, 2012.
Seema Jayachandran. Selling labor low: Wage responses to productivity shocks in de-
veloping countries. Journal of Political Economy, 114(3):538–575, June 2006. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v114y2006i3p538-575.html.
Seema Jayachandran. The Roots of Gender Inequality in Developing Countries. NBER
Working Papers 20380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, August 2014. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/20380.html.
Seema Jayachandran and Ilyana Kuziemko. Why do mothers breastfeed girls less than
boys? evidence and implications for child health in india. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 126(3):1485–1538, 2011. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/
v126y2011i3p1485-1538.html.
186
Seema Jayachandran and Rohini Pande. Why are indian children shorter than african
children? Technical report, Working Paper, 2013.
Robert Jensen and Nolan Miller. Keepin’ ’em down on the farm: migration and strategic
investment in children’s schooling. Technical report, Working Paper, 2011.
Michael Kevane and David I. Levine. Changing status of daughters in indonesia. Techni-
cal report, Center for International and Development Economics Research, 2003. URL
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0b52v28f.
Sunita Kishor. Gender differential in child mortality: A review of the evidence. In Mon-
ica Das Gupta, Lincoln C. Chen, and T.N. Krishnan, editors, Women’s Health in India:
Risk and Vulnerability. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Jeffrey R Kling, Jeffrey B Liebman, and Lawrence F Katz. Experimental analysis of neigh-
borhood effects. Econometrica, 75(1):83–119, 01 2007. URL http://ideas.repec.
org/a/ecm/emetrp/v75y2007i1p83-119.html.
Gayatri B. Koolwal. Son preference and child labor in nepal: The household impact
of sending girls to work. World Development, 35(5):881 – 903, 2007. ISSN 0305-
750X. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.01.001. URL http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X07000162.
Lori Kowaleski-Jones and Greg J. Duncan. Effects of participation in the wic program
on birthweight: evidence from the national longitudinal survey of youth. special supple-
mental nutrition program for women, infants, and children. Am J Public Health, 92(5):
799–804, May 2002.
M.S. Kramer, F. Aboud, E. Mironova, I. Vanilovich, R.W. Platt, L. Matush, S. Igumnov,
E. Fombonne, N. Bogdanovich, T. Ducruet, J.P. Collet, B. Chalmers, E. Hodnett, S. Davi-
dovsky, O. Skugarevsky, O. Trofimovich, L. Kozlova, and S. Shapiro. Breastfeeding and
187
child cognitive development: New evidence from a large randomized trial. Archives
of General Psychiatry, 65:578–584, 2008. URL http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/18458209.
David Levine and Michael Kevane. Are investments in daughters lower when daughters
move away? evidence from indonesia. World Development, 31(6):1065–1084, 2003.
ISSN 0305-750X. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(03)00050-0. URL http:
//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X03000500.
David I. Levine and Dean Yang. A note on the impact of local rainfall on rice output in
indonesian districts. Technical report, University of Michigan Working Paper, 2006.
Lixing Li and Xiaoyu Wu. Gender of children, bargaining power, and intrahousehold re-
source allocation in china. Journal of Human Resources, 46(2):295–316, 2011. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/uwp/jhriss/v46y2011ii1p295-316.html.
Jeffrey M Lubell, Mark Shroder, and Barry Steffen. Work participation and length of stay
in hud-assisted housing. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 6
(2):207–223, 2003.
V.C. Lucia, Z. Luo, J.C. Gardiner, N. Paneth, and N. Breslau. Reports of birthweight by
adolescents and their mothers: Comparing accuracy and identifying correlates. Paedi-
atric and Perinatal Epidemiology, 20:520–527, 2006.
R. Lukito. The enigma of national law in indonesia: the supreme court’s decisions on
gender-neutral inheritance. Journal of Legal Pluralism, 52:147–167, 2006.
Sharon Maccini and Dean Yang. Under the weather: Health, schooling, and economic
consequences of early-life rainfall. The American Economic Review, 99(3):pp. 1006–
1026, 2009. ISSN 00028282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592491.
188
Karen Macours, Norbert Schady, and Renos Vakis. Cash transfers, behavioral changes,
and cognitive development in early childhood: Evidence from a randomized experiment.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(2):247–73, April 2012. URL http:
//ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejapp/v4y2012i2p247-73.html.
John A. Maluccio, John Hoddinott, Jere R. Behrman, Reynaldo Martorell, Agnes R.
Quisumbing, and Aryeh D. Stein. The impact of improving nutrition during early child-
hood on education among guatemalan adults. Economic Journal, 119(537):734–763, 04
2009. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v119y2009i537p734-763.
html.
Maurizio Mazzocco and Shiv Saini. Testing efficient risk sharing with heterogeneous risk
preferences. American Economic Review, 102(1):428–68, February 2012. URL http:
//ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v102y2012i1p428-68.html.
Annamaria Milazzo. Why are adult women missing? Technical report, Policy Research
Working Paper, 2014.
Bryce Millett and Manisha Shah. The effects of in-utero shocks on cognitive test scores:
Evidence from droughts in india. Technical report, Harvard University, 2012a.
Bryce Millett and Manisha Shah. Could droughts improve human capital? evidence from
india. Technical report, Harvard University Working Paper, 2012b.
Gregory Mills, Daniel Gubits, Larry Orr, David Long, Judie Feins, Bulbul Kaul, Michelle
Wodd, Amy Jones & Associates, Coudburst Consulting, and the QED Group. The effects
of housing vouchers on welfare families. Technical report, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 2006.
Jonathan Morduch. Income smoothing and consumption smoothing. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9(3):103–114, Summer 1995. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/
jecper/v9y1995i3p103-14.html.
189
Oscar Newman. Defensible space: crime prevention through urban design. Macmillan,
1972.
Sandra Newman and Joseph Harkness. Ahousing housing and the educational attainment
of children. Journal of Housing Economics, 9:40–63, 2000.
Philip Oldenburg. Sex ratio, son preference and violence in india: A research note. Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly, 27(49/50):pp. 2657–2662, 1992. ISSN 00129976. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4399215.
Edgar O Olsen, Catherine A Tyler, Jonathan W King, and Paul E Carrillo. The effects of
different types of housing assistance on earnings and employment. Cityscape: A Journal
of Policy Development and Research, 8(2):163–187, 2005.
Philip Oreopoulos. The long-run consequences of living in a poor neighborhood. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 118(4):1533–1575, 2003.
Owen Ozier. Long-term effects of early childhood deworming. Technical report, Develop-
ment Economics Research Group Working Paper, 2011.
Alberto Palloni and Marta Tienda. The effects of breastfeeding and pace of childbearing
on mortality at early ages. Demography, 23(1):pp. 31–52, 1986. ISSN 00703370. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2061406.
Rohini Pande and Nan Astone. Explaining son preference in rural india: the indepen-
dent role of structural versus individual factors. Population Research and Policy Re-
view, 26(1):1–29, February 2007. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/poprpr/
v26y2007i1p1-29.html.
Varsha R. Parchure. Bonds and options: Capital market solutions for crop insurance prob-
lems. Technical report, National Insurance Academy: Pune, 2002.
190
DL Pelletier, EA Fronquillo Jr, DG Schroeder, and JP Habicht. The effects of malnutrition
on child mortality in developing countries. Bulletin of the World Health Organization,
73:443–448, 1995.
Mark M. Pitt and Wendy Sigle. Seasonality, weather shocks and the timing of births and
child mortality in senegal. Technical report, Brown University Working Paper, 2012.
Mark M. Pitt, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Md. Nazmul Hassan. Productivity, health, and
inequality in the intrahousehold distribution of food in low-income countries. The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 80(5):1139–1156, December 1990. URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/2006766.
Mark M. Pitt, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Mohammad Nazmul Hassan. Human capi-
tal investment and the gender division of labor in a brawn-based economy. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 102(7):3531–60, 2012. doi: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3531. URL
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.7.3531.
Nancy Qian. Missing women and the price of tea in china: The effect of sex-specific earn-
ings on sex imbalance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123:1251–1285, 2008. doi:
10.1162/qjec.2008.123.3.1251. URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/
123/3/1251.short.
Lupin Rahman and Vijayendra Rao. The determinants of gender equity in india: Examining
dyson and moore’s thesis with new data. Population and Development Review, 30(2):
239–268, June 2004.
Martin Ravallion and Shubham Chaudhuri. Risk and insurance in village india: Com-
ment. Econometrica, 65(1):171–184, January 1997. URL http://ideas.repec.org/
a/ecm/emetrp/v65y1997i1p171-184.html.
Marie-Claire Robitaille. Determinants of stated son preference in india: Are men and
women different? The Journal of Development Studies, 49(5):657–669, 2013.
191
James E Rosenbaum. Changing the geography of opportunity by expanding residential
choice: lessons from the gautreaux program. Housing Policy Debate, 6(1):231–269,
1995.
Mark R Rosenzweig. Risk, implicit contracts and the family in rural areas of low-income
countries. Economic Journal, 98(393):1148–70, December 1988. URL http://ideas.
repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v98y1988i393p1148-70.html.
Mark R. Rosenzweig and T. Paul Schultz. Market opportunities, genetic endowments,
and intrafamily resource distribution: Child survival in rural india. The American
Economic Review, 72(4):803–815, September 1982. URL http://www.jstor.org/
stable/1810018.
Mark R Rosenzweig and Oded Stark. Consumption smoothing, migration, and marriage:
Evidence from rural india. Journal of Political Economy, 97(4):905–26, August 1989.
URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v97y1989i4p905-26.html.
Mark R. Rosenzweig and Kenneth I. Wolpin. Heterogeneity, intrafamily distribution and
child health. The Journal of Human Resources, 23:437–461, 1988. URL http://www.
jstor.org/stable/145808.
Mark R Rosenzweig and Kenneth I Wolpin. Credit market constraints, consumption
smoothing, and the accumulation of durable production assets in low-income countries:
Investment in bullocks in india. Journal of Political Economy, 101(2):223–44, April
1993. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v101y1993i2p223-44.
html.
Heather Royer. Separated at girth: Estimating the long-run and intergenerational effects
of birthweight using twins. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1:49–85,
2009.
192
Lisa Sanbonmatsu, Jens Ludwig, Lawrence F Katz, Lisa A Gennetian, Greg J Duncan,
Ronald C Kessler, Emma Adam, Thomas W McDade, and Stacy Tessler Lindau. Moving
to opportunity for fair housing demonstration program–final impacts evaluation. Tech-
nical report, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy
Development and Research, 2011.
Mark Shroder. Does housing assistance perversely affect self-sufficiency? a review essay.
Journal of Housing Economics, 11:381–417, 2002.
David Stevens. Employment that is not covered by state unemployment insurance laws.
Technical report, U.S. Census Bureau LEHD Technical Paper, 2007.
James H. Stock and Motohiro Yogo. Testing for weak instruments in linear iv regression.
NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc,
November 2002. URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberte/0284.html.
Tahlim Sudaryanto, Sri Hery Susilowati, and Sony Sumaryanto. Increasing number of
small farms in indonesia: Causes and consequences. Technical report, European As-
sociation of Agricultural Economists, 2009. URL http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
handle/52808.
Scott Susin. Longitudinal outcomes of subsidized housing recipients in matched survey
and administrative data. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 8
(2):189–218, 2005.
Peter A Tatian and Christopher Snow. The effects of housing assistance on income, earn-
ings, and employment. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 8(2):
135–161, 2005.
Robert M Townsend. Risk and insurance in village india. Econometrica, 62(3):539–91,
May 1994. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v62y1994i3p539-91.
html.
193
Penelope Troude, Laurence Foix L’Helias, Anne-Marie Raison-Boulley, Christine Castel,
Christine Pichon, Jean Bouyer, and Elise de La Rouchebrochard. Perinatal factors re-
ported by mothers: Do they agree with medical records? European Journal of Epidemi-
ology, 23:557–564, 2008.
Cesar G Victoria, Linda Adair, Caroline Fall, Pedro C Hallal, Reynaldo Martorell,
Linda Richter, and Harshpal Singh Sachdev. Maternal and child undernutrition: Con-
sequences for adult health and human capital. The Lancet, 371:340–357, 2008.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(07)61692-4. URL http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2258311/.
Carol Vlassoff. The value of sons in an indian village: How widows see it. Population Stud-
ies, 44(1):pp. 5–20, 1990. ISSN 00324728. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2174301.
S.P. Walker, S.M. Chang, M. Vera-Hernandez, and S. Grantham-McGregor. Early child-
hood stimulation benefits adult competence and reduces violent behavior. Pediatrics,
127(5):849–857, 2011.
WHO. Who child growth standards. Technical report, The World Health Organization,
2006. URL www.who.int/childgrowth/standards/Technical_report.pdf.
WHO. Global databse on child growth and malnutrition. web site:
http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/about/introduction/en/index2.html [last accessed:
25 September 2014], 2014.
Guoyao Wu, Fuller W Bazer, Timothy A Cudd, Cynthia J Meininger, and Thomas E
Spencer. Maternal nutrition and fetal development. Journal of Nutrition, 134:2169–
2172, 2004.
Kazuo Yamaguchi. A formal theory for male-preferring stopping rules of childbearing:
194
Sex differences in birth order and in the number of siblings. Demography, 26(3):pp.
451–465, 1989. ISSN 00703370. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2061604.
Kathryn M. Yount. Women’s family power and gender preference in minya, egypt. Journal
of Marriage and Family, 67(2):pp. 410–428, 2005. ISSN 00222445. URL http://www.
jstor.org/stable/3600278.
195
